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Abstract 
The Western European Union was the product of a debate regarding the best means of 
securing Europe. Born at the interchange between the two `ideas' of collective defence and 
European integration, WEU was to be a `hybrid' organisation committed to the support of 
Alliance and Community throughout its existence. Through a full-life examination of the 
institution, this thesis demonstrates that WEU was to provide a vehicle for compromise 
between tensions resultant from divergent perspectives on the desired nature and scope of 
integration and the form and function of alliance. Evolving and devolving its functions 
according to the requirements of maintaining the primary organisations of NATO and the 
EC/EU, WEU's ambiguity as an instrument of alliance and integration enabled it to satisfy 
diverse interests at the highest point of compromise. A life-span analysis of WEU's role 
serves to demonstrate its essential and consistent nature, identifying key areas of tension 
and the means of satisfying them through the development of function. As such, this thesis 
contributes to the understanding of WEU's role over time, whilst illuminating the causes of 
tension between states and providing insight into the means of tension resolution. The 
thesis concludes that WEU was to play a central, if understated and largely 
unacknowledged, role in the maintenance and adaptation of the European security order. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: The Western European Union: Institutional Politics between Alliance 
and Integration 
A cursory examination of the historical development of the Western European Union 
(WEU) would suggest that it has been the product of a distinct lack of vision as to its role. 
With its roots in the early post-World War II enthusiasm for collective European 
behaviour, the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 was to establish the WEU with a broad 
remit and a specific defence guarantee. Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the 
military forces of NATO, the WEU's purely military responsibilities were transferred 
directly to the transatlantic defence alliance and despite the WEU's aims of strengthening 
European peace and security, promoting unity, and working towards the `progressive 
integration' of Europe, ' a gradual erosion of responsibility resulted in it becoming 
essentially a dormant institution in 1973. 
Revitalised in 1984, the WEU increasingly became the focus of debates surrounding the 
development of European security architecture. As a ready formed and institutionalised 
arrangement, the WEU was identified by both sides of the Atlanticist/Europeanist divide as 
a useful tool for transition purposes. A persistent theme of WEU declarations was to be its 
importance in both developing a European Union and in strengthening the European 
component of NATO. Thus, whilst the Maastricht compromise identified WEU as `an 
integral part of the development of the Union' and requested of it that it `elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications', 2 the 
WEU's role was equally defined as a means of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, 
contributing to solidarity and enhancing the capabilities of the European pillar `compatible 
with that of the Atlantic Alliance. '3 
Philip Gordon, one of the limited number of academics to take an early interest in WEU, 
has suggested that `Of all the organisations currently existing in the world, the Western 
European Union (WEU) must be one of those whose length of existence is the most 
'Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Brussels, 17 March 
1948 amended by the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, Paris, 23 October 1954. 
2 Treaty of European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992. 
3 WEU Ministerial Council, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992. 
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inversely proportionate to the actual functions that it has fulfilled. '4 Whilst some have 
simply dismissed it as an institutional aberration, 5 or have suggested that it took on a 
residual institutional momentum of it own, 6 both its longevity and its staggered 
development suggest that it had both served and been responsive in some way to the 
changing requirements and interests of member states within the system. What the WEU 
had actually been for, given the apparent limitations of its substantive functions, has been a 
perennial matter of contention. Indeed, the historiography of WEU is replete with policy 
makers and academics asking the same question: ̀ What is the role of WEU? '7 As the WEU 
effectively reaches the end of its institutional life it would seem timely to address the 
question of how it has contributed to European Security throughout its long and, some 
would argue, inauspicious career. This is the central theme of the thesis as it sets out to 
examine the nature of WEU's role from its origins to its effective demise. 
The thesis 
The central contention of this thesis is that WEU has played a fundamental and significant 
role in managing the tensions inherent within European security structures. Through its 
support role to the primary institutions of defence and integration, the WEU has provided a 
mechanism for compromise between divergent national interests in the pursuit of the core 
requirements of the security order. Given its broad institutional mandate and crossroads 
position between the transatlantic and European constituencies, WEU has had a unique 
role to play in satisfying what have been potentially contradictory security priorities and 
definitions. The thesis contends that resolving the tensions both within and between the 
two primary vehicles for defence and integration has been the WEU's essential raison 
d'etre. Whilst the WEU may have been an institution of only `secondary' importance to 
European Security when compared with the two `big players' of NATO and the EC/EU, its 
role in the maintenance of that Security has been understated in that it has been 
4 Gordon, P. `Does the WEU have a role? ', Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 1997, p. 125. 
5 See for example Mahant, E. Western European Union - or the Reactivation of a Platitude, St Louis, 
International Studies Association (mimeo), 1988. 
6 Forster notes the relevance of these institutional factors when he comments that WEU survived only 
`because it was based on an international treaty, it was a relatively inexpensive institution, and undoubtedly 
its death would have reopened painful debates about how defence issues fitted into the process of European 
integration'. Forster, A. `The Ratchet of European Defence: Britain and the Re-activation of Western 
European Union, 1984-1991 in Deighton, A. (ed. ), Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, 
Integration, Oxford, EIUR, 1997, p. 29. 
7 Schmidt, P. `The Western European Union in the 1990's: Searching for a Role', Strategic Outreach 
Roundtable Paper and Conference Report, Washington, 1993. Haslach, R. `The Western European Union: A 
Defence Organisation in Search of a New Role', Europe, January/February 1991, pp. 17-19. 
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fundamental to the resolution of tensions inherent in the process of developing a coherent 
European security and defence architecture. 
The primary question this thesis addresses is therefore the role that WEU has had over its 
life-time; a contention of this thesis being that the WEU's role and its subsequent 
contribution to European security can only be understood within the context of its hybrid 
nature. As a collective defence organisation with a commitment to `progressive 
integration', the WEU was a representation of two `big ideas' regarding the organisation of 
European security in the post-War world. 8 On the one hand, there was collective defence : 
a traditional idea, although new in terms of peacetime organisation, based in realism and 
externally focussed. The other was integration, internally focused and based on the 
construction of cooperative security through policies of mutual reassurance and enhanced 
interdependence. That these ideas were taken up by other institutions may be seen as an 
expression of WEU's limitations. Indeed, from the outset, WEU may be identified as a 
`second-best' alternative, in contrast with the co-operative arrangements established under 
NATO and the EC/EU. As a defence alliance WEU remained reliant on the external power 
of the United States (US), provisioned through NATO to whom it was to transfer its 
defence competency. As a vehicle for European integration, WEU was kept at a polite 
distance from a European integration process that has shied away from defence in its 
gradual evolution from Communities to Union. Nevertheless the WEU had established 
itself as a support to these two processes and it is in this support role that the contribution 
of WEU to the wider European security environment may be assessed. 
This raises a number of other issues regarding the nature of WEU's role. If WEU was 
established as a support organisation to these dual processes, why was it that this support 
was required? This leads to a consideration of the post war security environment. As 
structural realities drove NATO to become the institutional hub of transatlantic defence, 
European integrative interests were sidelined, but not silenced. European co-operation 
became the home of `low politics' - commerce, trade and agriculture - the Community 
coming to provide `soft security' as a consequence of its internal market and economic 
strength, a feat made possible by its reliance on the US for its `hard politics. ' 
8 Baffles, A. Political Director of WEU, `WEU between the EU and NATO', transcript of speech delivered at 
Helsinki, 9 December 1998. 
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As the constituencies of collective defence and European integration became separated, a 
number of tensions arose both within each arena and between them. For the transatlantic 
alliance US hegemony carried its own difficulties, most notably in terms of burden sharing, 
and acceptance of the terms and conditions of US leadership. Attempts to devise burden- 
sharing schemes that could create something approximating a two-pillar structure 
foundered on the twin reefs of European divisions and American ambivalence. As the 
international threat context altered and the Europeans grew in economic stature, the 
management of alliance relations became a significant issue of concern; differing national 
perceptions of the desired transatlantic relationship serving to undermine consensus and 
limit effective co-operation. 
European nations were also divided in their responses to the political dilemmas posed by 
integration. The scope of integration in terms of membership and functional area were the 
matter of much contention as states sought to satisfy national concerns rather than develop 
any grand vision of co-operation. In terms of a European security dimension for the 
integrating space, the lack of any institutional blueprint for development, led to diverse 
ideas as to the desired `end-state' of the integrative process. Tensions emerged between 
those who sought to match the Communities developing economic power with the high 
politics capabilities of defence and those who sought to develop a `civilian power' Europe 
based on strong economy and `soft-power' capability. 
Both alliance and integration carried costs as well as benefits, this leading to tensions 
within each environment as states sought to mitigate the worst aspects of each whilst 
seeking to drive development in terms of national perceptions of interests. That the two 
constituencies themselves would conflict was inherent in the uneven nature of their 
relations. As the relative power relationship between Europe and the US altered, and 
integrating Europe became less dependent on its American `protector', efforts to assert 
greater authority served to undermine the US leadership position. The central paradox to 
emerge in the management of European security was that, whilst US policy used the 
language of partnership to describe the desired transatlantic `front' against the Soviets, 
they could not accept the loss of leadership that this `partnership' would require. As 
Europeans sought increasing influence over the security environment, tensions emerged 
between `partners', who were frustrated and resentful of each others `unreasonable' 
demands. Distinct strategic visions of Europe's future security order, one European and 
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one Atlantic, were to further complicate the relationship between these two dual 
imperatives of collective defence and European integration. 
Given its dual mandate, the WEU was to encompasses two different sets of interests that 
sat more or less uncomfortably side by side for states as well as institutions. The 
compromises that states made were possible because they held both sets of interests in 
mind in terms of satisfying their security needs. Indeed, the WEU Treaty was in many 
ways an expression of the basic fact that states may hold both building Europe and Atlantic 
solidarity as central interests. That these interests may be at odds with each other has 
become something of a truism and has been the subject of a debate well played out in both 
policy and academic literature. The extent and method by which states develop a 
propensity to find a compromise between these interests will be consequent on both 
parochial self-interest and the international environment. Hence, both of these must be 
considered. What is clear is that the development of the WEU has taken place within the 
context of these changes and its history is inherently woven into the institutional web of 
the two other evolving dynamics. But more than that, it is the contention of this thesis that 
resolving the tensions both within and between these two central interests has been the 
WEU's core business. 
Whilst role can only in part be understood in terms of formal function, an examination of 
function can provide us with some insight into what has driven development. It becomes 
clear from an historical examination of WEU that its functions have evolved and devolved 
over time. Whilst the original arms control function of WEU was to be dropped in 1984, its 
political function was to evolve and devolve between 1955 and 1970, whilst its operational 
function was to develop in the 1980s. Rees has identified the multifunctional nature of 
WEU and, whilst focussing essentially on the post-Maastricht environment, recognises that 
these functions have changed `according to the demand of the time'. 9 Pijpers pursues the 
idea of functional evolution and devolution when he suggests that, in responding to the 
`internal' problems of inter-state relations, WEU had acted as a `first aid' organisation, 
only emerging to provide the `crutches to get Europe back on its feet again'. lo 
9 Rees, G. W. The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans Atlantic Solidarity and 
European Integration, Oxford, Westview, 1998, p. 131. 
10 Pjipers. A. `Western European Union and European Political Co-operation: Competition or 
Complementarity', in Tsakaloyannis, P. (ed. ), The Reactivation of the WEU; The Effects on the European 
Community and its Institutions, Maastrict, EIPA, 1985, p. 78; Borcier, P. The Political Role of the Assembly 
of WEU, Paris, WEU Assembly, 1963, p. 49, refers to it as a `duty doctor on call'. 
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Consequently, WEU evolves when its `competitors' are unhealthy and devolves when they 
are not. The argument that WEU only appeared when the fault lines or inadequacies of 
other organisations become evident is also made by Schmidt who states that WEU's 
functions were `upgraded only when the desired progress in the preferred organisation 
failed to materialise or when problems and difficulties occurred which could not (initially) 
be settled within the framework of that organisation. ' 11 In this sense, WEU was a ̀ forum of 
convenience', 12 the extent to which it enabled other alliance and integrative developments 
to take place largely determining its activities and development. 
WEU's crossroads position between NATO and the EC/EU13 had led to the uneasy task of 
meeting a range of frequently competing or contradictory interests. Consequently, Clerk 
has referred to WEU as a `political football between two much bigger teams' reacting to 
the requirements of these ̀ bigger' organisations. 14 In the same vein, Rees has asserted that 
`Throughout its long life, the WEU has suffered from being an actor caught in the ebb and 
flow of a debate between two larger organisations, NATO and the European 
Community/European Union. ' 15 Whilst both of these contentions may be true, the 
contribution that WEU was able to make to the European security order was in terms of its 
influence on these two primary organisations. In this sense, WEU had not `suffered' but 
had thrived on the ebb and flow that was to provide its raison d'etre and life-blood. 
The hybrid nature of the organisation and the ambiguity of its position have been its 
positive and enduring characteristics. Its ability to be all things to all people, to bend and 
adapt to meet interests that had been at times inherently conflictual, had `oiled the works' 
of the broader security framework. 16 On the one hand WEU had been the means of 
managing inter-state diversity with regard to both transatlantic and European defence co- 
11 Schmidt, P, `The WEU- a Union without perspective? ', Aussenpolitk, Vol. 37, Pt. 4,1986, p. 389. 
12 Gambles, I. Prospects for West European Security Cooperation, Adelphi Paper 244, London, IISS, 1989, 
p11. 
13 Eekelen. W. van. `The WEU is a crossroads institution', International Defense Review, Vol. 3,1990, 
pp. 261-262. 
la Clarke, M. `Book Review of Deighton', Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 18, No. 1, April 1997, p. 199. 
15 Rees, op. cit., 1998, p. 130. 
16 Cornish, P. `European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO', International Affairs, Vol. 
72, No. 4, October 1996, p. 768, refers to WEU as `the lubricant in the relationship between NATO and the 
EU, for as long as these institutions differ in their membership'. 
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operation, '7 preventing stagnation in both processes. On the other, it had a significant role 
in resolving or satisficing the contradictions or tensions which had emerged from the 
relationship between the Atlantic and European processes, for states, between states and 
between institutions. Acting as a `pivot' the WEU joined the Atlantic and European 
constituencies of defence and integration, enabling both to develop and change shape 
without disconnecting one from the other. 18 Its fundamental ambiguity and widely cast 
core functions enabled it to provide an arena for compromise. As a forum for `safe' 
multilateralism, selective interpretation of VWEU's activity resultant from its ambiguous 
nature enabled the highest point of compromise and co-operation without undermining 
either of the primary organisations. Whilst WEU may have been an institution of only 
`secondary' importance to European Security when compared with the two `big players' of 
NATO and the EU, its role in the maintenance of that Security may has been understated in 
that it had been fundamental in the resolution of the tensions inherent in the process of 
developing a coherent European security and defence architecture. 
This study examines the development of WEU from its wartime origins to the present day. 
Its purpose is to assess the role played by WEU in the European institutional environment 
and to identify the impact of multilevel factors on its development. From the vantage point 
of 2002, the thesis provides an original full-life developmental history, enabling the 
identification of patterns of development through time and the consistency or otherwise of 
factors of influence on that development. This thesis contributes to the existing body of 
literature concerning WEU and adds to the security studies literature, providing a clearer 
understanding of how European security co-operation has developed in the form of WEU 
over time and how this relates to the issues being addressed in European security. By better 
defining WEU's security role, this thesis provides a complement to the broader theoretical 
debate. 
The development of WEU is identified over given periods through an examination of 
treaty provision, institutional structures and the scope of institutional function, including its 
range of activity, its membership, and its capabilities. Such an examination however, 
provides us with little more than a `snap-shot', and requires contextualisation within a 
broader picture of structural change, national priorities and imperatives of key players and 
17 Deighton suggests that WEU `reflects the continuing differences between European states themselves 
about their interests and how best to upgrade them'. op. cit., 1997, p. 170. 
" Cutlieiro, J. 'WEU's Pivotal Position Between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union', Address to 
the Association for Western Co-operation, Reykjavik, 12 September 1996. 
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inter-governmental bargaining that represent the developmental environment. By 
examining these developments within this broader context, light is shed on the utility of 
WEU in meeting the diverse interests of its membership. Placed in its historical context, 
this analysis illuminates the factors that influenced WEU's development and serves to 
highlight areas of continuity and change. 
This examination also raises a range of broader analytical problems that are further 
explored within the thesis. Most significantly, the thesis addresses the tensions that exist 
both for and between states in the management of their security interests, tensions most 
evident in balancing their approach to European construction with their interests in 
transatlantic cooperation for defence. Through the examination of how, when and why 
WEU has been utilised by states it is possible to identify where tensions lie within 
European security interests. Hence, through a consideration of the constraining and 
motivating factors influencing the preferences of states, in terms of the compromises they 
seek within WEU, it is possible to gain some insight into the substance of those tensions 
and the factors that influence them. 
In its broadest sense the thesis provides an insight into the influences on institutional 
development and the complexity of the interplay between factors. Whilst WEU 
development was a response to the compromise made both between national priorities and 
inter-state interests, when these interests diverged, it was also a product of institutional 
`form', definitional ambiguity and environmental or external/structural change. This thesis 
attempts to illustrate the point that an over-emphasis on any single approach leads to a 
`distorted' image that impedes effective understanding and ̀ interpretation' of events. 
Sources 
This thesis draws on a broad range of primary and secondary sources. The breadth of 
sources is in part a consequence of the limited academic scrutiny of WEU until recent 
years, itself a product of the general perception of the institution as being of limited utility 
and potential. For the historical periods examined, it has been necessary to draw on a broad 
range of literature, the contemporaneous nature of many of these sources providing a 
contextualised understanding of the relevant issues. Progress from the Brussels Treaty to 
the European Defence Community (EDC) negotiations, the failure of which had direct 
effect on British proposals for WEU, has been well documented in the secondary 
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literature. 19 However, an examination of the passage from EDC to the ratification of the 
Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 has been limited20 and, in the light of NATO and EC 
ascendance, WEU receives little attention in the period from 1955 through to the 1980s, 
featuring only at times of alliance or community crisis as an appendage to the 
consideration of these `primary' institutions. 21 Consequently the literature provides only a 
partial view of WEU's development. Whilst the significance of the inter-relationship 
between Atlantic Alliance and the integrative process in Europe is recognised in much of 
the literature during these times of reflection, the specific implications for WEU receive 
limited attention. 22 The revitalisation of WEU in 1984, following many years of inactivity, 
was marked by an increased interest in the Union reflecting a growing debate polarised 
along the lines of Atlanticism versus Europeanism, itself a reflection of declining alliance 
cohesion and enhanced European assertiveness. 23 
This thesis has drawn on the significant body of literature from the 1980s which addresses 
the problems arising from the Transatlantic relationship and which considers US/Western 
European relations in the light of an increasing recognition of a need to shift the balance 
within the relationship. 24 In the post-Maastricht and post-Rome environment, given the 
debate regarding European and Atlantic futures, WEU did become an object of intellectual 
debate and, despite limited `exclusive' analysis in the secondary literature, 25 the thesis has 
19 Fursdon, E. The European Defence Community. A History, London, Macmillan, 1980. The European 
Defence Community: A History, 1980; Riste, O. (ed. ), Western Security: The Formative Years, Oslo, 
Norwegian University, 1985. 
20 Leites, N. and De La Malene, C. 'Paris from EDC to WEU', World Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2, January 1957. 
1957; Deighton. A, `The last piece of the Jigsaw: Britain and the creation of the WEU, 1954', Contemporary 
European History, Vol. 7, No. 2,1998, pp. 181-196. 
21Thus in the 1960's, with French withdrawal from the integrated command structure of NATO, and in the 
1970's with the perennial burden sharing debate and the coinciding Community developments, the role of 
WEU within one or other arena was the topic of limited debate. For the 1960s see Camps, M. What Kind of 
Europe, Oxford, OUP, 1965; Cleveland, H. The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals, New York, McGraw- 
Hill, 1966. For the 1970s, see Gordon, C. `The WEU and European Defence Cooperation', Orbis, Vol. 17, 
No. 1,1973, pp. 247-257; Burrows, B. and Irwin, C. The Security of Western Europe, London, Charles 
Knight, 1972. 
22 Jaquet, L. European and Atlantic Co-operation, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965; Pick, O. `Atlantic 
Defence and the Integration of Europe', Atlantic Communities Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1972, 
pp. 174-185. 
23 Poos, J. F. `Prospects for the WEU', NATO Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, August 1987, pp. 16-19; Palmer, J. 
Europe Without America, Oxford, OUP, 1988. 
24 Alford, J and Hunt, K. (eds. ), Europe in the Western Alliance. Towards a European Defence Identity, 
London, Macmillan, 1988; Clarke, M. and Hague, R. European Defence Co-operation. America, Britain and 
NATO, Manchester, Manchester University press, 1990. 
25 Eekelen, W. van. 'WEU's Post-Maastricht Agenda', NATO Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, April 1992, pp. 13-17; 
Duke, S. `The Second Death (or the Second Coming? ) of the WEU', Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 34, No. 2, June 1996, pp. 167-190. 
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drawn on the broader literature regarding the relationship between security and integration 
in Europe26 and the future of the transatlantic relationship. 
27 Most significant amidst the 
small number of recent publications directly addressing WEU, Van Eekelen's portrayal of 
his years as WEU Secretary General provides an insider's view of the organisation's 
development between 1989 and 1998,28 whilst the Rees and Deighton texts deal essentially 
with the contemporary relevance and recent development of the institution. 
The thesis makes use of a wide range of primary sources throughout the historical 
examination. The Public Records Office (PRO) documents provide contemporaneous 
evidence of policy attitudes and direction. Access to the restricted DG1 files on Western 
Union was particularly informative on the early debate regarding the institution and its 
place in the evolving security architecture. Official documents from NATO, the EC/EU 
and WEU have also been utilised, most notable amongst these being the WEU Assembly 
Reports which have served to articulate the various interests of member states both in the 
development of WEU and with regard to broader security concerns. Newspaper articles 
have provided further evidence of the issues of relevance in their contemporary setting. 
The thesis also draws on a range of interviews conducted at national and international 
institutions, interviews with two of the former Secretary Generals providing particular 
insight into the subtleties of institutional development. 
Thesis structure 
The development of the Western European Union has been examined within the time 
periods representative of institutional change. Thus the years from 1948 to 1954 may be 
identified as the period resulting in the `birth of the Union', followed by the period from 
1954 to 1973 which covers the `fall' of the institution from activity to dormancy. The 
period from 1984 to the major structural transformations of the international system in 
26 Jopp, M., Rummel, R. and Schmidt, P. Integration and Security in the Western Europe - Inside the 
European Pillar, Boulder, West View Press, 1991; Regelsberger, E., Schoutheete, P. de Tervarent. and 
Wessels, W. Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder Colorado, 
Lynne Rienner, 1997. Duke, S. The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP, Macmillan 
Press, London, 2000 
27 Cromwell, W. C. The United States and the )uropean Pillar, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1992. Featherstone, 
K. and Ginsberg, R. H. The United States and the European Community in the 1990s: Partners in Transition, 
New York, St Martins Press, 1993. 
28 Eekelen, W. van. Debating European Security 1945 - 1998, SDU Publishers, The Hague, 1998. 
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1989 represents a period of `revitalisation of the WEU', followed by the post-Cold War 
period of challenges and opportunities from 1989 to 2001. 
Chapter 2 traces the origins of WEU from the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, to the Brussels 
Treaty of 1948, through the EDC debates and on to the establishment of WEU in 1954. 
This examination demonstrates that WEU was the product of a debate on the nature of the 
future security order for Europe. The dominance of the two central ideas of collective 
security and European integration are illustrated through the Western Union debates, the 
Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self- 
Defence reflecting these dual interests. Whilst the structural realities of the period were to 
lead to an acceptance of defence dependency through NATO, the alliance requirement for 
a German defence contribution in the light of the Soviet threat, led to French pursuit of an 
integrative answer to the immediate problem of German rearmament. British Atlanticism 
and French fears of the supranationalism inherent in the European Defence Community 
project led to the eventual WEU compromise, the British commitment to continental force 
deployment and `token' acceptance of the pursuit of `progressive integration' enabling the 
acceptance of a security order for Europe based on the dominance of the Atlantic defence 
structure. 
Chapter 3 covers the period from WEU's inception in 1954 to its retreat into Ministerial 
hibernation in 1973. In a discussion of the political and military dimensions of WEU 
development during this period this chapter examines how tensions resultant on differing 
national perspectives on the preferred scope of integration combined with concerns 
regarding the efficacy of alliance to determine the functional development of WEU. What 
is evident during this period is the lack of consensus on WEU's role, as diverse national 
interests led to the development of function on an ad hoc basis rather than in accordance 
with any grand vision or plan. British resistance to a defence role for WEU on Atlanticist 
grounds, is contrasted with its encouragement of WEU's political role as a lever for further 
British interests in accession to the European Economic Community in the light of Gaullist 
resistance. European concerns over their control and influence of alliance nuclear strategy 
led to debates on the acceptable levels of dependence and served to undermine WEU's 
arms control function as states sought to develop independent capabilities. Efforts to utilise 
WEU for arms co-operation were promoted largely in response to British concerns 
regarding `unacceptable' Franco-German-Italian developments in the field and came to 
little in the face of national resistance. Whilst WEU alternatives for nuclear sharing were to 
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be considered during this period of alliance tension, WEU was to prove of limited utility 
for the development of a more balanced alliance partnership due to British insistence on 
NATO precedence and, following French departure from NATO's military structure in 
1966, French rejection of WEU as an `Anglo-Saxon' organisation. With British accession 
to the Communities in 1973, the political function of WEU was transferred to the EPC and, 
given the lack of main player interest in further exploiting its potential defence role, the 
Ministerial Council ceased to meet. 
In Chapter 4, the motivations behind WEU's revitalisation in 1984 are explored. Tensions 
had emerged within the Alliance as a consequence of the apparent inconsistencies in 
American policy. Satisfaction with American leadership had declined as European foreign 
policy perspectives increasingly diverged from those of their American ally, Reagan's 
arms control unilateralism and Strategic Defence Initiative contributing to a sense of 
strategic incoherence within the alliance. At the same time, French and German efforts to 
develop a European security dimension within the EC had come up against significant 
resistance from those who sought to maintain Europe's `soft power' status. Consequently, 
the interests of European states converged on WEU, as a vehicle for influencing NATO 
strategy and enhancing European defence dialogue in the absence of a Community based 
alternative. British concerns regarding the possibility of alienating the US with too 
vigorous moves towards a European defence identity, prevented tangible progress. 
Nevertheless, the Platform document was evidence that, despite differing national 
perspectives over the alliance and integration processes, there were convergent areas of 
concern. As such, the debates could be `sold' as contributing both to the Atlanticist and 
Europeanist visions. In its iterative adaptation and development, WEU served as a symbol 
for Atlanticist co-operation and the development of a European security identity. 
Chapter 5, covering the period from the end of the Cold War up until WEU's demise, 
begins by examining the processes leading to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and 
subsequently charts the development of WEU's functions in response to the debate taking 
place at the national and institutional level with regard to the future direction of the 
integrative process in Europe, the continuing relevance of NATO and the transatlantic 
security link. The main issues during this period concerned the future scope of European 
defence integration and the continuing efficacy of NATO given the demise of its 
competing Super-power. These interests again converged in WEU: the development of its 
operational capabilities reflecting the emerging European security dimension and 
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contributing to the re-balancing of the trans-Atlantic Alliance and the emergence of a 
European defence competency. By the inclusion of neutral and `enlargement' states, WEU 
continued to fulfil its dual support role and allowed for the re-positioning of the primary 
institutions within the changed security order. Whilst revealing the limitations of European 
defence capability, WEU envisioned a pragmatic re-alignment of the European security 
order that demonstrated the compatibility of the development of a European crisis- 
management capability with the interests of a broader defence alliance. It thus, became the 
architect of its own demise. 
The thesis concludes by identifying the general themes that emerge from the historical 
analysis. The role of WEU as a support organisation to the two primary institutions of 
alliance and integration is established and the consistent nature of this role is identified. 
The functional evolution and devolution of WEU is explained in terms of this support role, 
WEU responding to meet the challenges presented by changing national and structural 
imperatives. Whilst the benefits of WEU's broad mandate and key state membership are 
identified as significant in its ability to carry out its support function, the thesis contends 
that, in the light of the historical evidence, WEU's ambiguity was its main strength, 
enabling ostensibly divergent interests to converge and inherent tensions to be relieved. In 
this way, WEU was to facilitate the gradual transformation of the institutional frameworks 
of European security and in so doing, it satisfied its core role as a support organisation to 
the processes of collective defence and European integration. 
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Chapter 2 
Birth of the Union: 1945-1955 
Introduction 
In 1955, as a consequence of the signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty in October 1954, 
the WEU was to emerge as an element of the institutional order of post war Europe. Whilst 
the Union's ascendance was to be short-lived, quickly to be outshone by NATO and the 
emerging European Community, the WEU was to have a significant influence on the 
development of this new European security order. The route to WEU lies along the path 
leading from the initial debates regarding the very nature of post war security and the 
appropriate mechanisms for its management. This chapter begins by tracing the 
development of these debates from the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, to the Brussels Treaty of 
1948 and on through the failed European Defence Community negotiations leading to the 
eventual modification of the Brussels Treaty in 1954. Through an examination of the 
central influences and interests at play in the development of the final compromise, 
articulated and institutionalised in the WEU, this chapter seeks to address the central 
question of the thesis: what role was WEU to fulfil in the management of European 
security? 
That tensions existed between two central aims of Europeans in their search for a new post 
war European Security order is evidenced by the early Western Union debate. In 
establishing the requirements of collective defence and broader European collaboration, 
the Western Union concept was to reflect two distinct security `images', one structurally 
dependent on a transatlantic constituency for Alliance predicated on external threat, the 
other reflecting the promise of internal security through European integration. These dual 
`images' raised contentious issues as to the acceptable nature of transatlantic relations and 
the scope and extent of desired European integration. That WEU was finally established as 
a support institution, intended neither as the centre of a defence alliance nor as the 
institutional hub of integration, was a reflection of the inherent tensions that existed both 
within and between these two central images. As the division of `low politics' integration 
and defence was to be provisioned through the development of the `primary' organisations, 
NATO and the emerging European Communities, WEU served to `fill the gaps' left where 
these two images met. In articulating a European identity in defence and a commitment to 
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progressive integration, WEU was to provide the `balm' that enabled an acceptance of 
defence dependency, thus facilitating the establishment of a security architecture that was 
to provide the basis of the new European security order. 
The early years 
The WEU has its roots in the security debate of the final years of the Second World War. 
Weakened and demoralised by this second major conflict of the century, the European 
allies sought to find a better means of managing future European relations. The American 
presence in Europe provided immediate reassurance, but fears of a resurgent Germany 
combined with recognition of general European decline, led many to seek alternative 
solutions to the seemingly intractable problem of constructing a stable Europe. Whilst talks 
on the development of a collective security regime under a 'United Nations' began amongst 
the major allied powers as early as 1941, the conflict-preventing potential of co-operative 
and integrated behaviour in the European arena was beginning to foster interest in elite 
European circles. Discussions regarding West European security arrangements had 
consistently taken place between the French and British since 19401 and had been 
encouraged by the smaller West European governments in exile. 2 
Within the British Foreign Office planning for `peacetime' West European co-operation 
began in the last years of the war. Most notable was the 'Jebb report' of June 1944 that 
envisaged a `United Nations Commission for Europe'. Under this a West European system 
of mutual defence pacts would balance a parallel Soviet arrangement to form a wider 
`dumbbell' balance of power in Europe. 3 The alternative view held by Prime Minister 
Churchill, along with the War and Colonial Office, was that an alliance with the Western 
Europeans could act as the wartime cordon sanitaire against the Soviets, whilst the 
'These discussions had a significant history. See for example Shlaim, A. 'Prelude to Downfall: the British 
offer of Union to France, June 1940', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9,1972, pp. 27-63 and Baylis, J. 
'Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 5,1982, p. 236 
who refer to the 'Declaration of London' of June 1940, a failed offer of a Franco-British Union covering 
defence, foreign, finance and economic policy as well as joint citizenship. 
2 See PRO: CAB 66/48: W. P. (44)181, Belgium's Foreign Minister Spaak, 'The Future of Europe', 3 April 
1944. Spaak sought British approval for a customs union between Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg 
(who subsequently agreed to form the primarily economic Benelux alliance on 5 September 1944) and 
France, adding that the Belgians and Dutch were keen to develop European military agreements, including 
Britain, at the conclusion of the war. % 
3 Based initially on an Anglo-French arrangement, the plan envisaged common military planning and the 
standardisation of armaments. It was envisaged that this dumbbell would (with the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 
1942) establish a balance that would prevent future German aggression. See Baylis, J. 'Britain, the Brussels 
Pact and the Continental Commitment', International Affairs, Vol. 60,1984, p. 616. 
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continuation of the alliance with the US would be the key to meeting the Soviet threat. 4 
Rising concerns regarding this threat and the potential requirement for a German 
contribution to meet West European security needs were recognised in the response of the 
Chiefs of Staff to the Jebb proposals and in the following plans drawn up by the Post 
Hostilities Planning Staff within the Foreign Office. 5 Whilst the plan concluded that it was 
vital that Britain form a West European Security Group, including the French, the Benelux 
and Scandinavian countries and possibly even Germany, this organisation should co- 
operate with the Commonwealth and the US with the intention of eventually establishing a 
North Atlantic organisation to counter the Soviet threat to Western Europe. 
The election of a Labour Government in July 1945 led to the appointment of a new British 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who was sympathetic to the Foreign Office concept of a 
'Western Union' based on close Anglo-French co-operation. 6 Whilst Bevin was a keen 
supporter of the Anglo-American relationship he foresaw the possibility of a 'fortress 
America', protected economically by a high tariff wall, and thus the need for some level of 
European economic independence from Washington. By turning the Foreign Office 
'defence first' approach 'on its head', Bevin sought an economic partnership as the basis of 
an Anglo-French relationship in which military co-operation would be an indirect result. 7 
He was to write to the French socialist Leon Blum in September of 1945, that his policy 
was `aiming at increasing economic and cultural co-operation in the hope that out of such 
8 co-operation should arise a common outlook in defence matters'. Thus Bevin's view of a 
Western Union was based on economic co-operation and an Anglo-French axis, supported 
by the development of an internationally controlled Ruhr, severing from Germany its 
4 Churchill had fully prioritised the Soviet threat by the time of famous 'Iron Curtain' speech in Fulton, 
Missouri on 11 March 1946. The struggle between Churchill's 'overcurrent' and the Foreign Office's 
'undercurrent' raged even after the change in government in 1945. See Wiebes, C. and Zeeman, B., 'The 
Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: The Launching of the North Atlantic Treaty', International Affairs, Vol. 
59,1983, pp. 351-63. 
5 PRO: CAB 81/95: PHP 44: 27 (0), Final, 'Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic', 9 November 
1944. 
6 For Bevin's views expressed during discussions within the Foreign Office and Cabinet between 10 and 17 
August 1945 see PRO: FO 371/49069: Z9595/13/17 and PRO: FO 371/45731: UE3683,3689/3683/53. For 
history of western bloc idea up to this point see PRO: FO 371/49069: Z9639/13/17. 
The traditional view that Bevin's interest in European co-operation was only as a means of persuading the 
US to guarantee West European security (see Manderson-Jones, R. B. The Special Relationship: Anglo- 
American Relations and Western European Unity 1947-1956, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972) has 
been questioned by others who suggest that Bevin had some real enthusiasm for economic, commercial and 
political co-operation between Britain and other Europeans. See Rothwell, V. Britain and the Cold War, 
1941-47, London, Cape, 1982; Greenwood, S. 'Ernest Bevin and "Western Union"', August 1945 - February 
1946', European History Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3,1984, p. 325. 
8 PRO: FO 371/49069: Z11077/13/17,21 September 1945. 
16 
economic potential for aggression and with the `long term objective [was] to make the 
Ruhr industries the central pivot in the economy of an eventual 'western union'. '9 
Whilst a partnership with the US may have been Bevin's `preferred option', this 
`compromise solution' of Western Union was further promoted by Soviet antagonism and 
American unilateralism at the London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in September- 
October 1945 which did much to increase Bevin's interest in establishing a strong Anglo- 
French axis as a potential 'third force' between the Superpowers. 10 He approached French 
Foreign Minister Bidault on the day after the conclusion of the Council meeting to propose 
opening negotiations on an Anglo-French treaty. 11 
The foreign policy of the French Fourth Republic had been largely inherited from De 
Gaulle's provisional government of 1944 to 1945.12 The containment of Germany was 
central in French deliberations and, it was recognised, this could only be achieved by a 
combination of political, economic and military factors. The internationalisation of the 
industrial Ruhr and the return to France of the Saar region13 would be a central plank in the 
policy of denial of German economic and military capabilities, whilst alliance formation, 
the benefits of which had been proven too slowly mobilised to secure immediate French 
interests, remained of secondary relevance. 
Whilst De Gaulle believed that the future security of Europe would require economic and 
military co-operation between France, the Benelux states and possibly Britain, he sought 
9 Bevin's ideas about the Ruhr were welcomed by the French, but not shared by the British Foreign Office 
who saw the potential for a German nationalist backlash at any attempt at dismemberment. See PRO: FO 
371/46723: C 6134/22/18,16 September 1945. 
10 On Bevin's views on a 'third force' see Williams, F. Ernest Bevin, London, 1952, p. 262; Larres, K. 'A 
Search for Order: Britain and the origins of a WEU, 1944-55' in Brivati, B. and Jones, H. (eds. ), From 
Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1993, 
p. 72. 
11 The 'Harvey minute' of 9 January 1946 represents the high point of Bevin's Western Union plans, outlining 
his policy to `work steadily towards the closest co-operation and integration economically, socially and 
militarily with our Western neighbours without, at this stage, creating any formal regional group'. PRO: FO 
371/59911: Z 2410/120/72. See Deighton, A. The Impossible Peace; Britain, the Division of Germany and 
the Origins of the Cold War, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 37-46. 
12 See Fremeaux, J. and Martel, A. 'French Defence Policy 1947-1949' in Riste, O. (ed. ), op. cit, p. 92. 
13 Ceded to France in 1919 as war compensation, the Saar had been administered by the League of Nations 
until returned to Germany under the plebiscite of 1935. The French were to give the area autonomy from 
Germany as well as economic union with France after the Second World War, creating significant Franco- 
German tension. For French post war interests see Young, J. W. Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 
1945-1951, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1990, p. 14; DePorte, A. W. De Gaulle's Foreign Policy 
1944-46, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 126-152. 
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essentially an economic association through a customs union of West European states 
which `would seem to constitute a central pillar in a world organisation of production, 
trade and security' . 
14 The persistence of a strong colonial orientation to French foreign 
policy in the immediate post war years was a reflection of the benefits seen to accrue from 
French overseas possessions during the war and the foothold that these might provide for 
the status of France between the two emergent superpowers. 
The British government's rejection of the removal of the Ruhr from Germany on 17 April 
1946,15 acceptance of which had been a precondition of French participation in an alliance, 
was largely a response to the increasing political instability in France that had undermined 
British enthusiasm for an Anglo-French Alliance. 16 The offer made by US Secretary of 
State Byrnes in the same month of a twenty-five year four-power treaty for the 
demilitarisation of Germany suggested a level of American engagement with Europe that 
would be preferable to any Anglo-French arrangement. '7 Whilst Bevin's interest in a 
customs union for Europe resulted in some minor agreements with France on the removal 
of destructive economic practices in the autumn of 1946, the notion of an Anglo-French 
cornerstone to a Western Union had been all but abandoned. 18 The negotiations that 
followed the Anglo-French Communique of 16 January 1947 focused specifically on the 
development of a treaty against German aggression. 19 
The Dunkirk Treaty 
Signed on 4 March 1947, the Anglo-French 'Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance', 
known as the Dunkirk Treaty, consisted of a bilateral agreement to provide for each other 
`all the military and other support and assistance' possible and was specifically aimed at 
14 De Gaulle to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, March 1944. in Young, op. cit., p. 13. 
15 PRO: CAB 128/15: CM(46)36. British occupation of the Ruhr had left it with control over much of 
Germany's coal supplies. 
16 Following the establishment of a Communist majority in the French National Assembly after the October 
1945 elections and President De Gaulle's resignation from his weak coalition government on 20 January 
1946, the possibility of civil war in France seemed real. See PRO: FO 371/59957: Z745/21/17. 
17 See PRO: FO 371/67670: Z1215/25/17 and PRO: FO 371/67671: Z2190/25/17. See Bullock, A. Ernest 
Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, London, Heinemann, 1983, p. 359. 
18 See PRO: FO 371/599 11: Z 10754/120/72, Ronald Memorandum, 13 March 1946. 
19 Blum's caretaker administration, which was to hold power from mid December 1946 until the Constitution 
of the Fourth Republic became operative on 17 January 1947, had expressed a wish to establish further co- 
operation with Britain at the unauthorised prompting of the British Ambassador in Paris, Duff Cooper. 
Charmley, J. 'Duff Cooper and WEU 1944-47', Review of International Studies, Vol. 11,1985, pp. 53-64. 
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the containment of any future German revanchism. 
20 In the absence of an Anglo-French 
consensus on a still prostrate Germany, the Dunkirk Treaty may seem to have offered little 
more than the 'gilding for the pill that no coal was available', the offer of alliance simply 
shoring up the French government at a time of instability and persuading it to give up its 
plans for the Ruhr as the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference on Germany began. 21 
Whilst Krieger has argued that, for these reasons, the Treaty of Dunkirk cannot be seen as 
the forerunner of the Brussels Treaty, 22 it may be regarded as a pragmatic response to an 
uncertain future. As Larres points out, it `would allow Britain to either take the road to 
reliance on a Western European Union or to opt for pursuing the path of Atlantic Alliance' 
dependent on whether US support would be forthcoming. 23 
The elucidation of the Truman Doctrine on 11 March 1947 and the concomitant US 
acceptance of responsibility for Greece, Turkey and Iran served to convince the British 
government that the Americans were indeed prepared to tie themselves, if loosely, to a 
defensive system with Western Europe against the Soviet threat. Followed in June by the 
Marshall Plan for economic aid to Europe, 24 American commitment seemed assured and 
became central to British policy planning thereafter. Thus it has been argued that, whilst 
the Marshall plan may have appeared to enhance European unity by encouraging Western 
co-operation in the economic field, it actually cut short any further developments along the 
path of true European independence in defence as the British moved solidly down the 
Churchill line, tying the United Kingdom as closely as possible to the US. 25 
20 Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Dunkirk. Cmd. 7217, London, HMSO, 1947, signed 4 March 
1947. 
21 See PRO: FO 371/67686: Z 269/119/17, Hall-Patch minute, 4 January 1947. See Greenwood, S. 'Return to 
Dunkirk: the Origins of the Anglo-French Treaty of March 1947', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 4,1983, 
pp. 49-55. 
22 Krieger, W. 'Foundation and History of the Treaty of Brussels, 1948-1950' in Wiggershaus, N. and 
Foerster, R. (eds. ), The Western Security Community: Common Problems and Conflicting National Interests 
During the Foundation Phase of the North Atlantic Alliance, Oxford, Berg, 1993, p. 23 1. 
23 Larres in Brivati, op. cit., p. 83. The dominant view, articulated by Baylis, op. cit. 1982, identifies the 
Dunkirk Treaty as the first tentative step by the UK toward alliance creation with the US, resulting in the 
Brussels Treaty and NATO as a natural consequence of post war Foreign Office planning, although the 
uncertainty as to the prominence of the German or Soviet threat is reflected in the uneasy progress toward 
NATO. 
24 Secretary of State George Marshall's speech at Harvard University, 5 June, 1947 led to the meeting of 14 
nations in Paris of 27 July 1947 to discuss the implications and management of American aid for Europe . 
This in turn led to the formation of the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in Paris, 
the European Payments Union and the European Recovery Programme. 
25 Talks on closer Anglo-French economic co-operation during August 1947 stumbled as Bevin rejected the 
integration favoured by the French and Americans. See Newton, S. 'Britain, the Sterling Area and European 
Integration', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 13, No. 3,1985, pp. 163-168; Zeeman, B. 
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The failure of the London talks on the future of Germany, held in the concluding weeks of 
1947, prompted further discussions in Washington on the consolidation of a western 
position on the German question and on the future security order of Europe more 
generally. 26 By January 1948 the British Ambassador to Washington was able to provide 
Secretary of State Marshall with a summary of the Western Union plan. 27 The new treaty 
was to be dual purpose, offering the French security against any future German revanchism 
and laying the foundations for a future Atlantic agreement aimed against the Soviets. In his 
Commons Speech of 22 January Bevin stated, `We shall be hard put to it to stem the 
further encroachment of the Soviet tide.. . 
This in my view can only be done by creating 
some form of union in Western Europe.... This need not take the shape of a formal 
alliance.... It does, however, mean closer consultation with each of the Western European 
countries, beginning with economic questions'. 28 
Whilst Bevin's apparent enthusiasm for the economic elements of the Western Union plan 
may have been at least partially driven by a desire to sweeten the pill of collective 
defence, 29 it was the defence elements which dominated the Foreign Office and Cabinet 
discussions following his Commons speech. 30 Bevin's preference was not for a formal 
regional grouping as was to emerge in the Brussels Pact, but rather a series of bilateral 
treaties based on the Dunkirk model. Pressure from the Benelux countries and the US 
persuaded him, by February of 1948, to accept a wider multilateral framework of defence 
guarantees which would leave the way clear for eventual German inclusion and the 
'Britain and the Cold War: An alternative approach; the Treaty of Dunkirk example', European History 
Quarterly, Vol. 16,1986, pp. 343-367. 
26 During the London talks Bevin had aired his concept of Two Circles of defence, the first represented by a 
tight inner core of West European states and the second by a looser arrangement including the US and 
Canada. See Ferrel, R. H. 'The Formation of the Alliance, 1948-1949' in Kaplan, L. S. American Historians 
and the Atlantic Alliance, Ohio, Kent State University Press, 1991, pp. 22-23. 
27 Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS), 1947, Vol. 3, pp. 4-5. Inverchapel to Marshall. 
28 Hansard, Vol. 446,22 January 1948, Cols. 387-409. 
29 See Bevin's conversation with French Ambassador, PRO: FO 371/73047: Z1308 16 February 1948 which 
states, 'HMG however, wished to present the whole Western Union project in all its aspects of economic, 
cultural and overseas co-operation, as well as defence. We wanted to show people that there was a positive 
reorganisation of the West, and not give any impression that we were simply preparing for defence, which in 
its turn might have an unfortunate effect upon the Soviet Union'. This document identifies a continuing 
interest in strengthening Europe's position visa a vis the US, Bevin going on to state that 'I was convinced 
that we should be able to deal with other parts of the world including America better if the western world 
were more united and did not operate in separate units'. 
30 See Bullock, op. cit., pp. 516-7. 
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development of a wider European security system which might be directed against the 
Soviet threat. 31 
As major communist-led domestic unrest erupted in France, the Prague coup of February 
1948 provided the impetus for agreement between the French and Anglo-American 
positions on Germany's Western zones by illustrating the linkage between the continuing 
American presence in Germany and the Soviet threat. 32 Whilst continuing to harbour 
concerns about the Atlantic idea, not least that it might exasperate the Russians and had 
implicit in it a concession on German reconstruction and eventual rearmament, 33 the 
French Administration were moved to recognise the benefits to be accrued by an alliance 
with the developing Western bloc. 34 
During the Brussels Conference that followed35 the US Administration 'warmly welcomed 
Mr Bevin's initiative toward the formation of a `western union'. However, it was made 
clear that only 'when there is evidence of unity with a firm determination to effect an 
arrangement under which the various European countries are prepared to act in concert to 
defend themselves, the US will carefully consider the part it might appropriately play in 
support of such a Western European Union'. 36 Inverchapel was aware that acceptance of 
the European Recovery Programme by Congress was due to its presentation as a means of 
creating a `climate of peace' in which countries could build up their own economic and 
defensive structures. Asking Congress for a military guarantee to West European security 
at that time could mean that the arguments for ERP 'would be blown to bits'. 37 However, 
the British Ambassador was informed that it was 'virtually unthinkable' that the 'de facto 
guarantee' provided by occupying American forces in Europe would be withdrawn before 
31 For the US view see FRUS, 1948, Vol. 3, p. 7. Hickerson to Marshall. For Benelux views see Report of 
Luxembourg's Foreign Minister, Mr Beech's, meeting at the Foreign Office, PRO: FO 371/73047: Zl 116,10 
February 1948; and Reports to the Foreign Office on Spaak's views, PRO: FO 371/73046: Z894,3 February 
1948 and PRO: FO 371/73047: Z1250 13 February 1948. 
32 At the London Four Power Conference (19 February to 6 March 1948) the full association of the western 
zones of Germany in the European Recovery Programme were agreed, having been previously resisted by the 
French who sought national economic recovery in advance of any support for German redevelopment. See 
Communique issued at the recess of the London Conference, FRUS, 1948, Vol. 2, pp. 142-3. 
33 Melandri, P. 'France and the Atlantic Alliance 1950-1953: Between Great Power Policy and European 
Integration', in Riste, op. cit., p. 268. 
34 See Fremeaux in Riste, op. cit., pp. 95-97. 
3s 6 March to 17 March 1948. See PRO: FO 371/73046-51 for details of negotiations. 
36 PRO: FO 371/73046: Z896G, Lovett to Inverchapel, 3 February 1948; FRUS, 1948, Vol. 3, pp. 46-48, 
British Embassy to the Department of State. 
37 See PRO: FO 371/73046: Z1060/G, Lord Inverchapel to Foreign Office 7 February 1948 
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January 1949 'when the incoming Administration and Congress should be in a position to 
consider a more permanent and formal type of guarantee'. 38 Thus, the Americans were 
seeking a holding measure - offering the potential of American involvement in European 
defence if the Europeans could demonstrate their own collective capabilities, when the 
ERP issue had been resolved and after the forthcoming US elections. 39 
The Brussels Treaty 
Britain, France and the Benelux states signed the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence on 17 March 1948.40 The treaty 
provided a substantive and definite collective defence commitment whereby signatories 
were obligated, in the case of an armed attack in Europe on any member, to "afford the 
Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power". 41 Whilst 
specifically identifying the potential German threat, 42 the treaty was to provide for mutual 
assistance against any antagonist in the European arena. The title and content of the Treaty 
also suggest a wide based role in terms of the promotion of European co-operation. In 
identifying the `common heritage' of signatories, and `convinced of the close community 
of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery 
of Europe' the Treaty committed member states to `strengthen the economic, social and 
43 cultural ties by which they are already united' . 
At an institutional level, the Brussels Treaty provided little in terms of organisational 
direction, being rather a statement of obligation than an organisational blueprint. Whilst the 
treaty did provide for the establishment of a Consultative Council of Foreign Ministers on 
a purely intergovernmental basis, the resultant organisational development would seem to 
38 PRO: FO 371/73047: Z1210, Washington to Foreign Office, 13 February 1948. 
39 For further discussion of the details of the process toward agreement on the Brussels Treaty see Ireland, 
T. P. Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty, Aldwych Press, London, 
1981, Chap. 2. 
ao Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence on the 17 March 
1948, Cmd. 7599, London, HMSO, 1948. 
41 Article IV of the Brussels Treaty. This contrasts with the rather more vague and general cultural and social 
commitments of the Brussels Treaty and with the forthcoming NATO Article 5 position which commits its 
signatories merely to take such action as they 'deem necessary, including the use of armed force' in the case 
of armed attack on other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
42 Brussels Treaty Preamble - `take such steps as may be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of 
a policy of aggression' and Article VII - 'the Council shall be immediately convened... with regard to the ... 
steps to be taken in case of the renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy'. 
43 Brussels Treaty Preamble and Article I. 
22 
have been a response to the requirements of the treaty's broad agenda. 44 A Permanent 
Commission of Ambassadors of the member states in London was established to act on 
behalf of the Consultative Council when it was not in session, along with Committees of 
experts on economic, social and cultural issues. 45 
Given the clear military incapacity of the member states, the requirement for some 
collective defence planning beyond simple mutual guarantees was recognised in the 
establishment of a defence organisation under the direction of the Consultative Council and 
its Ministerial Defence Committee. Assisted by the first peacetime Chiefs of Staff 
Committee and a Military Supply Board, the Western Union Command Organisation, 
headed by a Commanders in Chief Committee was established at Fontainebleau ̀ to study 
tactical and technical problems of Western European defence'. 46 
What are clear in the treaty provision of the Brussels Pact are the identity of interest 
between military defence and the broader context of regional security. Whilst military 
provision may secure external borders, internal co-operation and cohesion, promoted at 
both the military and non-military level ensured the structural basis for effective collective 
defence and the functional and psychological conditions of security. At the level of treaty 
declaration and institutional form, the Brussels Treaty articulated a broad remit for 
security, where defence guarantees where accompanied by community building activities 
in the areas of `low politics'. However, that the Brussels Treaty was ever intended to 
establish the institutional hub for the satisfaction of either of these interests is contentious. 
In terms of collective defence, that the Brussels Treaty was ever intended as anything more 
than a means of gaining American aid and eventual American entanglement has been 
questioned. Whilst Gaddis has argued that British interests in establishing Western Union 
as a `third force' were genuine, US aid being sought only as a short term imperative, 47 
44 Robertson argues that `the authors of the treaty evidently did not intend to create a new international 
organisation; nevertheless, the force of events was such that they did in fact do so, for the simple reason that 
the measures of international co-operation resulting from the treaty could not be realised without the 
necessary international machinery'. Robertson, A. H. European Institutions, New York, Praeger, 1959, p. 127. 
45 The US and Canada formed a close association with the treaty organisation as observers. See CI, 'Western 
Union : Political Aspects', The World Today, Vol. 5, No. 4, April 1949, pp. 170-78. 
46 For institutional details see Palmer, M. and Lambert, J. European Unity: A Survey of the European 
organisations, London, Allen and Unwin, 1968, Chap. 9. 
47 Gaddis, J. L. `The United States and the Question of a Sphere of Influence in Europe 1944-49' in Riste, op. 
cit.; Kent, J. and Young, J. `The "Third Force" and the Origins of NATO - in Search of a New Perspective' in 
Heuser, B. and O'Neill, R. Securing Peace in Europe 1945-1962, London, Macmillan, 1992. 
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Larres has argued that the `third force' perspective of the Western Union was never more 
than 'a contingency plan to face the problems of the post-war world without being able to 
rely on Washington'. 48 The evidence does seem to suggest that the Marshall Plan had done 
much to reassure the British regarding American commitment to Europe and Bevin's 
Western Union (WU) initiative was a reflection of his overriding interest in securing an 
American responsibility for European security. Hence, the Brussels Treaty has been 
identified as 'less a matter of creating joint forces than of forming 'a union of concerned 
parties able to facilitate the implementation of American military assistance'. 49 
As a means of engaging the Americans the Brussels Treaty would seem to have been most 
successful. It is no coincidence that on the very day on which the Brussels Treaty was 
signed, President Truman was to address the US Congress, stating that `I am sure that the 
determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an 
equal determination on our part to help them protect themselves'. 50 In fact even before the 
Brussels Treaty had been signed a date was fixed for the secret 'Pentagon Talks' between 
the US, Canada and the United Kingdom. 51 Much against the advice of the US military 
establishment, which feared entanglement with a militarily weak and arsenal-depleting 
Europe, the administration began talks that resulted in NSC9,52 the National Security 
Council paper that opened the way for a 'Collective Defence Agreement for the North 
Atlantic'. 
At the first meeting of the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff of the WU powers on 30 
April 1948, it had been agreed to draw up strategic plans and aims on the basis of available 
forces and weapons so as to co-ordinate rearmament. 53 However, there was continuous 
controversy between the Brussels Treaty powers regarding their respective contributions to 
WU, not least because of national concerns that US-stipulated defence spending would 
48 For Larres, the Dunkirk Treaty represents the high point or 'decisive junction' in the development of a truly 
European co-operative perspective in defence. Lames in Brivati, op. cit., p. 85. 
49 Chauvel, J. Commentaire d Alger a Berne (1944-1952), Paris, Fayard, 1972, p. 267. 
50 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Washington D. C., Office of the Federal Register, 
National Archives and Records Service, 1953, p. 184. 
51 See Bullock, op. cit., p. 530. 
52 For the first of 3 versions of NSC 9 on 'The position of the United States with Respect to Support for 
Western Union and Other Related Countries', (the first version being issued 23rd April 1948), see FRUS, 
1948, Vol. 3, pp. 100-101. 
53 PRO: DG 1/5, Defence Ministers and Chiefs Of Staff Meeting. 
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undermine economic reconstruction. 54 Despite US pressure for high visibility of European 
collective defence efforts, 55 and the increased European perception of Soviet threat in light 
of the `Prague Putsch' and the blockade of Berlin, the adoption of NSC 14 (1 July 1948) 
facilitating US procurement of military aid for Europe, resulted in WU concerns focussing 
on `the filling of its needs by American aid, rather than implementing or seriously 
formulating plans for pooling its own resources, standardising weapons, or expanding 
military production'. 56 As early as September 1948, Western Union's dependence on 
Washington had been acknowledged and effectively `institutionalised' when it had been 
agreed that WU military planners could work on the assumption that, following 
Presidential approval, US occupation forces would be placed under Western Union 
command in time of war. 57 
The reluctant acceptance of the limited 'strategic plan' of the Western Union in November 
194858 reflected the growing desire within the US Administration to get military aid to 
Europe as quickly as possible to meet the growing Soviet threat, and in a manner 
acceptable to Congress and the American people. It was to take significant pressure from 
the Americans to persuade the member states of the WU to pool any resources, organise a 
level of weapons transfer and put forward a comprehensive Short Term Strategic plan by 
the end of March 1949.59 By this time, it had become increasingly clear that the lack of 
military power at the disposal of the five nations60 in terms of manpower, equipment and 
sa The five powers had to agree a defence budget of $325 million for 1949-1950 in order to get US support. 
PRO: DG 1/9/52, Jebb to Douglas, 14 May 1948; PRO: DG 1/1, Permanent Consultative Council with Finance 
and Defence Ministers present 14-15 March 1948. 
55 N. S. C. 9/3,28th June 1948; FRUS, 1948 Vol. 3, pp. 140-141. 
56 Kaplan in Riste, op. cit., p. 113. The five Brussels powers proved reluctant to undertake major military 
efforts and maintained individual, national and imperial interests which US involvement enabled the 
Europeans to develop and maintain. See Lundestad, G. 'Empire by Invitation. The United States and Western 
Europe, 1945-1952', SHAFR Newsletter, Vol. 15, No. 3,1984, pp. 1-21. 
57 Thus Montgomery, as Chairman of the Commanders in Chief Committee of the Western Union, was to be 
replaced by an American in time of war. PRO: DG1/5/30, Record of Meeting Defence Ministers and Chiefs of 
Staff 27/9/48. Also see PRO: DG 1/9/52, Draft directive with Annex I FP (48)41,30 September 1948. 
58 This `plan' involved a summary of forces available for mobilisation in 1949 if the equipment could be 
obtained, a position which the US Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted as if these were real achievements. 
59 See PRO: DG 1/5/32, Memo by Defence Committee 23/3/49; MD (49) 7,28 March 1949. 
60 Western Union resistance to US calls for the inclusion of strategically important 'stepping stone' states such 
as Iceland, Denmark and Portugal were seen as simply concerns about sharing the Military aid `pie'. As the 
US Military Assistance Programme became available to all NATO partners, WU was not to take on the role 
of allocating body of US aid. Krieger in Wiggershaus, op. cit., p. 244. 
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resources would prevent the Brussels Treaty Organisation from developing into an 
independently effective military shield. 61 
The Vandenburg resolution of 11 June 194862 having removed much of the constitutional 
difficulties for US participation in any defence alliance, agreement was finally reached on 
the principles of a defensive North Atlantic pact to include the Brussels Treaty powers, the 
US and Canada, and in addition Norway, Denmark, Italy, Iceland and Portugal. 63 The 
North Atlantic Treaty, a simple, short and non-discriminatory agreement, was signed on 4 
April 1949. The Western Union was to serve as a regional planning group for NATO 
whilst its Supply Board and Finance and Economic Committee were to be absorbed by the 
organisation. In succeeding in 'entangling' the Americans in an Alliance that Osgood has 
referred to as creating 'an obvious profitable balance of assets over liabilities for all its 
signatories', 64 the Western Union powers had effectively 'subverted the stated goal of a 
self-reliant European Union' implicit in European notions of a Third Force. 65 
Nevertheless, as a vehicle for `economic, social and cultural collaboration' the Brussels 
Treaty represented something of a first step on the path towards a greater European unity. 66 
Providing for a level of intergovernmental consultation and co-operation in the areas of 
low politics, the treaty acknowledged some level of integrative aspiration amongst the 
European powers. 67 However, the lack of political consensus regarding the nature, 
purpose and scope of co-operation, most particularly between the British and the others, 
was reflected in the treaty provisions. Explicitly providing for the development of 
61 As Montgomery was moved to report in a secret telegram to the War Office in London, 'My present 
instructions are to hold the line at the Rhine. Presently available allied forces might enable me to hold the tip 
of the Brittany peninsula for three days. Please instruct further. ' Cited in Ferrel in Kaplan op. cit., p. 14. 
62 Joint Resolution 239, Congressional Record, Vol. 94,80 Congress, 2nd session, 11 June 1948, p. 7791. 
63 For Minutes of the Washington Explanatory Talks see FRUS, 1948, Vol. 3, p. 240, especially 
`Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks 6th July-9th September'. 
64 Osgood, R. op. cit., p. 31. 
65 Kaplan in Riste, op. cit., p. 122. 
66 Bevin's recognition of the potential for a Western Union contribution toward the incremental development 
of a federal state or political union was noted in his House of Commons speech in May 1948 where he stated 
that 'in the world of international politics one is forced to proceed step by step'. Cited in Barker, E. Britain 
in a Divided Europe. 1945-1970, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971, p. 81. 
67 As early as September 1946 Churchill had called for a United States of Europe during his Zurich speech 
and had established a United Europe Committee in London by January 1947. By the end of that year an 
International Committee had formed, the ideas of a United Europe being reinforced at the 1948 Hague 
meeting of the International Committee of Movements for European Unity that effectively launched the 
European movement. See Churchill, R. S. (ed. ), The Sinews of Peace: Post-war Speeches by Winston S. 
Churchill, London, Cassell, 1948, p. 199, for his Zurich speech. 
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economic co-operation within other fora, co-operation that it was committed not to 
duplicate but rather to assist, the Brussels Treaty effectively established itself as a support 
for alternative European collaborative ventures. 68 
Just as the Western Union Defence Organisation of the Brussels Pact was to serve as a 
`preparatory move toward NATO' , 
69 its social and cultural activities were to provide an 
example for the establishment of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1949.70 In October 1948 
the WEU's Ministerial Council had established a Committee on European Unity to seek to 
form a European Assembly to promote the unification of Europe. British resistance to 
French federalist leanings in the construction of an autonomous parliamentary Assembly71 
led to an eventual compromise agreement, by January 1949, on the establishment of a 
Council of Europe, consisting of a Council of Foreign Ministers and a Consultative 
Assembly, where decisions would be taken on the basis of Council unanimity. 72 The 5 )VU 
states were to be joined by Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Sweden in setting up the 
Statute of the Council of Europe on 5 May. However, the aim of the Council was vague, 
seeking 'to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding 
and realising the ideals and principles which are the common heritage, and facilitating their 
economic and social progress'. Whilst the presence of the UK restricted any federative 
development within the new Council, the Council was to provide an arena in which much 
of the debate regarding the future integration of Europe was to be articulated. 
Consequently, it might be argued that the Brussels Treaty Organisation contributed to its 
own relative decline. Once it had established itself with the dual aims of promoting low 
politics collaboration and collective defence, the establishment of NATO and the Council 
of Europe helped to push the Brussels Treaty to the periphery of international relations. 
68 Co-operation under the Brussels Treaty was not to `involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of 
other economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on 
the contrary assist the work of those organisations'. Author's emphasis, Brussels Treaty, Article 1. 
69 Holborn, H. 'American Foreign Policy and European Integration', World Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, October 
1953, p. 15. 
70 WU did achieve a high degree of co-operation in such areas as social security, war pension and health 
provision, manpower and the exchange of workers, and the rehabilitation and resettlement of the disabled. 
Cultural co-operation between the five was promoted through bilateral cultural convention and cross-cultural 
contact, particularly aimed at the young and government officials. See Central Office of Information, 
Western Co-operation -A Handbook, Paris, WEU, 1955, pp. 73-81, also Third Report of the Council to the 
WEUAssembly, Doc. 79, February 1958, pp. 28-45. 
71Whilst it is true that the British resisted greater powers for the Council, Elizabeth Baker, in her examination 
of the negotiations, notes that 'how much further other West European governments would really have been 
prepared to go if Britain had not acted as a brake and an alibi, is not at all certain'. Barker, op. cit., p. 84. 
72 See PRO: DG1/3/13. French Prime Minister Bidault's speech at the 2°d Session of the Consultative Council, 
`Federation of Europe', The Hague, 20 July 1948. 
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The EDC, NATO and the German problem: the parting of the ways. 
By the London Foreign Ministers Conference in May 1950, divergent national interests 
and perceptions were already beginning to produce signs of strain as competitive forces 
reasserted themselves in Europe. 73 The Soviets had broken the US' nuclear monopoly in 
September 1949 and the communist invasion of South Korea in June 1950 had 
demonstrated Europe's potential vulnerability to conventional Soviet attack. Whilst 
Truman sought increased US troop deployment and military assistance for Europe through 
the Mutual Defence Aid Program, the limitations of the NATO position became clear. 74 
Without a coherent and co-operative West European effort the Alliance's future, and 
indeed the future security of Western Europe itself, looked increasingly bleak. As the issue 
of German participation in the European security system became a central focus of the 
debate, contending national preferences became increasingly evident. 
In Great Britain, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had come to see the Atlantic Community 
as the only sure basis for the integration of Western democracies, enabling them `to 
withstand the great concentration of power now stretching from China to the Oder'. 75 As a 
`great power' Britain was keen to promote its special relationship with the US, a 
relationship which would require `a sustained political, military and economic effort', 76 
and to offer paternalistic encouragement to a European process from which it was 
geographically, historically and politically removed. 77 Whilst there were still those within 
73 See PRO DEFE 7/529 36B, Speaight, Foreign Office Information Policy Department to A. J. Newling, 
MOD, 7 January 1950. This memorandum refers to the need to counter the French view that `... our [UK] 
preoccupation's are with the Commonwealth and the United States rather that Europe, that we are anyway 
selfish and insular people who are apt to neglect the claims of their friends, except when we want something 
from them, and that therefore we are only half hearted over Western Union defence and are once again 
leaving it to the French to do the dirty work'. 
74 Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, was to note at the time of Alliance's first Medium-Term 
Defence Plan, April 1950, that NATO members had 14 divisions without adequate reserves and deployed 
without regard for their operational role and 1000 aeroplanes as against 175 Soviet divisions and 20,000 
planes. Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1955, p. 29. 
75 PRO: CAB 128/17, Cabinet 29th Meeting, 8 May 1950. 
76 PRO: PUSC (51) 'Anglo-American Relations - Present and Future', 28 April 1950, CAB 21/1761. The 
centrality of NATO to Anglo-American relations was clearly noted and the importance therefore of making 
the alliance work as the centre-piece of American policy in Europe, especially as 'the Americans do not 
hesitate to scrap ruthlessly something which is not working well'. 
" At odds with Continental Socialists, the British Labour Government rejected supranational integration in 
Europe, maintaining that national economic controls and the preservation of Commonwealth and the US 
relations were paramount in meeting the broad range of British commercial, resource and security interests. 
See Labour Party Publication (LPP), Cards on the Table: An interpretation of Labour's Foreign Policy, 
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the British establishment who were sympathetic to the idea of British leadership of a purely 
West European partnership to counter the weight of both Soviet and American power, 78 the 
dominant view within government had swung towards Atlanticism. The problem of 
Germany's position in the new Europe could be managed within this new American led 
order, wherein a 'rehabilitated' Germany could contribute to the security interests of the 
Western world, whilst West German rearmament would have the positive effect of 
diverting capital away from the West German economy, benefiting British industry which 
was unable to compete whilst committed to rearmament itself. 79 
The French had long held to the idea of a united federal Europe and had been disappointed 
by the purely consultative, rather than parliamentarian, nature of the Council of Europe in 
1949.80 Inspired by such great integrationists as Jean Monnet, and helped by the perceived 
ineffectuality of the French political process hampered by communist and Gaullist 
interests, the idea of a new form of European government had substantial support within 
the French political elite. Concerns regarding the Soviet threat and the limits of European 
capability had led the French to accept the necessity of the North Atlantic Alliance, but the 
search for a European answer to French concerns was still a central plank of French policy 
debate. 
Consequently, when the North Atlantic Council, meeting in September 1949, tasked the 
French Foreign Minister with finding a solution to the thorny problem of German 
participation in Europe, the resultant `Schuman Plan' reflected French predilection for 
integrative answers to broader political and security problems. 81 By the establishment of an 
organisation for the common production of coal and steel, governed by a supra-national 
authority, the states of Europe could not only contribute to the redevelopment of these 
essential industries, but, in turn, make war between France and Germany `not merely 
London, 1947; LPP, European Unity, Statement by the N. E. C. of the Labour Party, London, 1950; LPP, 
Problems of Foreign Policy, London, 1952; 'The Socialist Parties and European Unity: a British Labour Party 
View', The World Today, Vol. 6, October 1950, pp. 415-423. 
78 Perhaps most notable amongst these was the British Ambassador in Paris, who saw a European Alliance as 
`so mighty that no power on earth would have dared to challenge it'. Cooper, D. Old Men Forget, London, 
Rupert Hart-Davis, 1954, pp. 344-347. 
79 Whilst Bevin managed to obtain Cabinet acceptance of the principle of German participation in western 
defence, there was a great deal of opposition within government. See Bevin telegrams 13 and 14 September 
1950, PRO: PREM 8/1429/1: CM(50), 58th Conclusions, Minute 1, CAB 128/18,15 September 1950. 
80 Dockrill, S. `The Evolution of Britain's Policy Towards a European Army, 1950-1954', Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 1989, p. 40. 
81 See Acheson, D. Present at the Creation, Norton, New York, 1969, p. 326; Pinder, J. European 
Community; The Building of a Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 1. 
29 
unthinkable but materially impossible. '82 Thus the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), which was to finally emerge in June 1952,83 was the next step in a movement 
towards a level of European unity consistently encouraged by the US and formerly 
expressed through official co-operation within the OEEC. 
Equally, in terms of Europe's defence role the French line had been the converse of the 
British. Rather than subsuming Europe within a Transatlantic defence force dominated by 
the Superpower relationship, the French had seen Europe's future position as that of a 
`third world power' that could act independently of both Superpowers. 84 For the French, 
still smarting from the last bout of German occupation, West German rearmament needed 
to be prevented at all costs, particularly whilst the French army was so highly committed in 
south-east Asia. However, the French were inextricably dependent on American aid in 
support of their military campaign, support that the Americans were initially prepared to 
give only as a means of returning the French forces to Europe so that they might participate 
more fully in an integrated defence strategy for Western Europe. 
Despite French resistance to any attempts at rehabilitating Germany, the British and 
Americans succeeded in promoting three-power agreement on the establishment of a new 
German Federal Republic with limited powers under the Basic Law of 23 May 1949. This 
led in turn to the election of the Adenauer government and the creation of the Federal 
Republic on 20 September 1949. Following the Bundestag vote of 26 July 1950, the 
German federal government was directed to follow a policy aimed at creating a European 
federal state, 85 European integration providing the vehicle for the rehabilitation of 
Germany by accommodating the sensitivities of her European neighbours. 86 However, 
82 Fursdon, E. 'The Role of the European Defence Community in European Integration', in Heller, H. and 
Gillingham, J. R. NATO: the Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, New York, St 
Martins, 1992, p. 218. 
83 The ECSC was signed by the six Foreign Ministers representing France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux 
states on 18 April 1951, and ratified in June 1952. Whilst 'sympathetic' to the ECSC idea, the British 
Government rejected the French proposals on constitutional grounds. Hansard, Vol. 476, June 1950, Col. 
1918. 
84 See in Warner, G. `The British Labour Government and the Atlantic Alliance, 1949-1951', in 
Wiggershaus, op cit., p. 152. 
85 `A resolution shall be submitted to the Council of Europe demanding that a supra-national federal 
organisation be created in Europe, which is to base itself on universal, free elections and which shall possess 
legislative, executive and judicial powers'. Cited in Hallstein, W. 'Germany's Dual Aim: Unity and 
Integration', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 1, October 1952, pp. 58-66. 
86 ̀Above all, other countries trust in Germany must be restored. That is the task which cannot be completed 
in three or six or even ten years. To win that trust we must have great patience, great tenacity, we must try to 
advance step by step', Adenauer, K. World Indivisible, London, Allen & Unwin, 1956. p. 34. 
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from 1950 onwards Chancellor Adenauer had been harassed by socialist opposition that 
saw too close a relationship with the 'West', particularly in defence, as creating 
unnecessary tensions with the Soviet Union, undermining the central interest of 
reunification by deepening German divisions and permitting the growth of militarism. 
Some on the right urged abandonment of the Western orientation in German policy in 
order to play East against West. 87 Whilst there was a general consensus on rearmament 
within the governing coalition on the grounds of expediency and the hope of normalising 
Germany's position within Europe, German public opinion was essentially pro-neutral and 
anti-rearmament. 88 Even those in favour of rearmament were not prepared either to put 
economic recovery at risk, or be led to contribute to European defence simply in terms of 
immediate Alliance manpower requirements. 
During the September 1950 meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in New York, 
the 'package proposal' was presented by the Americans. This made US implementation of 
its promised troop reinforcement in Europe, and the establishment of an integrated defence 
force under an American NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, dependent on Allied 
agreement to the formation of German divisions within NATO. Whilst the issue of how 
this was to be achieved was left open, it was clear that, as far as the Americans were 
concerned, the principle was not debatable. The resultant Three Power Communique began 
the process of West German `rehabilitation', including a defence commitment to the FRG 
and West Berlin in the case of attack. 89 It also signalled the revision of occupation status 
and the granting of new powers to the Federal government, although it was noted that the 
constitution of a German national army would serve no one's interests. 90 Despite the 
implications of the Communique, the French, increasingly isolated within NATO, refused 
to accept the principle of German contributions under SACEUR. 
87 See Craig, C. From Bismarck to Adenauer. Aspects of German State-Craft, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 
1958, p. 142. 
88 See Hanreider, W. West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, California, Stanford University Press, 1967, 
p. 105. 
89 Communique of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the US, New York, 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, No. 587,19 September 1950, pp. 530-531. See Manderson-Jones, op. 
cit., 1972, p. 97. 
90 On 26 September the NAC formally accepted the principle of Germany military assistance. See Bebr, G. 
'The European Defence Community and the WEU-an Agonising Dilemma', Stanford Law Review, 1955, 
pp. 169-236. Thus the East-West rift had resulted in a significant change from the Potsdam position which 
had envisaged the complete disarmament and de-militarisation of Germany, including the elimination of any 
military production facility. See Department of State, 'Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents', Vol. 
48, Publication No. 3556, European and British Commonwealth Series, No. 9,1950. 
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The EDC 
Whilst debates went on within the NATO context as to the future role of Germany within 
the alliance, the possibilities of a European initiative in defence had begun to take shape. 
91 
During debate in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in August 1950 the 
UK Leader of the Opposition, Winston Churchill, was to surprise his audience by 
suggesting a 'European army', and subsequently accepting the Assembly's Resolution 
calling for its creation 'under the authority of a European Minister of Defence, subject to 
proper European democratic control and acting in full co-operation with the United States 
and Canada'. 92 
France had wanted assurances that German rearmament would not constitute a threat to 
France, and that the benefits laid out by the US `package proposals' would be gained. In 
the absence of a French alternative, Monnet suggested that `our resistance will have proved 
futile. We shall lose face, and lose the political initiative'. 93 The subsequent Pleven Plan, 
laid before the French Assembly on 24 October 1950, envisaged the creation of a European 
Army of a supra-national character by merging military units `at the level of the smallest 
possible unit', financed by a common budget, under the leadership of a European Minister 
of Defence responsible to a Council of Ministers and a Common Assembly. 94 The Army 
would initially consist of around 100,000 men, and would include West German units. At 
the same time NATO members would retain their national forces, integrated under NATO, 
to which would eventually be added the `federal unit' of the European Army. This would 
retain national forces for all NATO members except Germany, whilst allowing Germany to 
contribute to the defence of Europe. 
For France, the plan would not present the problems inherent in the American proposals 
for placing Germany forces directly into NATO. A possible resurgence of German military 
power under the NATO plan could mean that the American presence would be 
indispensable for the future security of Europe, a scenario not favoured by the French. The 
91 H. G. L. 'The European Defence Community', The World Today, Vol. 8, No. 6, June 1952, p. 237. 
92 `We should make a gesture of practical and constructive guidance by declaring ourselves in favour of the 
immediate creation of a European Army under a unified command, and in which we should bear a worthy 
and honourable part', Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Second Session 1950, Official Report, Part 
1, p. 228- 
93 Monnet, J. Memoirs, London, Collins, 1978, p. 345. 
94 For the Pleven Proposals see Journal Officiel, Debates, 25 October 1950, pp. 7118-7119. 
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French alternative could, on the other hand, lead to the creation of a European Third Force, 
an idea close to French hearts, whilst at the same time stimulating the US to fulfil some of 
the promises in the 'package proposals'. The Pleven plan can thus be seen as heavily 
motivated by a recognition of immediate defence dependency on the US. It was essentially 
a `negative contrivance', in that, like the Schuman Plan before it, it was an attempt to deal 
with the immediate problem of Germany and was driven by fears of an unacceptable 
NATO alternative. 95 
Despite initial US scepticism, Pleven succeeded in persuading Truman, during his visit to 
Washington in December 1950, to hold off on any final decision over the German issue 
until negotiations on a European option had a chance to succeed. 96 The compromise 
reached in NATO in the same month, known as the Spofford plan, found agreement on the 
principle that Pleven's plan could be adapted so as to permit German troops in combat 
groups of less than 6,000 men on the basis of one German group to five from other 
participating countries and that the European army should have German units within it 
from the outset, although there would be no German War or Armaments Ministry. 
In the early months of 1951 two sets of negotiations were inaugurated, those on the 
European Army in Paris, and those on the direct re-militarisation of Germany within 
NATO to be held in Petersberg, near Bonn. As a consequence of this compromise the US 
agreed to implement the `package proposals', thus separating the German question from 
the immediate issue of establishing an integrated NATO force under General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander. With the appointment of SACEUR, and the 
establishment of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), modelled 
on the WU's Headquarters in Fontainebleau, the defence planning and military functions of 
the Brussels Treaty Organisation were effectively subsumed into NATO. 97 The Brussels 
95 ̀Before the United States Government insisted that there should be German troops to defend Germany and 
Europe nobody had thought seriously of an integrated European army. RIIA. Britain in Western Europe: 
WEU and Atlantic Alliance, London, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 30. 
96 Truman and Marshall had sympathy with Acheson's view of the Pleven plan as `hopeless' given its 
unequal treatment of Germany. Acheson, op. cit., p. 443. Adenauer notes that, given the perceived urgency 
for German rearmament, there were concerns in Washington that the European response would almost 
certainly be `snail pace'. Nevertheless, Acheson had written to Schuman on the opening of the Pleven 
conference stating the United States Administration's `full and whole-hearted support to European 
integration' as the means of resolving the `present political, economic and military problems'. See Adenauer, 
K. Konrad Adenauer. Memoirs. 1945-1953, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966. pp. 345-347. 
97 See Resolution of Consultative Council on the Future of Western Union's Defence Organisation after the 
establishment of SHAPE, PRO: DG 1/1/2, Record of the 10th Session of the Consultative Council, Brussels, 
20 December 1950, where it is stated that'the continued existence of the Western Union defence organisation 
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Treaty powers authorised SACEUR to take over the responsibilities of the Western Union 
Commanders in Chief Committee, with all the staff and facilities of the Western Union 
commands put at his disposal. Whatever was to be agreed within the ongoing negotiations, 
NATO's position as policy maker and organiser of common defence was assured, with 
forces deployed under NATO decision. 
As the Conference pour l'Organisation de l'Armee Europeenne took place in Paris98, the 
Petersberg Conference on direct German entry to NATO was to come to an early impasse. 
German demands for equality of treatment had become a sticking point for the French. 
Monnet had succeeded in persuading Eisenhower of the merits of European integration and 
he was to add his support to the Paris talks. 99 Equally, the British, who were becoming 
increasingly keen to deflect the UK defence burdens by the early rearmament of 
Germany, 10° began to reassess their early preference for the `NATO Option'. Bevin had 
initially seen the federalist leaning of the French proposals as potentially damaging to the 
Atlantic Alliance, an alliance that had become the mainstay of British defence policy, '0' 
and the Labour government had refused to take an active part in the Paris discussions. 102 
However, given German demands for sovereignty and equality within the Alliance, the 
tight integration of West German forces within the proposed European Defence 
Community (EDC), itself within the NATO framework, began to appear the safer 
option. 103 
is no longer necessary'.. (although)... 'the reorganisation of the military machinery shall not affect the right of 
the Western Union Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff to meet as they please to consider matters of 
mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty Powers'. 
98 Germany would only accept participation within the NATO framework on the basis of equality of 
treatment for German forces, the substantial reinforcement of Allied forces in West Germany and the end of 
occupation status. 
99 'Success [in the EDC] would be a step also toward the unification of Europe. This is the central goal and 
the only possible way of creating reasonable security, and insuring, at the same time, the improvement in 
living standards that characterises western civilisations, ' SACEUR, 'First Annual Report to the Standing 
Committee', NATO, Paris, 1952. 
goo The defence spending issue was to cause serious splits within the Labour Party between 1950-6, as 
defence expenditure was seen to undermine social and economic improvements which, in themselves might 
prove the most effective `defence' against communism. See Newman, M. Socialism and European Unity: 
The Dilemma of the Left in Britain and France, Junction Books, London, 1983, pp. 140 -142. 
101 ̀If we are ever to break down this antipathy [to the United States and NATO] and to make the French 
good members of NATO, we cannot afford to allow the European federal concept to gain a foothold within 
NATO and thus weaken instead of strengthening the ties between the countries on the two sides of the 
Atlantic. We must nip it in the bud! '. See PRO: PREM 8/1429/1: DO(50)100, Bevin Paper for the Defence 
Committee, 24 November 1950. 
102 See PRO: CAB 128/18,30 October 1950, Cabinet 69th Meeting. 
103 See Hansard, Vol. 485,12 February 1951, Col. 66. 
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The British and US were thus persuaded that the Paris talks must be the way ahead and the 
Petersberg discussions ended in June 1951 with only an Interim Report. Realising that 
Germany might well leave the Paris talks if France did not concede the equality point, the 
principle that all member states forces for the defence of Europe would be included in the 
European Army from the onset was accepted by the French, 104 giving the Paris talks 
another boost. Following their Washington meeting in September 1951, the Foreign 
Ministers of Britain, the US and France welcomed both the Schuman and the Paris plans, 
the declared aim of which was `the inclusion of a democratic Germany, on a basis of 
equality, in a Continental European Community, which itself will form a part of a 
constantly developing Atlantic Community' . 
105 
On the basis of a draft plan agreed following the six-power conference beginning in 
December in Paris, '06 agreements were reached on reciprocal guarantees to be offered on 
ratification of the EDC treaty, including an effective `Article 5' with NATO, Article IV of 
the Brussels Treaty with the UK, and a Tripartite Agreement with France, the US and UK 
equivalent to a NATO Article 4 commitment to consult together whenever, in the opinion 
of any of them, `the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the 
logy Parties is threatened' . 
The Paris Treaty establishing la Communaute Europeene de Defence (EDC) and the 
associated documents were signed by the six participating states on 27 May 1952.108 
Uncompromising in its language, the treaty stated that `the High Contracting Parties 
establish between them a European Defence Community of supranational character, 
comprising common institutions, common armed forces and a common budget'. The 
European Army was to include all national land and air forces, except police forces and 
104 Thus national armies in Europe would all but 'cease to exist' upon EDC ratification. Dockrill, op. cit., 
p. 46. 
105 Three Power Washington Declaration, Cmd. 8626, London, HMSO, 14 September 1951 , p. 134,. 
106 For reports see The Times, 8 and 23 February 1952. 
107 See `Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty', Misc. No. 9 (1952), Memorandum regarding Western support 
for the European Defence Community, Cmd. 8562, London, HMSO, 27 May 1952, Annex B; 'Treaty 
between the United Kingdom and the Member States of the European Defence Community', Misc. No. 5, 
Cmd. 8512, London, HMSO, April 1952. 
108 The Treaty had a massive 132 Articles and 12 Associated Protocols, a Common Declaration on the 
duration of the Treaty and an Agreement of Explanation of Article 107 concerning territorial definition. This 
is reflective of the level of complexity of the treaty. 
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those required for overseas defence or in the event of serious internal crises. 
'09 It was to be 
accountable to a permanent Council. whose approval would be required for some decisions 
of the executive Defence Commission, 110 where all major decisions would be taken on the 
basis of unanimous voting. An Assembly of national parliamentarians would be tasked 
with the examination of budget estimates, approval of defence commission reports and the 
preparation of plans for a directly elected Assembly as part of an eventual European 
Union. The agreements provided for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Assembly' 1'tasked 
with establishing the requirements of a constitution for a future political federation that 
might preside over both the EDC and ECSC and would be the basis for a European 
Political Community. Thus, it was stressed, the EDC was to be an essential step toward the 
creation of a United Europe. However, the treaty also made clear that the Community 
defence effort was placed within the framework of NATO. The NATO Commander in 
Chief was to supervise the 'organisation, equipment and training of the Community forces' 
and was to assume command of them in time of war. 112 
The signing of the Paris Treaty was to be the high point of the EDC debacle. The progress 
toward ratification was to be tortuous, marked by procrastination and backsliding as 
national governments sought to reconcile domestic and external interests. 113 
The EDC ratification process 
Britain was to have a significant role in the EDC ratification process as not only the 
French, but also the smaller participating states, sought close British co-operation and 
involvement with the Community as a counter-balance to German power. With the return 
of the Conservative Government in October 1951 it soon became clear to the Europeans 
that Prime Minister Churchill's earlier rhetoric had been nothing more than an `empty 
109 Naval forces were not to be integrated. 'Members of the European Defence Force have the same 
obligations toward the Community and its command echelons as military personnel of national armies 
normally have toward their Government and their own command', EDC Military Protocol, Article 16. For a 
discussion of force structures see Dockrill, op. cit., p. 45. 
110 The Commission was to wield broad executive and supervisory powers over the training, equipment and 
supply of the European forces, gradually developing powers over recruitment, the determination of rank and 
advancement and the conduct of unified training. EDC Treaty Article 73(1) and 74(1), EDC Military 
Protocol Article 12 and 15. It was bound to `refrain from any action inconsistent with the supra-national 
character of their duties'. See EDC Treaty, Article 107. 
111 This role was to be temporarily filled by the Assembly of the ECSC, enlarged by 3 additional members 
from each of the big powers to make its numbers the same as those of the provisional Defence Assembly. 
112 Burrows, B. and Irwin, C. op. cit., p. 35. 
113 Federalists see that these negotiations reflect the need for a political authority as a prerequisite - without it 
`a point will always be reached when it is in the interests of some State to do one thing and in the interests of 
others to do the opposite. ' HGL, op. cit., p. 248. 
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vessel', supporting defence integration `for them, not for us. ' 
114 Foreign Minister, Eden 
was, however, acutely aware of the mounting criticisms of the British Government's 
`unhelpful attitude', both in the US and Europe, and indeed within the British 
establishment itself. "5 
The Truman administration, whilst initially advocating British participation in the EDC 
project, recognised that in the short term it might be more expedient for Britain to maintain 
a supportive distance. The creation of an effective European Army would free British and 
American forces for the larger role of global containment of international communism, 
Britain's global connections giving her a special role in the peripheries of the world stage. 
Additionally, it was feared that the inclusion of a nuclear capable Britain into an EDC 
might lead to an increase in calls for a Third Force or neutrality in Europe. 116 In the 
immediate term, British intervention in negotiations would almost certainly slow down 
progress toward German rearmament. 117 Nevertheless, Eden's concept of Britain acting as 
a `third pillar', or `binding link' between the US and Western Europe 118 was seen as only a 
temporary expedient by the Truman Administration, until such time as Britain could be 
fully integrated into mainland Europe. 119 
114 Cited in Fursdon in Heller, op. cit., p. 219. See 'European Unity: a Conservative Party View', The World 
Today, Vol. 7, January 1951, pp. 21-30. Eisenhower recalls that he used 'every resource at my command, 
including argument, cajolery, and sheer prayer, to get Winston to say a single kind word about EDC'. 
Eisenhower, D. D. The White House Years: Mandate for Change 1953-1961, London, Heinemann, 1963, 
p. 246. 
115 Eden noted that: '.. the failure of the Paris Conference would be blamed on us and we should incur, 
however unjustly, much odium. ' PRO: COS(51) 733,8 December 1951, DEFE 5/35. Montgomery, NATO 
Deputy Supreme Commander, reversed his previous position, when he stated (10 December 1952), 'Unless 
the British will.. . 
join in the European Army, the European Army ship will crash on the rocks.... I can see no 
justification why the British should not come in. They can make any reservations they like. ' Montgomery 
cited in Hamilton, N. Monty, the Field Marshall, London, Macmillan, 1978, pp. 826-827. 
116 The British Government's Global Strategy Paper, April 1952, might be identified as the beginning of the 
nuclearization of British policy, to be further articulated in the 1956-7 Sandys' Review. 
117 CJ, 'The Schuman Plan and the Council of Europe', The World Today, November 1952, p. 477. 
118 See pamphlet for the National Planning Association's Committee on International Policy by Geiger, T and 
Cleveland, H. van B. `Making Western Europe Defensible - An appraisal of the Effectiveness of United States 
Policy in Western Europe', NPA. Planning Pamphlets, No. 74, August 1951. 
119 All in all, the Americans could accept that it might be expedient for Britain to decline EDC entry until... 
'the supra-national functional progress among the Six had mushroomed, as it was expected to, into a fully- 
fledged Western European political union. This was the Truman-Acheson policy supported by General 
Eisenhower. ' Manderson-Jones, op. cit., pp. 101-102. 
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French disillusionment with the EDC treaty had set in even before signature. 
120 The 
defence burdens of the Indo-China war had necessitated a reduction in French defence 
targets which could result in a marginal superiority for German forces within the European 
Army 121 At the same time, the limited duration of the Washington Treaty could result in 
an American withdrawal well before the fifty year EDC agreement matured, whilst the 
limited British association with EDC provided neither for a balance against German forces 
nor a parity of `great power' status for France. The EDC project was increasingly offering 
less to satisfy French interests either in terms of promoting the level of autonomy from the 
US who might enable it to play a balancing role in the Atlantic Community, or in securing 
French status in the Atlantic Alliance. Consequently, the French representatives 
deliberating within the Ad Hoc Assembly increasingly resisted the loss of sovereignty 
implied by the draft treaty on EDC. 122 
In the Federal Republic, opposition to EDC was a reflection of a larger debate about the 
benefits of Adenauer's West-facing policy. The Chancellor remained convinced that the 
Soviets could only be managed through a policy of 'negotiation from strength', determined 
by a building up of Western defence. Equally, European integration could provide the 
vehicle for the rehabilitation of West Germany both within Europe and within the broader 
Atlantic community. 123 However, amongst the opposition, fears regarding the Soviet 
response to the EDC agreement were added to concerns that the division of Germany may 
be permanent. On 7 February 1952 the German Federal Parliament passed a resolution 
approving a German defence contribution to EDC on condition that the Federal Republic 
would be accepted into the Community as a full and equal partner, and that re-unification 
would be sought for Germany. The Bonn Contractual Agreements of 25 May 1952 
provided for the ending of occupation status in the FRG on the establishment of EDC, but 
120 See for example the `motion of confidence' passed by the French Assembly on 19 February 1952 on the 
basis of that the Government take a more `conditional' approach to EDC. See De Larminat, E. L Armee 
Europeene, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1952. 
121 Ironically, 'the French wanted a German army which would be both stronger than the Soviet one and yet 
smaller than the French one! '. Pierre Melandri, 'France and the Atlantic Alliance 1950-1953', in Riste, op. 
cit., p. 276. 
122 The swing to the right in the French legislative elections in June 1951 had significantly enlarged the 
constituency within the administration who rejected the loss of French national independence implied in the 
moves to create a supra-national entity. 
123 Adenauer states 'Joint action in the field of heavy industry and of defence will certainly necessitate joint 
political action also. The men who designed the bold plans for the coal and steel organisation and for the 
EDC knew this. They were and are convinced that their work would find a political culmination ... 
We are 
putting all our energies into the unification of Europe'. Adenauer, K. 'Germany and Europe', Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 31, No. 3, April 1953, pp. 365-366. 
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overtures from East Germany and the Soviets during the preceding negotiations further 
mobilised opposition in the Federal Republic. 
Given the political situation prevailing over the winter of 1952, the final report of the Ad 
Hoc Assembly on a European Political Community (6 March 1953) had retreated ̀ from the 
idea of a widely-drawn centralised federation' . 
124 The report envisaged a single European 
political authority for ECSC and EDC which would have far-reaching responsibilities over 
a range of economic and external affairs, the planned constitution for EPC offering a 
combination of federal and inter-governmental solutions, a form of integration which could 
prove acceptable to the national parliaments of the Six and one to which it was intended 
Britain could be closely associated. 125 
With the draft proposals at the negotiating table, the inauguration of President Eisenhower 
and the Republican Administration in January 1953 witnessed a reappraisal of the scope of 
American interests. In what Michael Smith refers to as the `globalisation of Cold War 
activities', 126 the dying throes of European colonialism had drawn the US into expanding 
objectives, internationalising areas of colonial struggle. Concerns about a potential 
`domino effect' elicited by the Korean conflict had led the US to see Indo-China as 
imperative to the future of Asia, where US strategic interests were seen to be threatened. 
Eisenhower's `New Look', introduced in 1953, envisaged heavy reliance on European 
conventional forces for `forward defence' in Europe, backed up by the deterrent capacity of 
the American nuclear arsenal. As such, the `New Look' was clearly an attempt to meet 
expanding objectives at a bearable cost. 127 The US, determined to shift the burden of 
continental defence on to the Europeans, was now prepared to 'bulldoze' Europe into 
124 Layton, Lord A. 'Little Europe and Britain', International Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3, July 1953, pp. 293. Draft 
Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community, Strasbourg, Service des Publications de la 
Communaute Europeene, 1953. 
125 Eden's suggestion that the Council of Europe might carry out the function of an EPC, European unity 
being promoted in an environment of `friendly cohabitation between 'integrationists' and 'associators", was 
rejected by the ECSC planners: indicative of their view that `since nothing more than benevolent non- 
intervention may be expected from Great Britain, European federation can be reached only by the dynamic 
methods of the planners of the Six'. C. J. op. cit., p. 479. Fursdon, op. cit., 1980, pp. 234-235. Fursdon 
provides the most comprehensive discussion of the whole EDC period. 
126 Smith, M. Western Europe and the United States: The Uncertain Alliance, London, Allen and Unwin, 
1984, p. 40. 
127 For standard accounts of Eisenhower's New Look see Snyder, G. 'The 'New Look' of 1953', in Schilling, 
W. R., Hammond, P. Y. and Snyder, G. (ed. ), Strategy, Politics, and Defence Budgets, New York, Praeger, 
1962, pp. 383-524; Gaddis, J. L. Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Post-war American 
National Security Policy, New York, 1982, pp. 127-63. See N. S. C. 5405, (16 January 1954) FRUS, 1952- 
1954, Vol. 13, pp. 971-76, which was the first policy statement on Southeast Asia and which identified the 
conflict as one between the communist and non-communist World. 
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ratifying the EDC treaty as a means of freeing up US efforts for the pursuit of its 'roll-back' 
policies against communism in Asia. 128 Throughout 1953 Dulles reiterated American 
support for EDC, 129 but increasingly raised the phantom of American withdrawal from 
Europe if an acceptable agreement was not soon in the offing. 130 Dulles' threats, by the end 
of 1953, of an `agonising reappraisal' 131 reflected growing concerns in the US that EDC 
was proving unrealisable and that the essential transatlantic consensus was faltering. 
As perceptions of Soviet threat declined amongst European publics following Stalin's death 
in March 1953,132 US threats towards China over Korea had raised European concerns 
regarding their partner's escalatory behaviour. As the Cold War `hotted up' the 
`aggressive' shift in American rhetoric toward the Soviet Union served to further 
disconcert the Europeans. A commentator at the time was moved to note that 'American 
policy and attitude have appeared wittingly or unwittingly to ride roughshod over vital 
European interests and sentiments. At their worst, they have seemed to treat the Western 
European nations as expendable pawns in an American-Soviet feud carried on over the 
heads of all other nations. The sense of partnership in the western world has been offended 
and neutralism strengthened. ' 133 As Acheson was to note, `the bloom was off NATO'. 134 
By October of 1953 the French were refusing to submit to foreign pressure to sign EDC 
without certain preconditions being met, notably the resolution of the Saar problem and the 
128 See Kolko J. and G. The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign policy 1945-1954, 
New York, Harper and Row, 1972, p. 695; May E. R. 'The American Commitment to Germany, 1949-1955, 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 13, Fall 1989, pp. 431-460. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 141. 
129 For example see Minutes of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference, 11 July 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
Vol. 5, pp. 1622-23. 
130 See United States Declaration to the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, London, 18 October, 1953, 
FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 5, pp. 826-28; Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 6th December 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, Vol. 5, p. 1764. The Richardson Amendment, (Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, Ist 
Session, 1953, pp. 8689-8693) provided that half of US aid to Europe would be conditional on ratification of 
the EDC Treaty. 
131 Dulles' statement to the NAC, 14th December 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 5, pp. 462-63. See Hoopes, T. 
'Eisenhower, Dulles and the European Defence Community', Diplomatic History, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 
1992. 
132 Armstrong suggests that the post-Stalin Soviet strategy of 'peaceful coexistence' contributed to altering 
the post war Grand Alliance 'from something hard into something soft'. Armstrong, op. cit., 'Postscript to 
EDC', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 1, October 1954, p. 17. 
133 Holborn, op. cit., p. 23. 
134 Acheson, op. cit., pp. 569-570 
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establishment of supra-national political organs to control the proposed European Army. 
135 
However, by the spring of 1954, with the negotiations on the Constitution put on hold until 
ratification of the EDC, concerns that German influence might be increased by the level of 
supra-nationality suggested in the draft Constitution led to a cooling of French interest in 
both projects. 136 
In the light of American persistence, it had become increasingly clear to the British that, if 
anything was to be salvaged from the increasingly precarious Anglo-American 
relationship, the UK must be seen to exercise its influence to promote the American 
interest in EDC ratification. 137 British policy became to ensure that, given the likely non- 
ratification of the Treaty by France, Britain appeared to have had nothing to do with its 
downfall. Thus, on 13 of April 1954 Britain responded to the demands of the French by 
entering into a formal agreement with the EDC powers, agreeing to representation on the 
Board of Commissioners and ad hoc Ministerial attendance at EDC Council meetings. 138 
This would supplement the November 1953 agreement on military relations drawn up by 
the EDC Interim Military Committee in Paris which allowed for the development of 'a 
common military outlook' in 'harmonising tactical doctrine and logistics, in standardising 
equipment and methods of training', and provided for the 'inclusion' of Royal Air Force 
squadrons within EDC formations and visa versa. 139 Given French lack of interest Eden 
was to take two further steps in March 1954, agreeing to the inclusion of British Army 
formations within EDC forces and visa versa if requested by SACEUR and, as a gesture of 
goodwill, to placing an armoured division into the European Army on formation. 
Significantly, in agreeing to maintain such forces on the mainland of Europe so as to 
contribute its fair share to the defence of the North Atlantic Area, the UK agreed not to 
135 See RIIA. op. cit., 1956, p. 43. It was noted that there was a French 'tendency to be paralysed rather than 
activated by foreign pressure', JCN, 'The European Defence Community: Problems of Ratification', The 
World Today, Vol. 10, No. 8, August 1954, p. 329. 
136 J. C. N, idem. 
137 In his memoirs, Eden recalls a meeting with Dulles in 1953 in which Dulles stated that 'we ... were 
approaching a parting of the ways' pointing out that a swing towards western hemispheric defence would be 
of `obvious concern to Great Britain', and urging Eden `to make some appeal to France. ' Eden, A. The 
Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, KG., PP. C., M. C. - Full Circle, London, Cassell, 1960, pp. 57-58. 
138 'Memorandum regarding United Kingdom Association with the European Defence Community, with 
Annexes', Cmd. 9126, London, HMSO, 1954. 
139 See PRO: CAB 129/64: C(53)332, Annex to Eden minute, 26 November 1953, and 'Britain and EDC', The 
World Today, Vol. 10, No. 5, May 1954, p. 183 for discussion. 
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alter the level of its armed forces on the continent without consulting EDC. 
140 This 
Statement of relations represented the furthest point of concessions that the British were 
prepared to tolerate to satisfy the French over EDC. 141 Despite further inducements from 
the US 142 and the ratification of the EDC treaty by the FRG and Benelux states by April 
1954, resistance to EDC in France continued to grow. 143 
The fall of the Laniel government and the investiture of the radical-Gaullist government of 
Mendes-France on 17 June 1954 altered the complexion of French politics. Ignoring 
Anglo-American calls for an end to French procrastination, refusing the Benelux invitation 
to a conference on EDC, and cancelling Franco-German talks on the subject, the Mendes- 
France government demonstrated that French fears of Soviet aggression and German 
rearmament did not exceed those which accompanied the loss of national identity and 
status implied by European unity. As Duchin states, `the tide of European unification 
seemed by this time to have turned. Once a powerful force in continental politics, post-war 
federalism was ebbing away'. 144 
At the Geneva Conference of July 1954, France came under significant pressure from the 
Communists to reject the EDC proposals in order to attain favourable terms from Moscow 
over Indo-China. 145 US refusal to support a diplomatic settlement at Geneva further 
undermined alliance cohesion. 146 In accepting the Moscow sweeteners France had 
effectively rung the death knell of EDC147 and the implications of the foreseeable failure of 
140 See PRO: CAB 129/66: C(54)93,3 March 1954, 'United Kingdom Association with the European Defence 
Community'. It is noted that the agreed force levels would anyway be necessary for British defence for the 
immediate future and that an agreement did not preclude longer-term reductions. 
141 Statement of Common Policy on Military Association, Cmd. 9126, London, HMSO, 1954, Annex B. 
142 The US was to offer consultation with NATO over level of EDC forces, integration of NATO and EDC 
forces where possible and the sharing of information between organisations. It was also made clear that any 
state which had not ratified the EDC Treaty by 31 December 1954 would get no more aid under the United 
States Mutual Security Act. 
143 Despite Gasperi's fall from power after July 1953, the Italian Government did not generally swerve from 
his policy of promotion of EDC and European integration in general, although they were waiting on the 
French before ratification. 
144Duchin, R. 'The "Agonising Reappraisal": Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defence Community', 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 212. 
145 See Khrushchev, N. Khrushchev Remembers, Strobe Talbott, Boston, 1970, pp. 481-482. For British view 
see PRO: CAB 129/70: C. (54)254,24 July 1954. 
146 merman, R. H. 'The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954: A New Look', Diplomatic 
History, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1990, p. 50 
147 See Randle, R. Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indo-Chinese War, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1969; Cable, J. The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, London, 1986. 
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French ratification of the EDC treaty became the main topic of Anglo-American 
discussion. 148 Not least, the Bonn and Paris agreements would require untangling in the 
event of French failure to ratify, given that the legal basis of these treaties procured 
German sovereignty only once she took on her responsibilities under EDC. 149 On 14 July, 
Dulles and Churchill informed their respective legislatures that the US and UK would 
propose immediate sovereignty for West Germany if France failed to ratify the EDC by 15 
August 1954, the expected date of the French National Assembly recess. 150 
At the Brussels Conference on the EDC, beginning 19 August 1954, Mendes-France put 
forward a new Protocol of EDC Treaty Amendments, which he presented as essential in 
order to procure the support of the French National Assembly. These proposed 
amendments effectively removed the supra-national elements from the treaty by 
introducing a veto, downgrading the Board of Commissioners to technical manager status, 
and reintroducing national armies at least for France. is 1 The counter-proposals of the five 
powers were summarily rejected and on 30 August 1954 the French National Assembly 
rejected EDC ratification without debate. The consequence of this were equally damning to 
the contractual accords between the US, the UK and EDC. 
Responses to the failure of the EDC plan were varied. As noted in a RITA report, `Dr 
Adenauer gave an interview to the correspondent of The Times in which he said harsh 
words about French inconsistency; US opinion, which had hoped until the last for 
ratification, took on a strongly anti-French bias and British spokesmen emitted the distant 
cluckings and tut-tuttings of a reproachful but not altogether unsympathetic governess. ' 152 
As another commentator was to note at the time there were widespread concerns that not 
only was the future of the Atlantic Alliance undermined, but `worst of all, perhaps, the 
148 See PRO: CAB 129/69: C. (54)226,7 July 1954. 
149 See Loewenstein, K. 'The Bonn Constitution and the EDC Treaties', Yale Law Journal, 1955, pp. 805-839. 
150 See Churchill's statement in which he argued that some limits on the rearmament of a restored sovereign 
West Germany would be required in order to maintain standards of fair play. Hansard, Vol. 530,1954, Col. 
499. 
151 For text of Joint Communique of the Brussels Conference, together with the draft protocol submitted by 
the French Government (known as the Mendes-France proposals) and the reply proposals (known as the 
Spaak declaration) see NATO, Information Division, NATO letter, 1 September 1954, pp. 21-27. 
152 RIIA. op. cit., 1956, p. 50. 
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idealism which had supported the European defence community as a step in the direction 
of a truly united Europe, was in danger of giving way to disillusion'. 153 
The Eden proposals 
For the British, the French failure to ratify had not been altogether unexpected and, whilst 
alternative plans had not been openly aired during the ratification process so as to avoid 
any criticism of British 'sabotage' of the Community, Eden's biographer notes that `he 
[Eden] had long given thought, together with his officials, to what alternative might be 
appropriate' . 
154 Cabinet records suggest that it was the then Housing Minister, Harold 
Macmillan, who first 'suggested that a NATO solution might be made more palatable both 
to French opinion and to the Labour Party in this country if, for this purpose, NATO could 
be made at least to appear to have been modified in the direction of the European idea. 
Was it possible for example, for Germany formally to adhere to the Brussels Treaty which 
continued to subsist within the North Atlantic Treaty'. '55 
During his tour of European capitals from 11 - 17 September 1954, Eden presented `his' 
plan for resolving the impasse on European defence organisation; an effective compromise 
could be reached through the expansion of the Brussels Treaty Organisation as a `political 
instrument to keep alive the idea of European unity', 156 and the direct entry of Germany 
into NATO as the organisation in which all military arrangements would be concentrated. 
The 'new' European defence arrangement, whilst lacking the supra-national elements of 
EDC, would have Britain as a full member, a commitment which could secure the 
Germany contribution to Western defence. Whilst Eden's proposals met with a level of 
153 Lester B Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and representative at the Nine Power 
Conferences in London and Paris and NATO Ministerial in Paris. `WEU: Implications for Canada and 
NATO', International Journal, Vol. 10, Pt. 1,1954, p. 1. 
154 Carlton, D. Anthony Eden. A Biography, London, Allen Lane, 1981, pp. 361. On 1 September 1954 the 
Foreign Office set out its 'Alternatives to the European Defence Community', the two military options being 
direct German entry into NATO or a looser non-supra-national EDC with UK participation. As it was 
envisaged that the second option would take the same tortuous route as EDC, the first option seemed 
preferable, and was consistent with Churchill's preference. See PRO: CAB 129/70: C. (54)280 and PRO: CAB 
128/27: C. C. 58(54), pp. 442-445. Also see PRO: CAB 128/27: C. C. 59(54), 8 September 1954, pp. 446-449 
for ongoing discussion of alternatives and PRO: PREM 11/843,9 September 1954, Churchill to Eden, for 
Churchill's views. 
155 See the PRO: CAB 128/27: C. C. 57 (54), Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, 27 August 1954 (and thus 
before French rejection). Also see PRO: CAB 129/70: C. (54)276,27 August 1954, pp. 70-75. 
156 Eden, op. cit., p. 163. For Eden's own `Eureka' experience explanation of the origins of the Modified 
Brussels Treaty Plan see ibid, p. 151. 
44 
support in Europe, 157 the reaction of the US administration was guarded. Disappointed by 
the failure of the Europeans to realise the integrationist expectations that had become the 
dominant thesis in the Dullesian approach to European security organisation, 
158 the 
American Secretary of State was suspicious of any attempts by the British to 'water down' 
the EDC idea. Dulles made it clear that Congressional support for Eden's plan could not be 
assumed and that the continuance of American aid remained under review given the failure 
of Europe to fulfil the expected united role that the US had laid out for it on the 
Continent. 159 
As a consequence of Dulles' inference it became clear to Eden that to keep the US in 
Europe, it was imperative that the London Conference succeed. If France was to accept his 
proposals, Eden must be prepared to offer a British commitment to European defence well 
beyond that offered to EDC. As Eden was to remark to Churchill, `the hard fact is that it is 
impossible to organise an effective defence system in Western Europe, which in turn is 
essential for the security of the United Kingdom, without a major British contribution... By 
recognising this fact and giving new commitment, we may succeed in bringing the 
Germans and the French together, and keeping the Americans in Europe'. 160 
Thus, as the London nine-power Conference on Eden's proposals commenced, (28 
September -3 October 1954), 
161 Eden skilfully played the British 'ace', 162 the offer of a 
new commitment to deploy British troops on mainland Europe, only to be withdrawn on 
agreement of the majority of the Brussels Treaty members. 163 With the offer of this 
157 See PRO: CAB 128/27: C. C. 60(54), 17 September 1954, pp. 456-458. Foreign Secretary's report on the 
trips to Brussels, Bonn, Paris and Rome. 
158 'The prevention of war between neighbouring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be 
dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats, but only by merging certain functions of their 
government into supra-national institutions'. Dulles in New York Times, 1 September, 1954. 
159 At the 4th Plenary Meeting of the London Nine Power Conference (29 September) Dulles stated that `there 
is a great wave of disillusionment which has swept over the United States and it is particularly manifest in the 
Congress... a feeling that after all the situation in Europe is pretty hopeless and the United States had better 
not make any long term committals to be part of it'. For text see Final Act of Nine Power Conference 
(London 3 October 1954), HMSO London, Cmd 9289 Miscellaneous No. 28 1954, (Annex IIA), p. 15. 
160Eden, op. cit., p. 166. 
161 For documents on the 9 power conference in London see FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. 5, pp. 1294-1366. For UK 
view of proceedings see PRO: CAB 128/27: C. C. 62 (54), 1 October 1954, pp. 467-469. 
162 For Eden's role in securing agreement see Deighton, A. `Britain and the creation of WEU' in Deighton, 
op. cit, 1997, pp. 11-27 and Deighton, A. op. cit., 1998, pp. 181-196. 
163 For a summary of the discussions of the 28 September 1954 in Cabinet which led to agreement on the 
offer of British force deployment, see PRO: CAB 129/71: C. (54)302. See Protocol 2, Article VI of the 
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unprecedented British commitment to continental defence on the table the negotiations 
moved surprisingly swiftly. These forces were to consist of Four Divisions and the Tactical 
Air Force under the caveats that this would not be binding in cases of `acute overseas 
emergency' or if they were to become `too great a strain on the external finances of the 
United Kingdom'. Given these caveats and that the UK military planning had been based 
on retaining this level under SACEUR, it may be seen as nothing `exceptional' in terms of 
commitment. However, as a treaty based peacetime UK commitment to the Continent it 
was unprecedented and it could be seen to mark a significant Europeanisation of British 
foreign policy. 
Agreement was quickly reached on the modification of the Brussels Treaty to include Italy 
and the FRG. Institutionally recreated as the WEU, the modified treaty was to provide for a 
new Council of (Foreign) Ministers with powers of decision, 164 supported by a Permanent 
Council, an Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA), and a parliamentary Assembly 
to which the Council was to make its Annual Report. 165 Lacking the supranational 
elements of the EDC proposals, the WEU structure was to ensure the participation of the 
UK in the political movement towards European integration by its development on the 
lines of intergovernmental co-operation, rather than the federative course that Britain felt 
unable to take. In this sense the modified Brussels Treaty was to be `a more effective focus 
of European integration', 166 where the threat of German aggression was to be mollified by 
the object of `promoting the unity and encouraging the progressive integration of 
Europe'. 167 
Modified Brussels Treaty, (Paris, 23 October 1954), Treaty Series No. 39 (1955) Cmd. 9498, London, 
HMSO, 1955. (Henceforth MBT) 
164 The proposed Council would have the power to take majority vote on what might be major policy 
decisions and which would be binding on all members, for example those questions submitted by the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments. Whilst not as far reaching as the supra-national powers of the proposed EDC 
arrangement, the WEU Council's powers eclipsed those of the committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe which made recommendations to governments on the basis of unanimity, or the Council of the 
O. E. E. C. which could take binding decisions but only with unanimous consent. 
165 The Assembly was to be composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and was intended as a parliamentary balance to the Council. Established 
in what has been described as a "laconic" style (Robertson, op. cit., p. 138) the WEU Assembly had the initial 
task of establishing its own brief and status. See statement by the Chairman of the Council, M. Spaak, at the 
Assembly's inaugural meeting, WEU Assembly, Proceedings of the First Session, July 1955, p. 24. 
166 Final Act of Nine Power Conference, Cmd 9289, op. cit., also see Robertson A. H. 'The Creation of 
WEU', European Yearbook, Vol. 2, pp. 126-129 and Bebr, G. `The European Defence Community and the 
WEU - an Agonising Dilemma', Stanford Law Review, 1955, pp. 169-236. 
167 See MBT, Protocol 1: Article 4. Appendix 2. The reference to German aggression was to be removed 
from the preamble of the Brussels Treaty and this new commitment was added to replace it. 
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The new Treaty also established WEU powers to determine maximum force levels of 
member states on the continent during peacetime, placing significant and extensive 
controls on West German force levels. 168 Retaining the Article IV provisions of the 
original treaty (to become Article V under the Modified treaty), the member states of WEU 
would be commended to `consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat 
to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise', 169 and be given real powers of decision 
over military provision. 170 However, because the North Atlantic Council was accepted the 
proper place to discuss strategic planning and defence policy and any duplication of 
military staffs was avoided, the defence implications of the new organisation were to be 
significantly limited. 171 
As a consequence of the success of the London negotiations a range of documents, known 
collectively as the Paris Agreements, were signed between 20 and 23 October 1954.172 
These agreement included those amending the Bonn Conventions of May 1952 and 
providing for the ending of occupation status for Germany, 173 those which enabled 
German entry into NATO, 174 those which dealt with the Saar problem, 175 and those which 
modified the Brussels Treaty and invited enlargement to Germany and Italy. Incredibly, 
less than five weeks after the French rejection of EDC a significant step had been taken 
168 See MBT, Protocol 3. These restrictions were both qualitative and quantitative, to be reconsidered at the 
call of NATO, but revised only on agreement of the WEU powers. 
169 See MBT, Protocol 1, Article 8. 
170 The WEU was to determine the strength of national forces to be placed under SACEUR command, (MBT, 
Protocol II, Article I and III), whilst the level of internal and police forces held by each member was to be 
agreed by the members (MBT, Protocol II, Article V). The Union was not to fix levels of total national 
forces, and the execution of defence programmes was to remain purely a national affair. 
171 See MBT, Protocol 1, Article 4. The national forces of WEU member states stationed within the area of 
SACEUR command contributing to a unified military formation under SACEUR Authority. See Resolution 
of The NAC Implementing Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference, Cmd 9304, op. cit. 
172 Paris Conference held 20-22 October 1954 and the N. A. C. meeting of 22 -23 October 1954. For text see 
`Documents relating to the Accession to the Treaty of the Federal Republic of Germany. NATO: Facts and 
Figures. 1971. Appendix 10. pp. 306-334. 
173 The final agreements restored to West Germany `the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal 
and external affairs' Cmd 9304, HMSO, London, 1954, pp. 3. Whilst the Allied High Commission and Land 
Commissioners were to be terminated, the three powers' forces stationed in West Germany were to `retain 
the rights and responsibilities ... relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of 
Germany and a peace settlement'. 
174 German soldiers would be placed into a German Army, but this would be assigned to NATO in its totality. 
Italy had participated in the North Atlantic Treaty and was therefore already an ally of the Brussels Treaty 
Powers. See PRO: CAB 129/70: C(54)298, Foreign Secretary's Memorandum. 27 September 1954. 
175 Under the Paris Agreement the Saar was to be given a 'European Statute within the framework of WEU', 
to be the subject of a referendum which would determine the future of the region. 
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toward the construction of a security structure that was to satisfy the Europeans and their 
American NATO ally. 
The passage toward ratification of the Paris Agreements was not, however, without some 
difficulties. It was clear that the agreements offered much to satisfy the French, most 
particularly the new British commitment to continental force deployment, a commitment 
that, if made earlier, may have 'saved' the EDC. Lacking the supra-national elements of 
EDC which would, most significantly, have deprived France of her national army, the 
modified Brussels Treaty secured French sovereignty and appeared far less threatening to 
France's hold over her overseas territories, which might provide chances for recovering her 
former greatness. However, whilst many former supporters of EDC had come to see the 
Eden plan as the best possible compromise, initial euphoria regarding the British 
commitments began to subside as a consequence of what has been referred to as `the 
instability of desire after consummation'. 176 Domestic political hostility toward Mendes- 
France led to the rejection of the Paris proposals by the French National Assembly on the 
24 December 1954, although it was to pass as a matter of Confidence on 30 December. '77 
As the proposals awaited Senate approval Soviet pressure to dissuade the French from the 
ratification of the Paris agreements was intense, as was allied insistence on its approval. 178 
On 27 March 1955, following the fall of Mendes-France, the French Senate approved the 
Agreements by 184 to 110 votes. 
Adenauer's persuasive skills were well exercised in establishing West German support for 
ratification of the Paris Agreements and most particularly the provisions for the inclusion 
of the Federal Republic in NATO. Led by the Social Democrats, domestic opposition had a 
broad base, including trade unions, churches, youth movements, socialists and 
communists, who feared, following Soviet threats, that ratification might undermine the 
176 Leites, N. and De La Malene, C. 'Paris from EDC to WEU', World Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2, January 1957, 
p. 211. 
"' Having approving the London Agreements without qualification on 12 October, the view held by all other 
capitals was that the French Assembly was committed to pass the Paris Agreements. This was rejected by 
the French who saw the original vote as one on principal, not practise. 
"g Moscow stated that French ratification would lead to the annulment of the Franco-Russian treaty of 
friendship of 1944 and, in the event of ratification of the Paris Agreements, a treaty of friendship and aid, and 
a unified military command, would be established among the Communist powers. The US threatened to 
make bilateral arrangements with Germany from which the French would be excluded and the British stated 
that their troop deployment would be dependent on ratification of the Paris Agreement by all parties. RIIA. 
Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 39. 
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possibility of four-power talks on reunification. 179 Even Adenauer's principal allies, the 
Free Democratic Party, reacted against the restrictions envisaged by the Paris proposals on 
Germany's military manufacturing, the confirmation of the legal status of the allied troops 
in Germany, and Adenauer's promise to support the autonomy of the Saar under WEU 
supervision in the referendum provisioned by the agreements. 180 However, Adenauer's 
diplomatic skills triumphed; the Soviets, he insisted, were offering only propaganda - only 
under NATO pressure could the Soviets be brought to the negotiating table and the 
unification of Germany be achieved. 181 Following volatile debates in the Bundestag the 
Treaty was finally accepted on 27 February 1955, ratification taking place on the 18th 
March. 
By 5 May 1955 the ratification of the Paris Agreements was complete and had been 
achieved with higher parliamentary majorities than those achieved for EDC ratification. On 
6 May 1955, the WEU of the Modified Brussels Treaty came into force, the same day that 
the occupation status of West Germany was officially ended, and on 9 May the FRG 
became the 15th member of NATO. On 12 May 1955 the Soviet Union, along with seven 
satellite states, signed the Treaty establishing the Warsaw Pact. The Paris agreements, 
facilitated by the establishment of WEU, were consequently a significant factor in the 
institutionalisation of the Cold War, the architecture of defence providing for a bipolar 
balance of power as the dominant overlay of the European security environment. 
Conclusion 
In what has been described as ̀ one of the most significant milestones of post World War II 
European Defence history', 182 the Paris Agreements were to mark the high point of almost 
four years of Atlantic diplomacy. Perhaps the most significant amongst these agreements 
was that which modified the Brussels Treaty and provided for the establishment of the 
179 RHA. lbid, p. 37. 
"0 This agreement had been based on the study undertaken by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe on the Saar problem. See Council of Europe, Documents of the Consultative Assembly, Doc. 225, 
May 1954. 
ls' See Kaplan, L. S. `NATO and Adenauer's Germany: Uneasy Partnership', International Organisations, 
Vol. 15, No. 4, Autumn 1961, pp. 618-629, for discussion. 
182 Fursdon, op. cit., p. 323. 
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WEU. It was this Agreement that was to be the facilitating element of an enduring Cold 
War transatlantic security architecture. 
In this chapter, the stages of development leading to the eventual establishment of the 
WEU have been traced from the first pragmatic steps toward European defence co- 
operation in the Dunkirk Treaty, through the complexities of the 'western union' debates 
resulting in the Brussels Treaty and on through the EDC debacle to the eventual 1954 
compromise. The evidence suggests that throughout these early developments in the 
collective post war European security order a 'debate' may be traced between two 
perspectives emerging in Europe. Loosely defined in terms of collective defence and 
integration, one focused on the construction of a stable alliance system for the European 
area, whilst the other sought an integrative European approach to the construction of a 
European order. 
The Brussels Treaty had taken up the challenge of collective defence in a European 
context. With its Article IV commitment and its Western Union Command structures, the 
treaty provided for the establishment of the first peacetime collective defence organisation. 
However, that this organisation was ever intended as anything more than a precursor, if a 
very necessary one, to a broader collective defence arrangement with the US is contestable. 
What is clear is that the Brussels Treaty did facilitate an American commitment to the 
defence of Europe through NATO. As an exercise in `smoke and mirrors', the BTO 
created an impression for the American public of European commitment to co-operative 
action in providing for their own defence. The failure of these efforts to adequately meet 
the growing Soviet threat was to provide the rationale for an American engagement with 
Europe. 
In support of the broader commitment to the promotion of European `common interests', 
the Brussels Treaty had invested within it more than just a defence role. As well as a 
commitment of enhancing social and cultural collaboration, the `necessity of uniting in 
order to promote the economic recovery of Europe' had established an economic role for 
the Treaty Organisation. Its work in these areas was constrained by the commitment not to 
`involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organizations in 
which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary 
assist the work of those organizations'. Given the British resistance to closer integration 
with the European mainland, European economic integration began to develop amongst the 
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`six' in the alternative forum of the ECSC, whilst the foundation of the Council of Europe 
established a broader forum for the continuing development of social and cultural ties 
being pursued under WV auspices. 
Given the lack of a clear vision on the future order of Europe, the Brussels Treaty was 
established as an `ambiguous' arrangement. In its provision for collective defence, the 
treaty established an `Article V defence commitment between European states, but did not 
prescribe the manner in which that defence should be organised. Likewise, in providing for 
broad ranging European co-operation as the means of promoting European unity, the treaty 
did not prescribe supranational integration as the favoured process, nor determined that this 
integration should include defence. This ambiguity, whilst failing to provide a blue-print 
for future developments in either area, represented one of the strengths of the treaty in that 
it enabled the emergent WEU to be `all things to all people', shifting its functional focus as 
different tensions arose in the European security arena and providing a compromise 
between alternative visions and interests. 
The examination of the EDC debacle serves to point up the tensions that existed between 
states with regard to the future organisation of European security, the satisfaction of which 
underlay the development of the WEU as a vehicle for promoting collective defence and 
European integration. These tensions may essentially be identified as lying in the areas of 
threat perception, leadership acceptance and the nature of integration. 
In terms of threat perception, concerns in Europe over a resurgent German threat were a 
`natural' response in the post war environment, with the Brussels Treaty and the Dunkirk 
Treaty that preceded it, specifically identifying Germany as a primary concern. Whilst the 
Soviet `threat' had been recognised by all of the NATO allies, by the end of the decade, 
French concerns regarding the `uncontrolled' development of German power had led them 
to resist US calls for the remilitarisation of Germany as a member of the alliance. The 
French EDC alternative was seen as a means of facilitating a `controlled' German 
contribution to defence, and as such had more to do with maintaining national power than 
any grand federal vision for Europe. The failure of the French vision to satisfy US 
requirements of Europe that it combine to meet the `primary' Soviet threat, resultant on the 
failure of the EDC project, had led, the US to posit the potential for an `agonising 
reappraisal' of US engagement with Europe, an engagement which all recognised as a 
necessary condition for a viable European defence order. 
51 
The role of the US in the post war order had been a matter of some contention. The Third 
Force ideas, which had emerged in the early post war years, had proposed that Europe 
develop as a power between the Soviets and Americans, with the pursuit of US aid being 
only a short term expedient in the light of Europe's post war weakness. The US' defence 
engagement with Europe, facilitated through the Brussels Treaty and the emergence of 
NATO, had convinced the British of the essential nature of the Atlantic commitment. This 
ended British pretensions towards any alternative European model and tied her to an 
Atlanticist view of her interests that was to dominate British thinking throughout the Cold 
War period. French interests in limiting US power as a means of ensuring French 
independence, made the acceptance of defence dependence problematic, the EDC 
negotiations focussing French resistance to a US-dominated Atlantic system in offering a 
vision of an emergent European alternative. The failure of EDC was to leave France with 
something of a dilemma in terms of strategic realities and politically acceptable options. 
Not that the US had perceived the EDC as a challenge to its primacy in the new Atlantic 
system. Indeed, the examination of post-war developments suggests that, for the 
Americans, European integration could compliment the interest of the US in establishing a 
wider Atlantic system of economic and strategic co-operation. Despite an early preference 
for a more direct route to German inclusion, the integration of European defence through 
EDC could strengthen the transatlantic Alliance by providing for an `essential' West 
German contribution in a manner acceptable to the Continentals. Furthermore, EDC could 
provide the basis for a uniting Europe, where integration at the level of low politics could 
create the conditions of stability and growth in the European and Atlantic areas. However, 
US perceptions of the purpose of integration were somewhat at odds with those of the 
Europeans for whom European unity was either an end in itself, or a means of satisfying 
national interests, rather than a vehicle for serving a larger Atlantic purpose. Integration 
might provide the means of creating a balance against the power of the both the US and the 
Soviets, but for the French it was to prove a step too far in the abrogation of national 
sovereignty: US policy served to undermine the defence-first integrationist policy 
encapsulated in EDC by underestimating the national concerns of participant 
governments. 
183 For the British, resistance to European federalism had grown along with 
their Atlantic preference. Potentially dangerous for NATO, European integration might 
183 Burrows and Irwin, op. cit., p. 37, suggest that EDC failed because of the 'departure from the logical order 
of things'. 
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well undermine Atlantic Relations by creating a `competitive identity. ' 184 Whilst Atlantic 
interests had led the British to offer `reluctant' support to the EDC process, the absence of 
Britain as an internal stabiliser for that process led to the rejection of EDC on the grounds 
that it was `too much integration - too little England' . 
185 
The WEU provided the compromise solution that addressed these central tensions of the 
post-war era and in so doing, it facilitated the development of the Cold War European 
security order. 
WEU supported the continued viability and development of collective defence for Europe 
by providing the reassurances required by Europeans as to the internal security of the 
European area, providing guarantees against resurgent German power through a `secured' 
British force commitment to the mainland and through the arms control arrangements 
established under the treaty. In so doing it ensured the dominance of the Alliance as the 
provider of collective defence, restricting itself to `subordination' to the Alliance through 
its Article IV agreement not to duplicate the work of NATO. In recognition of the 
structural necessities of the decade, the WEU enabled defence co-operation to develop in 
an alliance context, facilitating NATO's ascendance and firmly establishing the dominance 
of the Atlantic constituency for defence. Just as the Brussels Treaty had been the means of 
getting the US involved in European defence, the WEU was the means of keeping them 
engaged by `satisficing' national differences. 186 In providing an acceptable compromise in 
the form of WEU, Eden prevented a more significant 'reappraisal' of the US' commitment 
and had helped to tie her into the defence of Europe for the foreseeable future. 
Whilst Rees concludes that the WEU was `a facilitating mechanism to enable NATO to 
play the leading defence role in Europe', 187 it had also been `modified to emphasise the 
objective of European unity' and had been `strengthened and extended to make it a more 
effective focus of European integration' . 
188 WEU was to represent the furthest acceptable 
184 Warner notes that the view that Britain could not cope without the Americans 'led to an exaggerated 
Atlanticism in British policy' which made them suspicious of anything that might threaten that idea. Warner 
in Wiggershaus, op. cit., p. 152. 
185 Mendes France in correspondence with Fursdon in Heller, op. cit., p. 238. 
186 Fursdon quotes Sir Frank Roberts who states 'a most unhappy France, an unenthusiastic Britain and an 
even more unhappy Germany had to accept United States logic. ' Fursdon in Heller, op. cit., p. 237. 
187 Rees, G. W. op. cit., 1998, p. 9. 
188 MBT was the Final Act of Nine Power Conference (London 3 October 1954), Misc. No. 28, Cmd 9289, 
London, 1954, p. 4. Note this is identifying European unity in terms of integration. 
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point of compromise in terms of an integrative process for Europe to which Britain could 
be committed. It had provided for a rapprochement between France and Germany, so 
necessary for the broader integration process and supported by the US and at the same 
time, taking the first faltering steps towards a level of political and military integration in 
Europe which, as Duchin argues, 'Eisenhower felt so crucial to the future of the Free 
World'. 189 The WEU provided for a level of European co-operation which fell well short of 
the integrative interests of the federalists, but which provisioned an institutional 
arrangement in which a European Assembly could discuss defence issues, a Council could 
develop joint decisions not always on the basis of unanimity, and in which a commitment 
to promoting `progressive integration' was clearly articulated. And, in facilitating the 
development of NATO, an important element in providing the structural requirements for 
European economic development, the WEU provided for a level of potential co-operation 
that left the door open for a slower pace of European defence integration in the future. 
The WEU was thus a product of the debate on the nature and scope of integration, and the 
requirements of, and for, alliance. 190 As such it represented something of a compromise 
between the two, being articulated in terms of intergovernmental bargaining and influenced 
by both environmental or structural variants and national interests. 
The evidence suggests that, given its ambiguous nature, required of it in order to manage 
the tensions that existed between states, the WEU was never intended to be anything more 
than a support organisation, enabling the development of collective defence and European 
integration in other, more suitable, organisations. As a hybrid organisation, the WEU could 
be, and was, all things to all people - an embryonic EDC or a simple device of alliance 
management. With the potential for development in either direction, or indeed as a 
facilitator of both approaches, WEU was clearly developed as a consequence of these dual 
imperatives. 
189 Duchin, op. cit., p. 219. 
190 As a Chatham House Group identified in 1956, the WEU 'represents a compromise between two schools 
of European thought: that which looks to an Atlantic framework for the solution of Europe's problems, and 
that which stresses the need for a much closer European unity in order to strengthen Europe and the whole 
Western world'. RIIA. op. cit., 1956, p. 2. 
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Chapter 3 
From Activity to Dormancy: 1955 - 1973 
Introduction 
In the period immediately following the signature of the Modified Brussels Treaty in 1954, 
the WEU was to develop its institutional competencies in the setting of a new post-war 
order. Reliance on American security guarantees through NATO had created a level of 
West European defence dependence that was broadly acceptable in the light of the 
perceived Soviet threat. The ECSC Six had taken strides towards economic integration 
with their promotion of a customs union. Given the failure of the EDC and the realisation 
of the requirements of, and indeed for, US hegemony, the Six were to adopt a `defence 
last' approach to European integration. However, satisfaction with institutional 
arrangements was seldom more than grudgingly temporary. The Atlantic alliance was 
racked throughout the period by concerns regarding credibility, burden sharing and the 
costs of leadership. As early as 1956, events in Hungary and Suez had demonstrated to all 
three major European allies that their interests, however imperative, would not be allowed 
to prevail over those of their stronger 'partner'. ' As the limitations of the Alliance became 
increasingly evident to the Europeans, Soviet technological advances, symbolised by the 
launch of Sputnik in 1957, called into question the credibility of the US extended 
deterrence strategy. In a situation of emerging nuclear parity mutual interest in the 
avoidance of super-power confrontation led to increasing European fears of 
`peripheralism', under the belligerent-partnership of Super-Power condominium. Perennial 
concerns about the cost of American leadership led the Europeans to seek increased 
influence, whether through the development of `independent' capabilities or through 
greater involvement in the development and management of alliance nuclear strategy. 
From 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) was to provide for the re- 
emergence of Europe as an economic power, whilst the exclusion of the UK from the 
1 Whilst the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 may have served to reinforce the realities 
of the Soviet threat, it also demonstrated what Grosser refers to as `a tacit modus vivendi , 
born from the fear 
of a general war, which attributed to each of the two powers spheres of influence in which the other was 
compelled... not to intervene'. Grosser, A. 
"Suez, Hungary and European Integration', International 
Organisation, Vol. 11,1957, p. 471. More far reaching in its implications for future alliance relationships was 
US condemnation of Anglo/French action in Suez in support of what was seen as vital interests in the 
Middle East, Soviet nuclear threats being accompanied by American threats of economic sanction. 
Robertson, T. Crisis, London, Hutchinson. 1965. 
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evolving Communities, firstly through British resistance and then by French rejection, was 
to provide a further point of contention in a Community where integrationist tendencies 
were already in conflict with Gaullist nationalism. 
US post-war policy toward Europe had been guided by the desire to establish strong bonds, 
encouraging European unity and creating Atlantic Community, and it was thought that 
these two elements would be in harmony. Short-term economic sacrifices would be 
acceptable for the US in the pursuit of a strong and prosperous Europe, devoid of conflict- 
promoting nationalisms and capable of participating in a common front against the 
Soviets. 2 However, during the 1950s concerns were developing as to the benefits of the 
European integration process for US interests and by the early 1960s, Europe began to 
emerge as an economic competitor to the US. The economic success of the evolving 
common market contrasted with chronic US balance of payments problems, prompting US 
concerns over access to foreign markets. 3 As successive American Administrations sought 
to redefine the concept of Atlantic Partnership and Community, the linkage between 
economic and defence `interdependence', substantiated by the Nixon doctrine, served to 
point up the contradictions in US/European relations. 
As the two `big ideas' for European security were developed, in collective defence terms 
within the Atlantic Alliance, and in integrative terms within the Europe of the Six, the 
WEU was bound by its treaty obligations to restrict its own development and function to 
whatever provided a support to these primary organisations. Once the Federal Republic 
had been successfully incorporation into the Atlantic Alliance, a lack of consensus 
emerged amongst members as to the direction that the `hybrid' WEU should take. Given 
the lack of member agreement as to the preferred nature of transatlantic and Community 
development, it is unsurprising that the extent to which WEU could and should seek to 
pursue its dual aims of promoting European integration and Atlantic Alliance was as 
contentious as the means by which this might be achieved. Consequently, national players 
sought to utilise WEU to forward their own visions of what would constitute an acceptable 
institutional order. This chapter explores the nature of WEU's dual support role by 
examining the development of the institution during the period from its formation in 1955 
2 Wolfers notes that American support of European unity had been `one of the few persistent and bipartisan 
features of post-war United States policy. ' Wolfers, `Integration in the West: The Conflict of Perspectives', 
International Organisations, Vol. 17, Pt. 3,1963, p. 755. 
'See Wallich, H. C. `The United States and the European Economic Community: A problem of adjustment', 
International Organisation, Vol. 22,1968, pp. 841-854. 
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to its decline into `somnolence' in 1973. During these years the potential functions of 
WEU were the subject of much debate. An examination of those functions that WEU 
developed as well as those which were limited or stillborn provides insight into the utility 
of WEU in meeting the interests of participant states. In so doing, it highlights the tensions 
that existed within Europe as the centre for integration, within the Alliance as the 
constituency for collective defence, and between these two processes as central elements of 
the European security environment. 
The early debate 
That the role of WEU at its creation was at best ambiguous was demonstrated by the 
wranglings between the Council and Assembly as to the nature of the WEU's mandate and 
commitments. At the Assembly's opening Session in July 1955, Paul-Henri Spaak, 
Chairman of the WEU Council, noted the Council's intention to pursue a policy of peace, 
to reinforce security, to strive for unity and to encourage the gradual integration of Europe 
with closer co-operation internally and with the other European organisations 4. However, 
by 1956 the Council was to proclaim a minimalist role for WEU stating that `at present 
WEU should be regarded only as the repository of the solemn undertaking to afford mutual 
assistance embodied in Article V of the revised Brussels Treaty, and the guardian of 
procedure laid down in Article VIII', 5 with defence obligations being fulfilled through 
NATO. 6 The maximalist, or Assembly position, sought a far broader role for the WEU that 
included both the active promotion of European integration and the supervision of defence 
responsibilities encharged to NATO. In the 1956 Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments report to the Assembly it was requested of the Council, `.... not to take too 
restrictive a view about its relative competence with regard to NATO'. Whilst it was `right 
and practical that their general responsibility for security should be discharged through 
NATO' this should not preclude the communication of relevant information to the 
Assembly where, `if we discuss the issues in common, in a European Assembly, this forms 
a valuable corrective to the tendency in all national parliaments to look at plans involving 
4 WEU Assembly, (Session 1, Part 1), Proceedings, 1st Sitting, Official Report of Debates, 5 July 1955. 
5 See WEU Assembly Document 17,10 July 1956. 
6 See WEU Assembly, (Session 3: Part 1), Proceedings. Vol. 2,1957, pp. 10-11. In the Council's 2nd Report 
to the Assembly in 1957 it reiterated its position that `sole responsibility for planning defence policy and 
organizing common defence' had been transferred to NATO as of April 1951 and whilst there was a certain 
devolution of military tasks to WEU under the Paris Agreements, `no steps were taken to re-establish military 
planning or command machinery'. 
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considerable sacrifice solely from the point of view of immediate national advantage, 
rather than in the perspective of European security as a whole'. 7 
This liberal interpretation of the Assembly's role was agreed by the Council, after initial 
reticence, in its second annual report. 8 However, Whilst the Assembly would meet to 
discuss a range of useful reports produced by its `General Affairs' (GAC) and `Defence 
Questions and Armaments' (DQAC) Committees, `the Council would frequently respond 
to subsequent Assembly Recommendations by bald assertions that the issue had been noted 
or that the matter was one reserved for NATO'. 9 Despite numerous Assembly attempts to 
get some political accountability from the Council, the Assembly lacked the teeth to do 
much more than disagree with the specific content of Council Reports. 1° Although 
formally sensitive to the Assembly's concerns, ll the Council's position remained 
essentially a minimalist one. The consequence of Council intransigence was a disheartened 
Assembly. Thus it was noted as early as 1956 that `the members of the Assembly only 
attend the meetings of the committees and the plenary sessions of the Assembly out of 
politeness or a sense of duty and not because they are convinced of the prime importance 
of the Assembly and of the problems which it discusses'. 12 
One explanation of the Council's intransigence may be found in the attitudes of the British 
toward their own creation. Clearly for the British, the WEU was something of an 
`unwanted child', an entity which had served its purpose by ensuring a German 
contribution to NATO and thus, an American commitment to the Continent. The British 
WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Fens, `Activities of Western European Union in the Sphere of 
Security and the Production and Control of Armaments', Doc. 12,17 April 1956, p. 71. See Assembly's 
repeated request, following Council rejection of the Assembly invitation to attend a debate on the matter in 
October 1956, that the Council `urgently review their present interpretation of the amended Treaty of 
Brussels with regards to functions of Western European Union in the defence field'. Recommendation 6 of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in WEU Assembly (Session 2: Part 2). Proceedings, 
Vol. 4,1956, p. 117. 
8 `The Council appreciate the Assembly's desire to consider broader aspects of defence than those to which 
the Council must limit themselves and to debate these activities against the background of a general policy'. 
Document 37,25 February 1957. This was an important decision as neither the Consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe or the European Parliament could discuss these issues in a meaningful manner. 
9 Gordon, C. op. cit., 1973, p. 251. 
10 The Assembly's Charter provides for a `motion of disapproval' of the Council report. For full discussion of 
the issue see Curtis, M. West European Integration, New York, Harper Rowe, 1965, Chapter 5. 
" By 1957, the Council had recognized the legitimacy of the Assembly's demand for adequate documentation 
on defence matters that it was entitled to discuss, conceded the obligation to furnish such information in 
Annual Reports, and accepted that joint meetings between Council and Assembly representatives might be 
useful. See WEU Assembly, (Session 3: Part 1), Proceedings, Vol. 2,1957, p. 6. 
12 WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Senghor, `Activities of WEU in the Cultural Field', Doc. 21,19 
September 1956. 
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perception of WEU was essentially as a European element of the Atlantic Alliance. Whilst 
some may have hoped that the WEU had succeeded in convincing the UK of its 
inextricable security links with Europe, British attitudes toward its WEU commitments 
over the following years were soon to dispel any early optimism. 13 Britain did not share the 
continental's enthusiasm for the European integration process and political integration was, 
from London's view, more likely to undermine than enhance the Atlantic relationship. The 
British government sought a broader approach to European co-operation than that being 
pursued by the ECSC Six, as reflected in its European Free Trade Area (EFTA) plans. The 
UK's `Grand Design' proposals of October 1956 foresaw the Atlantic Alliance providing 
the high military and political direction to Europe, a single Atlantic Assembly overseeing 
semi-autonomous commissions, membership varying dependent on issue, covering all 
aspects of western co-operation. 14 Sold as a means to rationalise the increasing number of 
European institutions, the `Design' would prevent the establishment of a `little Europe' and 
undermine WEU as an expression of European identity. Thus, for the British, the Grand 
Design was essentially an Atlantic option, grouping the Six in a broader framework and 
limiting WEU to a `defence support role' to NATO. The UK's refusal to play a 
constructive part in WEU in its early years contributed to the institution's political 
decline. 15 
The interests of the major continental powers in the early development of WEU were 
reflected in the maximalist position of the Assembly. Defence through NATO may have 
been recognised as a necessity of European dependence, but the six continental members 
of WEU had continued to develop their interest in an integrated Europe in the area of low 
politics. At the Messina Conference in June 1955, they had begun the process of 
constructing a European common market. 16 Whilst WEU had been devised as a result of 
the failure of integration in the defence field, it had been conceived with the established 
aim to `promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. ' 
Consequently, for the continental members of WEU pursuing economic integration 
13 See Schmid, C. Ten Years of Seven Power Europe, Paris, Assembly of Western European Union, 1964, 
p. 12. 
14 PRO: CAB 129/84: CP(57)6, `The Grand Design' (Co-operation with Western Europe), Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 5 January 1957. 
's Confalonieri notes that `Until December 1958 the contradictory positions of the Six and of the UK 
condemned WEU to be no more than a forum, but an important forum for defence questions, carrying out but 
little weight in the political field. Confalonieri, Ten Years, Paris, WEU Assembly, 1964, p. 77. 
16 ̀The next phase in building of a united Europe must lie in the economic field'. Final communique, Messina 
Meeting of ECSC, June 1955. It was also agreed at Messina to establish a European Atomic Energy Agency, 
EURATOM. 
59 
through ongoing negotiations on a European Economic Community, the WEU represented 
something more than simply a largely symbolic support for an Atlantic defence 
commitment. During the ratification debate on the Paris Agreements in the French 
National Assembly, 23 December 1954, Mendes-France identified the WEU's broad area 
of competence and noted that `the contribution to the construction of Europe is infinitely 
more important to the future of our civilisation than the military clauses of the agreements 
which are now before you'. 17 Chancellor Adenauer stated that the WEU had `primarily 
political significance and aims' and would be `the starting point and nucleus of future 
European policy'. 18 
Having rejected the British `Design' as an attempt to undermine European integration by 
enlargement, 19 the Assembly sought clarification of the role of WEU. Recommendations in 
the Assembly's GAC report of 195620 included more regular Council meetings to discuss 
major issues concerning European interests and the co-ordination of instructions given to 
the permanent delegates of member states to NATO and the United Nations. It also 
recommended that the Council re-examine the relationship between the UK and the Six 
after ratification of Euratom and the Common Market so as to co-ordinate efforts to 
achieve European unity. In noting that the `moral and political imbalance' in NATO 
resulting from US leadership was `harmful to the efficiency of the Organisation', the report 
goes on to state that `the necessary balance can only be established if the principal powers 
of Western Europe transcend their differences... and unite, finally, to achieve European 
integration'. Hence WEU, as one of the `bases of European unity', could contribute to both 
defence and integration through the provision of the `political framework' for European 
unity. 21 British opposition to any attempt to make WEU an organisation for political co- 
operation was evidenced by the narrow majority for the report's recommendations. 
22 
17 Cited in Borcier, P. op. cit., 1963, p. 6. 
18 Cited in Borcier, P. The Assembly of Western European Union: Its contribution to the defence and building 
of Europe since 1955, Paris, WEU Assembly, 1975, p. 42. 
19 The British plan would create a `vague amorphous body, whose internal working would be of 
unprecedented complexity, and within which the real powers already won by some Assemblies might 
gradually sweep away'. WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr van Naters, `European Assemblies - the 
`Grand Design", Doc. 45,5 April 1957. 
20 See Senghor Report, WEU Assembly Document 41, p. 73 and Para. 23, pp. 404-405. 
21 WEU Assembly, Proceedings, Vol. 1,1957. 
22 The UK promoted the broader Council of Europe as a more appropriate political forum and it was agreed 
in June 1956 that the WEU would limit its activity to discussion of the military aspects of defence so as to 
avoid duplication with the Council of Europe, although reserving the right to extend discussion to the 
political where there was a direct link to military issues. Palmer and Lambert, op. cit., p. 336 were to note in 
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Borcier suggests that this `reflected the difficult circumstances in which WEU found itself 
and revealed the Assembly as a cross-roads of conflicting designs'. 23 
WEU and the politics of European co-operation 
By 1957, having successfully provided a resolution to the Saar dispute24 and transferred its 
social and cultural competencies to the Council of Europe25 the WEU's future direction 
seemed uncertain given the lack of consensus amongst member states. The WEU 
Assembly winter session of 1958 marked a shift in British policy that was to lead to the 
promotion of WEU as a vehicle for enhanced European political co-operation. The Rome 
Treaties, establishing the EEC and Euratom, had been signed by the Six in March 1957. In 
providing for the removal of internal tariffs, the freedom of labour, capital and enterprise 
movement and a community budget, the Six had taken clear steps toward Community- 
building in Europe. 26 The failure of the UK's alternative EFTA plan in the Autumn of 
1958, combined with a decline in the `special relationship' after Suez and a muting of 
Commonwealth relations, had led to a change in British attitudes to Europe. Whilst the 
British government continued to harbour fears about economic integration, increased co- 
operation within WEU might provide a means of drawing the Six closer to the UK, 
1968, that `in practice this has not restricted the WEU Assembly from the discussion of the politics as well as 
the military aspects of defence'. 
23 Borcier, op. cit., 1963, p. 15. 
24 Following the rejection of the Saar Statute in the October 1955 Referendum organised by the WEU's Five- 
Power Commission, the 'WEU Commission in the Saar' functioned as a caretaker government until the 
holding of a general election, establishing an International Tribunal to ensure fair and unprejudicial voting. 
Following further negotiations, during which economic concessions were provisioned for France, the Saar 
was incorporated into the Federal Republic on 1 January 1957, spelling the end of the WEU's unique 
supervision role. See Patterson, E. J. 'The Saar Referendum', European Yearbook, Vol. 4,1956, pp. 226-239. 
Paving the way for Franco-German reconciliation, the Saar resolution was seen as an early coup for WEU. 
Cahen, A. The Western European Union and NATO. Building a European Defence Identity within the 
Context of Atlantic Solidarity, London, Brasseys, 1989, p. 5. 
25The WEU's Cultural and a Social Sections had been active in establishing joint European courses and 
information exchange and in seeking to establish harmonisation of activity and legislation on Social 
Questions, Public Health, and the Rehabilitation and Resettlement of the Disabled, including aspects of civil 
defence and the use of atomic energy. See WEU Assembly Documents, First Annual Report 1955, p 19,208- 
9 and Second Annual Report 1957, pp. 23-5. Agreement to pass over these competencies to the Council of 
Europe was reached on the basis of the rationalisation of European institutional competencies. See 
WEUAssembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Struye, `Creation of a Fourth Assembly', Doc. 34,15 December 
1956. 
26 Entering into force 1 January 1958, the institutions of these communities were modelled on those of the 
ECSC, sharing a parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice. However, these new communities had a 
Commission instead of a High Authority for an executive, demonstrating a weakened federalism and a 
strengthening of member governments in the Council, a position accentuated by De Gaulle's election to the 
French Presidency in June 1958 and the merging of the executive Commission in 1965. 
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preventing the emergence of a widening gap as integration took off amongst the Six. 
27 
Consequently, during the winter session of the WEU Assembly in 1958, the UK began to 
promote political competence for the WEU Assembly. 28 
Despite Britain's resistance to the `European option', the Assembly of WEU was keen to 
keep the Community's door open for the UK. Consequently, at its June 1959 session, the 
Assembly established a political secretariat to ensure regular consultation between Britain 
and the Six, and the new Secretary General, Mr Badini Confalonieri, dedicated himself 
`wholeheartedly to the task of making Western European Union a bridge over the 
Channel' 
. 
29 The Assembly went on to `affirm the importance of the political functions of 
Western European Union' and to encourage the Council to `develop and increase political 
consultation ... 
in keeping with the spirit of Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Treaty'. 30In 
order to further promote the political role of the Assembly, the Michaud Report of 
December 1959 facilitated a reorganisation of the structure of the Secretariat-General and 
established joint meetings between the WEU Council and the Assembly at the level of the 
GAC. 31 
By the December 1959 Assembly debates a British Minister, John Profumo, was able to 
announce officially a revision of British policy, stating that `whereas when WEU came into 
being we in Britain were determined to draw Europe closer together, we are now 
determined to draw closer to Europe'. In response to the agreement of the Six in November 
1959 to intensify their political consultation and have regular quarterly ministerial 
consultative meetings on political questions, Profumo suggested that `... political 
consultations among the Six.. . might 
immediately be followed by a meeting of the Western 
27 For a discussion of the factors for and against British entry into the EEC see discussion in Pfaltzgraff, R. L. 
Jr, Britain faces Europe, Philadelphia, 1969, pp. 61-68. 
28 WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 1958, Vol. 3, Document 98. The UK's Conservative delegate Peter Kirk, 
speaking at the Assembly, 18 December 1958, stated `Of course, this is a political Assembly. Its main task 
may be to discuss defence, but the fact remains that it is also an Assembly of politicians representing seven 
nations. We are politicians and that is why we are here and we must be able to discuss politics. ' WEU 
Assembly, Proceedings, 1958, Vol. 4, p. 142. 
29 See Confalonieri, op. cit. 
30 See WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Michaud, "Activities of Western European Union in Political 
Questions', Doc. 36,20 May 1959, (Resolution 36) for proposals. 
31 WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Michaud, `Policy of Member States of Western European Union', 
Doc. 148,13 November 1959 (Resolution 38). 
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European Union Council at Ministerial level'. 32 By establishing the WEU as the `keystone 
of British policy in Europe' the British hoped to prevent a gap from developing between 
themselves and the Six. 33 As the first of these Council meetings took place in February 
1960, the British continued to promote alternatives to the EEC, seeking to use WEU as a 
bridge between EFTA34 and EEC although, since only one of the EFTA Seven was in 
WEU, there were clear limitations. A British observer was to note at the time that in order 
for WEU to be useful as an instrument of greater co-operation with mainland Europe it 
would require that the British move beyond `using the Union as a useful tool to get round 
the embarrassment caused by the creation of the Six; at the moment the omens are 
mixed' . 
3s 
Having considered the potential for the UK's partial membership of the Communities 
throughout 1960,36 the Assembly of WEU adopted Recommendation 53 in November, 
proposing that negotiations begin for the UK to join the three Communities. 37 Transmitted 
to the Council and Heads of Government, the Assembly initiative received wholehearted 
support and it was agreed that the Council would go forward with the recommendation to 
promote discussion between representatives of the Seven and the Commission of the EEC 
to prepare agreement for accession of the UK. Having taken `soundings', throughout the 
Autumn of 1960 through unofficial contacts in the WEU, the British Prime Minister, 
Harold Macmillan, had come to the view that any arrangement with the Common Market 
would have to be found on the basis of the Treaty of Rome and, therefore, that Britain 
32 See a condensed version of Profumo's address to the WEU Assembly, `Determined to Draw Closer to 
Europe', European Atlantic Review, Winter 1959-60, p. 5 and see WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 1959, Vol. 
4, pp. 60-61. 
33 See Kirk. P. `Keystone of European Unity', European Atlantic Review, Winter, 1959-60, p. 4. 
34 The British had continued with their EFTA plan after its rejection by the Six in December 1958, 
establishing a loose trading Association with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland 
under the Stockholm Convention of May 1960, to be enlarged later by the inclusion of Iceland and Finland. 
35 Kirk, op. cit., p. 5. 
36 The Conte Report of the GAC had recommended UK membership of EURATOM, although this was 
rejected by the Six who sought a more cohesive Europe. See WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr 
Conte, 'Policy of Western Europe - The varying fortunes of the building of Europe', Doc. 168,30 May 1960, 
Recommendation 48. 
37'The policy of member states of Western European Union', Document 184,17 November 1960. Borcier 
notes, `this document will occupy a place of honour in the archives concerning the building of Europe, since 
for all the member governments of WEU it is an authentic programme of European Community action 
providing for British participation, subject to London's readiness to play its part'. Borcier, op. cit., 1963, 
p. 35. 
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should apply to join the Six. 38 This revolutionary shift in UK policy orientation from the 
Commonwealth and EFTA to the EEC was largely the result of a decline in British trade 
with the Commonwealth, whilst the EEC's significance to British industry as a buyer and a 
competitor had increased. On 31 July, Macmillan, announced to the House of Commons 
his intention to apply for full British membership of the EEC, under Article 237 of the 
Treaty of Rome, and on the first day of August 1961, the British chose the WEU Council 
meeting as the forum for their official notification to the Six of their accession intentions. 
Having established the WEU as the bridge across the channel, Britain now sought to use it 
as a vehicle for facilitating its approach and accession to the Europe of the Six. As the 
Deputy Secretary General of WEU was to note, `that this was the forum chosen illustrates 
the role played by the WEU as the prefiguration of the enlarged European Community, and 
the intimate connection of the WEU with the whole process leading up to the British 
decision. '39 Most significantly, Borcier was to note that the `psychological contribution' of 
the WEU Assembly in preparing the way for British application for accession to the 
Communities during this period `is impossible to over-emphasise. 40 
Following the official notification of British intentions, the Council of WEU was to 
provide one forum for dialogue on UK accession to the EEC. Subsequent reports submitted 
to the WEU Assembly found the Seven unanimous in their optimism regarding the 
negotiations41 and keen to promote all efforts to reach a successful conclusion, providing, 
that was, that any future agreement `in no respect allow a weakening of European 
integration on a Community basis, as laid down in the letter and enshrined in the spirit of 
the Treaties of Paris and Rome'. 42 In addition to providing technical assistance to the 
38 For Macmillan's rationale see Sampson, A. Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity, London, Penguin, 1967, 
p. 207. 
39 Salter, N. `Western European Union: the role of the Assembly 1954 - 1963', International Affairs, Vol. 40, 
No. 1, January 1964, p. 39. 
40Borcier, op. cit., 1963, p. 32. 
41 Whilst Italy and the Benelux supported British entry as a counterweight to the Franco-German relationship, 
the US encouraged British entry on the grounds that `British membership of the EEC would in the first place 
mean the end of the EFTA with its `unhealthy' tinge of neutrality. It would also presumably counteract any 
European pretensions to `third force' status and help to weld Europe more firmly into the Atlantic 
partnership'. `President Kennedy's "Grand Design": The United States and a United Europe', The World 
Today, September 1962, p. 387. 
42 WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Leynen, `Progress in negotiations for the entry of the United 
Kingdom in to the European Economic Community', Doc. 219,11 December 1961: Recommendation 71. 
See also Docs. 235,3 May 1962 and 252,2 December 1963, on `Progress in Negotiations... ' 
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negotiators, 43 transmitting reports via the Council to negotiators in Brussels, the Assembly 
was to act as a forum and testing ground for a range of new European ideas, 
44as a liaison 
and contact institution between politicians of the Continent and UK, and as a public 
relations agency and psychological promoter for the concept of a Seven power Europe. As 
the only institution that contained only and at least the Seven it was ideal for this role. 
France and Fouchet 
The salience of the WEU's role in facilitating British entry to the Communities reflects 
French intransigence, connected with French President Charles de Gaulle's, attitudes 
toward the building of Europe. Adamantly opposed to European integration during the 
1940s and 1950s, de Gaulle, having taken office in 1958, began to identify the potential 
benefits to France of the EEC as a loose confederal system of European states. Such an 
entity could enhance French leadership in Western Europe and contribute to the weakening 
of influence of the external powers of the `Anglo-Saxons'. Whilst many Europeanists 
feared that the UK might act as a buttress against supra-national institutions, De Gaulle's 
concerns were rather that the UK might prevent the development of the EEC as a `vehicle 
of French grandeur', 45 whilst integration based on a model preferred by the US could only 
provide for enhanced US influence. 46 Consequently, the French vision was at odds with 
that of its federalist-minded allies. They sought the gradual enhancement of integration 
u See for example the WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Mathew, `The Policy of member states of 
Western European Union - Implementation of Recommendation 53: Examination of arrangements necessary 
for the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community', Doc. 200,29 April 1961; 
the Mathew report of November 1962, (Doc. 249) considered the legal implications for the British 
Constitution of EEC accession and, in the same month, M. Albert Sorel (Fr) reported on the consequences of 
British accession for Community institutions. (Doc. 248). 
44 See WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Confalonieri, `The future pattern of Europe, ', Doc. 228,4 
April 1962. See UK Statement to WEU Council, 10 April 1962, cited in Salter, op. cit., p. 42 in which the UK 
government `quite accept that the European Political Union, if it is to be effective, will have a common 
concern for defence problems, and that a European point of view on defence would emerge. ' 
45 Dougherty, J. `European Deterrence and Atlantic Unity', Orbis, Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 1962, p. 396. De Gaulle 
recollects that `I intended to assure French primacy in Western Europe by preventing the rise of a new 
(German) Reich that might again threaten its safety; to co-operate with East and West, and, if need be, 
contract the necessary alliances, on the one side or the other, without ever accepting any kind of dependency; 
to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic and strategic 
bloc and to press forward this organization as one of the three world powers, and, should it become 
necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps'. De Gaulle, Pres C. Memoirs, Vol. 
3,1960, pp. 204-205. 
46 As Hoffmann notes, for de Gaulle, `... the alternative to a Gaullist policy for Europe would be an American 
policy in Europe, either promoted by America's `clients' or filling the vacuum left by conflicting European 
policies that would cancel each other out'. Hoffmann, S. `The European Process at Atlantic Cross-Purposes', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2,1964-5, p. 98. Also see Lange, H. `European Integration 
and Atlantic Partnership', Atlantic Communities Quarterly, Vol. 1, Pt. 4,1963-4, p. 514. 
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within an enlarged Community, whilst de Gaulle looked towards developing an 
intergovernmental arrangement for cooperation amongst the Six across a broad range of 
issues, including defence and foreign affairs. 47 
The Fouchet Committee, mandated by the Six to study the problems of European co- 
operation, accepted a draft treaty submitted by the French government on 19 October 1961 
as the basis for subsequent discussions. The first Fouchet proposals foresaw the 
establishment of a `Union of States', the aims of which were to include the adoption of 
common foreign and defence policies, although it was noted that this would contribute to a 
strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. 48 The European Union was to be based on 
unanimous decision-making within a Council of Government Heads, supported by a 
permanent political committee and a consultative parliament. However, on the 18 January 
1962, de Gaulle presented a revised draft treaty to the Committee 49 in which any reference 
to NATO or provisions for new memberships were excluded, and where economic policy 
would come under the auspices of this new intergovernmental body. 5° 
Meeting in Luxembourg on 20 March and Paris on 17 April, the Foreign Ministers of the 
six could reach no agreement. The original Fouchet draft had the support of the British, 
who favoured a loose form of international association,, 51 and the Federalists, who saw it as 
an incremental step toward federalism given the priority of involving Britain in any future 
union. 52 The second draft not only moved away from the incremental federalism implied 
by the Treaty of Rome, but carried significant implications for the developing relationship 
with the UK and the future of the transatlantic relationship. 
47'The path to be followed must be that of organised co-operation between States, while waiting to achieve, 
perhaps, an imposing confederation'. De Gaulle speech cited in France and the European Community, PEP 
Occasional Paper 11, p. 18. 
48 This Article (2) had been added to the original draft on the insistence of Adenauer amongst others. See 
Duke, S. op. cit., 2000, p. 47. 
49See The Financial Times, 15 March 1962 that has the two drafts side by side. 
50De Gaulle was to restate this position on the 15 May, when he argued at a Press conference that, as all 
economic issues were essentially political, they shouldn't be left to supra-national bureaucrats. See Johnson, 
C. `De Gaulle's Europe', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2,1962, p. 162. 
s' Whilst Britain was excluded from the Fouchet discussions, paradoxically, De Gaulle's `Europe des Patries' 
would have found favour with the British government, resistant as it was to supranationalism. See British 
White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 14, Cmd. 1720, London, HMSO, 1962. 
52The treaty was to be revised after 3 years as a sop to the federalists who might approve the plan on the basis 
that it might be the best achievable at the present time. The Luxembourg compromise of 1965 was to 
disabuse federalists of any potential for enhanced integration under De Gaulle. 
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Whilst the WEU Council had been effectively side-lined by the Community discussion on 
political union and UK accession, 53 Heath's address to the WEU Assembly a week before 
the Luxembourg meeting effectively polarised debate on these issues. In his `preamble 
anglais' he argued the case for British inclusion in discussion on the future structure of 
Europe, a position that resulted in Belgian and Dutch refusal to sign any proposals for 
Political Union that excluded the UK. 54 The French refused to accept recognition within 
the draft of the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance framework. Thus, the rejection of both 
Fouchet plans was largely a consequence of persistent disagreement amongst the Six as to 
the nature of political union, the place of the UK within that union, and the place of 
defence both within the union and within the broader Atlantic Alliance. On the 29 January 
1963, at the insistence of the French, negotiations on British accession to the Communities 
were discontinued. 
Interestingly, a report by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to note that, in 1963 
`it was generally believed that such a crisis would shake WEU to its foundations by putting 
it in a position from which it was difficult to see how it would extract itself. Contrary to 
expectations the effect was quite the opposite. ' 55 Rather than undermining the WEU, 
problems in the Communities context actually served to stimulate it into action. Given the 
French veto on further accession talks, the WEU could provide the vehicle for the 
promotion of further links between the UK and the Six, preventing exclusion and isolation, 
and demonstrating the British interest in deepening European co-operation, whilst awaiting 
the political demise of De Gaulle. 
As early as June 1963, the British Minister Ted Heath was asking the WEU Assembly for a 
`Western European Union review of interests which member states have in common 
outside the NATO area, and the means which they deploy in support of these interests'. 56 
On 10 July 1963, the Council of Ministers of the EEC agreed to hold quarterly meetings in 
the framework of WEU to exchange views on the European economic situation and extra- 
53Curtis noted the relative ineffectuality of the WEU Council as a contributor to the solution of the accession 
issue. The Council failed to meet whilst negotiations for British entry into the EEC were taking place in 
Brussels in 1962, and only began to meet again at Foreign Minister level in July 1963. Michael Curtis, op. 
cit., p. 105. 
sa Duke, op. cit., 2000, pp. 48-49. That the negotiations on political union took place concomitantly with the 
British entry negotiations was not coincidental. For de Gaulle, it was imperative that the political character of 
the Economic Community should be determined before British entry. 
ss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, `Western European Union: History and Opinions', Memo 
From Belgium, No. 109-110, February/March 1969, p. 12. 
56 WEU Assembly, (Session 9: Part 1), Proceedings, 2nd Official Report, 1963, p. 78, col. 1. 
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European issues, attended by members of the Commission. 57 Thus `further proof was 
proffered of the political necessity of Western European Union' as the Council sought to 
`build bridges' between the UK and Six, meeting for the first time in 18 months at The 
Hague on 25-26 October 1963, for these discussions. 58 
Within the WEU itself the debate on the institution's political role continued. The 
unanimity rule within the Council had resulted in decision-making at the level of the 
lowest common denominator. Given De Gaulle's resistance to UK efforts to `exploit' the 
WEU in its EEC accession interests following the 1963 rejection, it was noted that `the six 
Ministers who want to act are forced to appear before the Assembly and in the eyes of 
public opinion as if they agreed with the only one who systematically boycotts their 
organisation'. 59 The high point of tension between the Council and Assembly came with 
the Assembly rejection of the Council's Annual Report in June 1967 in which the Council 
`ruled out' anything which might constitute a political assessment of its activities. 60 The 
Assembly was to be relegated to the position of a talking shop, the Council rejecting any 
supervisory or guidance role for the one European Assembly able to discuss the full range 
of political issues. 61 Whilst this `frustrating asymmetry of institutions' 62 did result in a level 
of `disillusionment' within the Assembly, 63it continued in its tradition of informative, 
unique and useful political reporting. 64 Consequently, the Assembly proved the more 
57 Salter, op. cit., p. 44. 
58Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 15. This link between the UK and the Six ensured that the UK was 
adequately represented at the European conference tables and helped to overcome `the tendency towards an 
economic fragmentation of Europe'. Plehwe, F. K. von. 'WEU's part in European construction', 
Aussenpolitik, Vol. 21, No. 2,1970, p. 152. 
59 Etienne de la Vallee Pussin, `England kept waiting on the doorstep of the European Communities' in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 44. 
60Pierre Werner, Chairman of the Council, presenting the 10th report, WEU Assembly, (Session 11: Part 1), 
Proceedings, 11th Session, Part 1,1st sitting, Official Report of Debates, 31 May 31 1965. 
61 See WEU Assembly, (Session 13: Part 1), Proceedings. 5th Sitting, July 1967, on Referral of Council 
Report. 
62 Burrows and Irwin, op. cit., p. 43. 
63 Gordon, op. cit., 1973, p. 251. 
64 Borcier notes, that despite some damning newspaper comment about the worthiness of the Assembly, `the 
authors of these reports have carried out extensive investigations and it would certainly be impossible 
anywhere else to find such a wealth of data, of comparative figures, conveying with equal clarity the present 
extent of Western European defence efforts. ' Borcier, P. Eight Years Work for European Defence: A Political 
Survey, Paris, WEU Assembly, 1964, p. 11. 
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effective body in articulating the debate and sounding out the views of all seven 
members. 65 
At the WEU Ministerial Meeting of 10 May 1967 the British Foreign Secretary George 
Brown had made the UK's second application for membership of the EEC on behalf of the 
Wilson Government, only to be rejected by De Gaulle less than a week later. Largely in 
response to this second French veto, at the Rome meeting of the WEU Council, on 21 
October 1968, Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel put forward a plan for closer cooperation 
between the UK and the Six within WEU. The scope of this cooperation was to include a 
range of issues not covered by the Rome treaty, including defence, foreign policy, 
technology and monetary affairs. 66 Despite French resistance, at the WEU Council meeting 
in Luxembourg in February 1969, it was agreed to consult on some foreign policy matters 
within WEU before national decision-making. In the light of a decision to hold a meeting 
of the Permanent Council to discuss the situation in the Middle East, De Gaulle instituted a 
French boycott of the Council. 67 It was clear to the French that, by another act of 
`diplomatic terrorism', the actions of the other Six WEU members were intended to force 
the hand of the French government, the proposed meeting being `one more step in the 
escalation, in which the British and their supporters have been indulging, to get around the 
French refusal to discuss among the seven British membership of the Common Market'. 68 
Following the departure of De Gaulle from office, agreement was reached at the Hague 
Summit in December 1969, on the reopening of EEC accession negotiations, to begin the 
following June. In response, Harmel made clear to the Assembly, in the session held one 
week after the Hague Summit, that `henceforth priority would go to the European 
Community... the European Communities remain the original core from which a European 
idea is developing and will continue to develop. ' Once again, as enlargement discussion 
began within the EEC, the Six began to discuss the potential for establishing a political 
community in Europe. The resulting Davignon Report led to a series of regular meetings 
65 Palmer and Lambert, op. cit., p. 340 note the importance of the Assembly in promoting discussion on 
political union after the failure of Fouchet and Gordon notes, `It could not avoid becoming an educator of 
national parliamentary opinion'. Gordon, op. cit., 1973, p. 252. 
66 WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr van der Stoel, `Political Organisations of European Defence', Doc. 
481,16 June 1969. See Gordon, op. cit., 1973, p. 255. 
67 The French boycott was at both the Ministerial and Permanent level, although they did continue to meet 
and co-operate with the agencies in Paris, i. e. the ACA, Secretariat of the SAC, and the Assembly. Von 
Plehwe, op. cit., 1970, p. 150. 
68 ̀Press Commentary' by French Foreign Ministry, 14 February 1969 cited in Barker, op. cit., p. 233. 
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between Foreign Ministers and senior foreign ministry officials, collectively referred to as 
European Political Co-operation (EPC), a process outside of the Treaty of Rome and 
intended as a vehicle for the harmonisation of members' foreign policies. 69 Whilst 
committing the Six to nothing less inter-governmental than the WEU arrangement, the 
significance of the Davignon Report was that it demonstrated the political choice of the 
Six, `opting away from WEU towards the Economic Community, yet nevertheless 
independent of it'. 70As Gordon was to note, with the establishment of EPC as an element 
of the EEC and negotiations reopening on accession, `the turn of the decade seemed to 
some observers to mark the end of the line for WEU'. 71 
In June 1971 the `Amrehn Report' of the Assembly's GAC sought to establish what the 
`tasks and competences' of the WEU should be `in view of the extension and strengthening 
of the European Common Market'. 72 This report identifies the debate in Europe on the 
precise competencies of the extended Community, a debate that opposed two camps: those 
who sought an exclusively economic inter-relationship, and the integrationalists who 
advocated decisive cooperation in the additional areas of defence, foreign policy and 
technology. Whilst the Assembly was sensitive to the inter-relationship between these 
areas, it noted that few states would be prepared to accept the same level of integration 
allowed in economics to operate elsewhere and most particularly in defence. For this 
reason the report suggests that two separate organisations might be better than having to 
`bring the more advanced communal structures down to the level of the more backward. ' 
Whilst proposals were aired for the potential fusion of the EEC and WEU Assemblies and 
the inclusion of WEU's executive organs in the EC as the basis of its `political and defence 
wing', 73 it was argued that the European Parliament would be unable to handle providing 
initiative and control for so many areas of public life, whilst the many years of experience 
in defence matters accrued by the Assembly made it a specialist in these areas. A merger of 
WEU with the EC would also raise the question of the automatic assistance clause of the 
Brussels Treaty, a stronger clause than NATO's Article V, given that not all members of 
69 For pessimistic contemporaneous view of the possibilities of the Davignon proposals see Gordon, C. 
`European Defence: A return to Brussels? ', Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 48, No. 22,1971, pp. 19-21 & 36- 
37. 
70 Burrows & Irwin , op. cit., p. 
121. 
71 Gordon, op. cit., 1973, p. 253. 
72 WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Amhren, `Evolution of the European Institutions', Doc. 543,14 
June 1971, Recommendation 204. 
73 See for example British Labour Peer, Lord Gladwyn's proposals, The Daily Telegraph, 20 May 1971. 
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the EC were WEU members, or sought Article V cover. The dissolution of WEU would 
also compel a reconsideration of the supervision and control of armed forces clauses and, if 
they were to continue, the management of these clauses and their extension to the rest of 
the Community. For these reasons the French Deputy of the GAC advocated `evolution of 
the Political Union from the WEU'. 74 The Assembly further recommended to the Council 
that steps should be taken within WEU to `work out a European defence policy within the 
framework of the North Atlantic Pact'. 75 
In fact, as EEC enlargement became an imminent reality, the WEU began to look 
increasingly unhealthy at the Ministerial level. British interest in WEU development had 
been largely satisfied by its coming accession to the EEC whilst, for the French, the WEU 
was not the means of achieving serious co-operation in defence terms for Europeans, given 
that the WEU `symbolises the most serious defect of NATO: the split between the 
"Europeanists" and "Atlanticists". ' 76 Some saw British accession to the EEC as the means 
of `lifting the most obvious constraint on its (EEC's) progress from an economic to 
`political' stage of existence', since the schism between the three major powers had been 
removed. 77 Given French ambivalence towards Atlanticism, the EEC increasingly seemed 
to represent the only means of developing any kind of effective foreign policy dialogue. 78 
With the accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973, the WEU Council ceased to meet, its 
political activities having effectively come to a halt in 1972. Nevertheless, the Assembly 
continued to provide a forum for dialogue of political issues and to promote closer 
European identity in defence. 
74 Destremau, M. Le Monde, 28 January 1971. See Plehwe, F. K. von. `WEU and the European Insititutions, 
Aussenpolitik, Vol. 22, No. 4,1971, pp. 421-422. 
75 See Amhren report above. 
76 Lee Williams, G and A. Crisis in European Defence: The Next Ten Years, London, C. Knight, 1974. p. 253 
Lee Williams suggests that `original French cynicism about the WEU has turned into a Gaullist resolve to use 
it not for its original purpose of consultation amongst like-minded allies but as a means to block the growth 
of political consensus among them. '. 
7' Duchene, F. `The Strategic Consequences of the Enlarged European Community', Survival, Vol. 15, No. 1, 
1973, p. 2. 
78 ̀ Observers in Paris believe that an EEC backcloth would stand the best chance of strengthening defence 
contacts with France'. Stanhope, H. `Spreading the butter over 27 years of peace in Europe', The Times, 23 
August 1972. 
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The WEU and the management of defence 
Arms control 
The Modified Brussels Treaty contained within it a significant Article V commitment to 
collective defence. However, the WEU Treaty commitment to `rely on the appropriate 
military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters' suggests that 
it may have been effectively emasculated in its defence management role. 79 A consistent 
feature throughout the period was the minimalist position taken by the WEU Council with 
regard to defence issues. 80 Nevertheless, the WEU had been mandated with one significant 
area of `military' activity, significant in that it had enabled the acceptance of the Paris 
Agreements of 1954. The WEU's asymmetrical arms limitations had limited member 
states' possession, manufacture and deployment of a range of armaments both 
conventional and non-conventional (`ABC'). 8' The most heavily restricted member of the 
WEU, West Germany had, in effect, bought its place in Europe at the expense of a heavily 
controlled military rearmament programme. 82 Britain, whilst excluded from these 
restrictions, had enabled continental acceptance of the modified treaty largely on the basis 
of its inscribed commitments to troop deployments on mainland Europe. 83 Consequently, 
the maxima and minima prescribed by the WEU treaty and to be managed through the 
Council's Arms Control Agency were a central element of the management of defence in 
Europe. 
The prospects for the development of an effective arms control regime through the 
auspices of WEU did not, however, appear promising, with growing concerns by the mid 
1950s over the nature of the US defence commitment to Europe. Acceptance of European 
dependence on US nuclear capability for its defence interests had been shaken by the Suez 
79 Modified Brussels Treaty, Article IV. 
80 Whilst, from 1958, the WEU Council regularly discussed classified information with the Assembly's 
Committees and provided special briefings for interested members at the behest of the Assembly, (and 
notably against a NATO ruling), it was noted in 1972 that `The WEU Council has retained a general 
consultative function at quarterly ministerial meetings but these meetings have practically never been used 
for consultation about defence'. Burrows & Irwin , op. cit., p. 122. 
81 Atomic, biological, chemical. 
82 See Protocols II and III of The MBT, especially Protocol III, Annex 1 Declaration by the Federal 
Chancellor. 
83 See Protocol II, Art VI of the MBT. 
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debacle in 1956.84 Assembly reports urging the maintenance of substantial conventional 
forces reflected European concerns that `it was unquestionably impossible from a 
psychological viewpoint for the representatives of European peoples physically in contact 
with the potential enemy to entrust their electors' safety wholly to the deterrent effect of 
the American nuclear force'. 85 The question of appropriate and efficient force structures 
for transatlantic defence had been the subject of much heated debate within the WEU 
Assembly since its inception. The declining credibility of the US `Massive Retaliation' 
strategy for extended deterrence, particularly following the Soviet Sputnik launch of 1957, 
led to Assembly promotion of the emerging `flexible response' posture, officially proposed 
by US Defence Secretary McNamara in 1962.86 Concurrent concerns as to the potential for 
war-fighting in the European theatre, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, 
increased European desires for greater control over the use of nuclear weapons and the 
development of NATO strategy. 
The British position throughout the 1950s remained consistently Atlanticist, recognising 
the requirement for US leadership in Western Europe. Humiliated by Suez and clinging to 
its great power status, the British government sought to maintain its special relationship 
with the American administration and to promote the centrality of NATO whilst, at the 
same time announcing a defence policy based on developing its own `independent' nuclear 
deterrent capability in the face of American opposition. 87 Britain was excluded from the 
nuclear arms restrictions of the WEU Treaty, but it was clear that a significant reduction in 
her conventional forces would be required in order to facilitate a nuclear programme that 
was exhaustive on defence budgets. Given the UK's WEU commitments to continental 
force deployments, the WEU Council asserted its right to `rule' on the proposed cuts. 88 The 
formal announcement of British conventional force reductions came to the WEU Council 
on 14 February 1957, the Council then requesting SACEUR's opinion on the likely impact 
on European defence. At the Special Session of the WEU Council in London on 18 March 
84 See Crowther, G. `Reconstruction of an Alliance', Foreign Affairs, January 1957, pp. 180-181. 
85 Borcier, op. cit., 1964, p. 16. See Fens Reports, Assembly Documents 28 and 38, `State of European 
Defence', 3 October 1956 (Recommendation 5) and 27 March 1957 (Recommendation 8). 
86 The Assembly position was restated many times; See Recommendation 21,12 October 1957; 
Recommendation 23,4 July 1958; Recommendation 35,17 June 1959. NATO did not formally adopt 
flexible Response until 1967, after French withdrawal from the integrated command. For the French, flexible 
response reaffirmed the weakness of US strategy, further promoting their independent approach. 
87 In supporting the requirement for an independent deterrent, Macmillan stated that `to rely on the American 
deterrent would surrender our power to influence American policy, and deprive us of any influence over the 
selection of targets'. Sampson, op. cit., p. 104. 
88 See The New York Times, 27 July 1956; Le Monde, 22 July 1956 for comment. 
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1957, the British Foreign Minister insisted that conversion and reduction were the only 
means by which Britain could maintain a viable commitment to Europe within its means. 
Despite general concern amongst the Six, a compromise solution was found by which the 
WEU Council agreed to wait on SACEUR's report, effectively acquiescing to UK 
proposals for a two-year phased conventional force reduction under SACEUR 
consultation. S9 In May the NAC unanimously accepted the British proposals for 
conventional/nuclear force balance, 90 as articulated in the British White Paper of April 
1957, and only subsequently did the British Foreign Minister address the WEU Assembly 
regarding the British policy. 91 Presenting the second annual Council report to the 
Assembly, the Council Chairman, M. Spaak, marked a notable change of emphasis in 
WEU Council thinking when he defended the UK's nuclear position and Council 
acquiescence to a withdrawal of 13,500 British troops, half of that `requested' by the 
British, although the evidence suggests that this acceptance was only grudgingly given, 
after British threats of a unilateral withdrawal. 92 In January 1958 the Council accepted a 
further 8,500 withdrawals. 93 The British continued to remain short by several thousand on 
their reluctantly agreed figure of 55,000 continentally deployed forces after 1959.94 
Whilst the British consistently reduced their conventional minima ostensibly to facilitate 
their nuclear weapons programme, the French, still seething from the humiliation of the 
Suez debacle, sought to develop their own nuclear capability for cases in which US 
interests might conflict with their own. By November 1956, the French Prime Minister 
Mollet had set in motion a programme for the production of weapons grade plutonium, at 
the same time establishing the foundations for an operational military nuclear programme, 
despite the clear restrictions of the Modified Brussels Treaty. Denouncing the WEU 
controls on French nuclear development as discriminatory, the Mollet government sought 
to encourage Franco-German co-operation, claiming that nuclear capabilities were being 
89 See ̀ Supplementary Report to Second Annual Review', pp. 114-116. 
90 See comment on the NAC survey of the technical and strategic implications of this conversion in WEU 
Assembly Documents, Third Session, 1st part May 1957, Document 51, pp. 114-116. 
91 `Defence: Outline of Future Policy', Cmd 124, London, HMSO, April 1957. The White Paper also 
abolished conscription without notifying the Council. 
92 WEU Assembly Report of the Debates, third Session, ist part, Ist sitting, 6 May 1957, pp. 84,90-97. These 
withdrawals contributed to a decline in British prestige amongst the Six and resulted in the carrying of an 
Assembly motion of no confidence in the Council in May 1957 although it lacked majority to become 
effective. 
93 See Third Report of the Council to the WEU Assembly, Doc. 79, February 1958, p. 15. 
94 See Palmer and Lambert, op. cit., p. 326; Grosser, A. The Western Alliance: European-American relations 
Since 1945, London, Macmillan, 1980, p. 447. 
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developed for experimental rather than `production' purposes. 95 The `Protocole de Colomb 
Bechar', signed in January 1957, established a Franco-German Committee to oversee 
research and development (R&D) in advanced weapons and materials, with a French- 
Italian-German arms pool (FIG) being established by the end of the year, to include the 
military application of nuclear energy to the prospective co-operation list. 
Whilst it may be argued that the FRG had gained the most from the Paris Agreements, the 
discriminatory arms control provisions of the WEU, providing for the rehabilitation of 
West Germany, consensus on Germany's place in the new architecture of European 
security was never assured. On the very day that the FRG had joined NATO, the Social 
Democrats had proposed the waiving of West Germany's military obligations under the 
Paris Agreements, suggesting that a united Germany become an equal partner in a new 
WEU-based European security system, within the framework of the UN. 96 As, by the end 
of the decade, the NATO alliance had failed to deliver on Adenauer's promised 
`reunification through allied negotiating strength', the debate within the FRG on its 
military future grew increasingly heated as her `second class status' began to grate. Failing 
to build the conventional forces demanded by its NATO commitments, La Feber notes that 
the Adenauer government `instead ominously began to request missiles, artillery capable of 
firing nuclear shells, and fighter bombers which could hail thermo-nuclear bombs'. 97 
Between 1958 and 1964 there were six amendments to the arms limitation provisions of 
the MBT, allowing the FRG to produce warships, small submarines and guided missiles in 
line with NATO requirements. 98 The German Defence Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, 
dismissed the openly reported support of some within the French administration for an 
9s France refused to submit the level of stocks of its nuclear weapons to a majority decision of WEU, hence 
breaking its obligations under the Modified Treaty. As Stikker points out, `it should not be overlooked that it 
is this same treaty which controls German armament, and under which Germany renounced the production of 
atomic, biological and chemical weapons in Germany', Stikker, D. U. `France and its Diminishing Will to Co- 
operate', Atlantic Communites Quarterly, Vol. 3, Pt. 2, Summer 1965, p. 198 
96 See `Programme for the Four-Power Negotiations on German Reunification', Europa Archiv, June 1955, 
pp. 7932-7936. The `disengagement' debate included Eden's proposals at the July 1955 Geneva summit for `a 
demilitarised area between East and West' and the Rapacki Plan of 1957 which envisaged a `denuclearised 
zone' covering Poland, Czechoslovakia and the two Germanys. See Hinterhoff, E. Disengagement, London, 
Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1959, for complete texts of Eden and Rapacki plans. Also see Kennan, G. F. Russia, 
the Atom, and the West, New York, Harper and Bros Ltd, 1957, and `Disengagement revisited' Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 37, January 1959, pp. 187-210. See Williams, G. The Permanent Alliance: The European 
American Partnership, 1945 -1984, Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1977, p. 39, for details of the disengagement 
debate in the late 1950s. 
97 La Feber. W. America, Russia and the Cold War, New York, John Willey and Sons, 1976, pp. 206. Kaplan 
op. cit., 1961, pp. 618-29. 
98 See Curtis, op. cit., p. 107 for discussion. 
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independent German nuclear programme, 99 acknowledging that the Federal Republic 
would fulfil its obligations under the Paris Treaties, but Strauss did not see these 
obligations as ruling out participation in collaborative nuclear research. Insisting that WEU 
members should be invited to join FIG and the US in order to `collaborate', Strauss even 
went so far as to suggest that Germany might contribute to the construction of a WEU- 
controlled European nuclear force. 10° For the FRG, WEU could once again provide the 
vehicle for German military development in a manner that would also enhance European 
integration whilst contributing to broader Atlantic defence. 
Thus, it would seem that the WEU had, by the turn of the decade, shown itself not to be up 
to its arms control tasks. '°' The French continued to develop their nuclear programme 
despite the conditions of the Modified Treaty, the West Germans called for qualitative 
enhancement of their weapons systems, whilst the British failed to meet the conventional 
force minima agreed under the treaty. The WEU's Agency for the Control of Armaments 
had some success in terms of establishing force level controls, but found itself unable to 
secure the necessary legal right to on-site inspection without prior warning. ' 02 As for 
obtaining reliable information from member governments and private firms and 
establishing effective inspection procedures, the ACA remained hampered until the 
institutionalisation of procedures late in 1957. In the same year physical inspections of 
military establishments began to take place, national budgets were inspected, and defence 
related factories were identified and inspected. However, as the Assembly complained, 
without the relevant assignment of police and military forces subject to the ACA's 
jurisdiction, the task of managing arms maxima remained problematic. The Council refusal 
99 See statement by the French General Chassin, reported in The Times, 24 September 1957. See Craig, G. A. 
`NATO and the New German Army' in Kaufmann, W. W. (ed. ), Military Policy and National Security, 
Princeton, PUP, 1956 and Craig, G. A. `Germany and NATO: the Rearmament Debates, 1950-1958' in Knorr 
(ed. ) NATO and American Security, Princeton, PUP, 1959 for discussion. 
100 The FRG representative to WEU said that `co-operation in the production of nuclear weapons was likely 
to be limited to studying the application of nuclear propulsion to submarines and other ships. ' PRO: FO 
371/13335577,12 February 1958. Strauss further advocated weapons and equipment standardisation, 
collaborative weapons research and development and the integration of European air defence and air raid 
warning systems. As Haas notes, `Germany became the spokesman in the WEU Council for the vigorous 
integration of important aspects of defence policy, countering the British insistence on maintaining national 
autonomy'. Haas, `Parliamentarians Against Ministers; The Case of the Western European Union', 
International Organisation, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1960, p. 47. 
'0' In stating that `The Western European Union is in fact dying', Grosser was to suggest that, as early as 
1957, the failure of WEU to control the armaments of its members was leading to its decline as a relevant 
organisation. Grosser, op. cit., 1957, p. 477. 
102 For workings of ACA see Report of the Council to the WEU Assembly, Doc. 79, February 1958, pp. 18- 
22. For a full report of the activities and structure of the ACA during this period see Cantu, G. The Agency 
for the Control of Armaments of the Western European Union, Paris, WEU, 1973. 
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to allocate the necessary funds for the required expert personnel to inspect atomic weapons 
production did little to enhance the ACA's credibility. Throughout the 1960s the Assembly 
continued to report on the problems of verification and control of force levels in Europe, 
urging respect for the letter of the Modified Treaty and most particularly the issues of force 
levels (Art V), maintenance of British forces on the Continent (Art VI, Prot II), and 
production of nuclear weapons in Europe (Art III, Prot III). 103 
Arms co-operation 
The WEU's Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), established on a French initiative in 
May 1955,104had developed an advisory function for the standardisation of equipment, 
intended to promote efficiencies in the use of common resources, including the adoption 
and common manufacture of certain weapons, co-ordinated with the efforts of NATO's 
Standardization Agency. However, US discouragement of closer European co-operation in 
defence production outside of the NATO framework had enhanced national 
disinclination. 105 Fearing `uncontrolled' European nuclear advances within the FIG 
programme, the US administration had put forward a set of proposals for nuclear sharing, 
including the deployment of first generation IRBMs (Thors and Jupiters) in NATO 
countries and the initiation of a `co-ordinated programme of research, development and 
production of a selected group of modern weapons systems, including IRBMs'. 106 
However the French were not prepared simply to be a landing stage for American 
controlled nuclear weapons and sought to use the FIG alternative as a means of levering 
the Americans into some real nuclear sharing. Given the limitations of the NATO and FIG 
options, and fearing isolation from an increasingly collaborative Franco-German axis, the 
British promoted the WEU as an acceptable framework for arms co-operation. For Britain, 
this WEU based participation could best be achieved `by first concluding bilateral 
agreements with the principal countries concerned', then these could be brought under the 
103 Defence Committee report by Mr Georges Housiaux led to intensive discussions in 1962,1963 and 1964 
in the Assembly. 
104 The French had gone so far as to propose a supra-national arms pool plan in 1954 to maintain tight 
controls on German equipment and to get a good share of the WEU-wide contracts for French industry. 
105 See Third Report of Council to the Assembly, op. cit., p. 23. Miksche identified the contradictions in the 
US position when he noted that `Integration on a European scale of the production of war materiel would 
lead to the needed standardization of equipment and to large-scale production that would reduce costs. The 
integration of armaments industries is the sine qua non of a serious European military policy'. Miksche, F. O. 
`Western Europe: Security Through Integration, Orbis, Vol. 13, Pt. 1,1969, p. 166. 
106 See text of Communique from NATO Heads of Government meeting, Paris, Department of State Bulletin, 
6 January 1958. IRBMs were to be under a dual key arrangement whereby the host state built and manned 
the bases, whilst the US maintained custody of the warheads and a veto over launch decisions. 
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WEU umbrella. 107 By the offering to co-operate on a liquid fuelled IRBM with both FIG 
and WEU, 108 Sandys was able to persuade Chaban-Delmas, the French Defence Minister, 
at the April 1958 NATO Ministerial Conference, that arms co-operation projects of 
bilateral and trilateral groups could be pursued within the WEU framework. 109Once again, 
the British had found a use for a WEU option. British sponsored arms production through 
what was described by Sandys as `secure multi-lateral co-operation within the framework' 
of WEU110 would weaken exclusive tripartite developments within FIG whilst countering 
the continentals' feeling that Britain stood apart from Europe. In connecting FIG to NATO 
through WEU, Britain had also ensured that European arms development contributed to its 
wider Atlantic interests. l ll 
In fact, despite some ambitious schemes for joint programmes of research, development 
and arms production, little was achieved in the way of co-operative European armaments 
production during this period. National interests and economic differences combined with 
industrial pressures to limit co-operation. ' 12 Although some bi- and multi-lateral 
negotiations resulted in degrees of standardisation, fears of giving the impression of caucus 
forming within NATO led to any project of importance being referred to the NATO 
Armaments Committee. ' 13 Given that, as Mulley was to note in 1962, `it is widely held in 
the arms industry that the transfer of projects from WEU to NATO often leads merely to 
their being taken over by American industry' it is unsurprising that WEU efforts at arms 
co-operation remained limited! 14 Nevertheless, the WEU Assembly, as part of its general 
107 Certainly, the FCO view was that Britain `should co-operate either bi-laterally or jointly with all members 
of the Western European Union in everything except the nuclear'. PRO: DEFE 13/339,21 March 1958. 
108The British had initially excluded discussion of co-operation in nuclear weapons, the research, design and 
development of ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and their equipment and navigational aids, and biological 
and chemical warfare from the remit of the emerging WEU Steering Committee architecture. PRO: DEFE 
10/378: ADSC(58), 13 February 1958, Meeting 1, p. 5. 
109 See FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. 17, Docs. 131 and 133. 
110 PRO: PREM 11/3721, Sandys to Macmillan, 24 March 58. 
"`Any group of nations in NATO, such as the Western European Union, should be encouraged to formulate 
collective plans for co-operation in defence research, development and production. Such plans should be 
presented to NATO through the Secretariat General. Proper provision should be made to give any interested 
NATO country which can make a positive contribution, the opportunity to associate itself with any such 
plans. ' PRO: DEFE 13/339: Annex A, European Arms Cooperation: Proposals approved by the North 
Atlantic Council, April 1958. 
112 Borcier noted that `common sense comes up against 2,000 years of national defence, 2,000 years of 
national armament industries which have their own vested interests and are reluctant to commit hara-kiri 
forthwith on the alter of Europe and integrated defence. ' Borcier, op. cit., 1964, p. 27. 
113 The NATO Armaments Committee was replaced in 1966 by the Council of National Armaments 
Directors (CNAD) to provide alliance wide information on national projects. 
1'a See Mulley, F. The Politics of Western Defence, New York, Praeger, 1962, p. 195. 
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interest in defence dialogue, maintained an active role in promoting European 
technological and industrial co-operation. Acting as a `pressure group' it was to submit 
numerous programme recommendations to the Council, organise conferences on European 
technology and promote the concept of Europe-wide co-operation in scientific and 
technical fields, establishing in April 1967 a Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions to promote a European policy for space and technological 
cooperation. 11 5 
The nuclear debate 
The question of the control and ownership of nuclear weapons was to be a recurring source 
of `irritation' within the Alliance throughout much of the period under examination. With 
De Gaulle's return to office in 1958, the French had increased their efforts to build up a 
nuclear `force de frappe' intended to provide a lever not only against the Soviets, but also 
against the Anglo-American leadership of the Atlantic Alliance! 16 Rejecting nuclear co- 
operation with the Federal Republic, 117 De Gaulle's desire to see France as a major actor 
led him to propose a `directoire a trois' between the US, the UK and France for joint 
nuclear decision-making, whereby each state could veto any use of nuclear weapons unless 
under direct attack. "8 This proposal having been rejected, De Gaulle's distaste for the 
Anglo-Saxons led to increased distancing from the Alliance; by September 1958 the 
French Mediterranean fleet had been withdrawn from NATO command. Subsequent US 
plans for a nuclear capable Multilateral Force (MLF) 119 within NATO, pursued between 
1960 and 1964, sought to satisfy European concerns regarding nuclear sharing by diffusing 
some of its nuclear force geographically within a mixed manned fleet, but the US 
maintained exclusive control over nuclear warheads. 120 Whilst the Federal Republic was 
115 Borcier, op. cit., 1975, p. 49. 
116 De Gaulle's return further exacerbated Franco-American relations, undermined by the US's refusal to 
`bail the French out' over Algeria which had resulted in the fall of the Ivth Republic in 1958. For discussion 
see Harrison, M. The Reluctant Ally. France and the Atlantic Alliance, 1981, pp. 39-40; Kolko, op. cit., p. 688. 
117 The concept of Franco-German collaboration in the nuclear field as a means to `... build a Continental 
Front against Anglo-American domination of NATO, ' collapsed in 1958 with the fall of the 4th Republic. 
See Morgan. R, The United States and Western Germany. 1945-1975. London, Oxford OUP, 1975, p. 67. 
118 Proposals made to Macmillan and Eisenhower 17 September 1958. See Kohl, W. French Nuclear Policy, 
Princeton, PUP, 1971, p. 72. 
' 19For discussion of MLF see Burns, A. L. `NATO and nuclear sharing' in Knorr, op. cit.; Hoag, M. `What 
Interdependence for NATO? ', Survival May-June 1960; Kissinger, H. A. `The unresolved problems of 
European Defence', Foreign Affairs, July 1962. 
120 As Goodman states, US Secretary of State McNamara's resistance to MLF on the grounds of practical 
military requirement `completely overlooked in his analysis was the political logic of the Alliance that called 
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encouraged by the possibility of some closer co-operation on nuclear issues, for the French 
and British there was little to be gained by appointing nuclear weapons directly to NATO 
if the control system remained American. 121 
The potential for a WEU `solution' to the problem of nuclear sharing had first been raised 
by the UK's `Grand Design' in 1956, in which Selwyn Lloyd had proposed that Britain 
could become a thermo-nuclear power in association with the WEU, making the WEU a 
great power in partnership with the US and against the SU. 122 Dropped in favour of closer 
US/UK nuclear collaboration, 123 Lloyd's proposals would have required a complete 
reorientation in British foreign policy, an abandonment of the Commonwealth, and a 
sharing of nuclear secrets with Europe that was hardly likely to gain the support of the 
US. 124 In December 1959 the idea of a WEU-based European deterrent was raised again 
with WEU Assembly approval as Recommendation 40.125 The report on which this 
recommendation was based proposed `the creation of a joint European strategic nuclear 
force... as a complement to the US Strategic Air Command'. The transfer of national 
nuclear forces to WEU control and direction, whilst eliminating the danger of competition 
between European countries, would make the WEU the `fourth nuclear power, with joint 
power of decision on the use of strategic weapons', until such time as the American and 
European forces might become part of a `common NATO pool' . 
126 
for a sharing in the formulation of nuclear policy and control of the nuclear capability of the west'. Goodman, 
E. The Fate of the Atlantic Community, New York, Praeger, 1975, p. 411. Also see Lange, op. cit., p. 515. 
121 Goodman remarks that, given the US insistence on veto, the MLF represented little more than a `facade' 
or, as a European Ambassador described to him, a `gimmick', the Gaullists referring to the whole `charade' 
as the `multilateral farce'. Goodman, op. cit., 1975, p. 417. 
122 Although Lloyd refers to a nuclear competent WEU as `the third great power', he goes on to state that 
`Such an association would not be a "Third Force" between America and Russia. Its object would rather be to 
develop into one powerful group within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), almost as powerful 
as America and perhaps in friendly rivalry with her'. Whilst a `closer political association' was envisaged, 
Lloyd stated that `there need be no supranational machinery not responsible to Governments. Nor need we 
ever come to a complete merging of forces. The machinery of W. E. U. could serve, developed in due course 
as was necessary for closer co-operation both in the nuclear and conventional field'. `The Grand Design', op. 
cit., p. 2. 
123See Porter, A. N. and Stockwell A. J. (eds. ), British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, 1938-64, 
Basingstoke and London, Vol. 2,1989. 
'24PRO: FO 371/129 224: Debated in Cabinet 9 January 1957. 
125 Mulley, F. `A European Nuclear Deterrent? ' from the Report on the State of European Security to the 
Fifth Session of the Assembly of the WEU, November, 1959 in Survival, Vol. 2, No. 1, Jan/Feb. 1960, pp. 34- 
36. 
'26 Mulley, ibid, p. 36. The report did not envisage joint nuclear production or the sharing of atomic secrets. 
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Whilst the Assembly's proposals met with all party disapproval in London, 
127 the WEU 
option continued to be debated throughout the early 1960s as a potential answer to the 
nuclear sharing conundrum. 128 As a concept, the WEU option had some virtues: it could 
provide a framework in which the FRG could contribute to the maintenance and 
construction of a European nuclear capability and participate in the strategic planning 
process, but remain under the arms control arrangements of the WEU Treaty. France 
would not need to develop an expensive independent (and proliferating) capability, being 
able to share Britain's nuclear capability and know-how, whilst ending the UK's nuclear 
`special relationship' with the US, and `gaining an additional counter to Germany, as when 
Britain's association with WEU eased France's acceptance of German rearmament in 
NATO'. 129 The British would obtain financial support for maintaining a strategic nuclear 
deterrent, with the WEU option achieving the political objective of ending the effective US 
nuclear monopoly in the Alliance without undermining the alliance itself, given the 
accepted subordination of WEU to NATO. 130 Given the WEU Council's `out of area' 
remit, a WEU based deterrent might also provide for greater influence over extra-European 
concerns that it was felt had been consistently disregarded by their American ally. As 
Mulley asserts, the WEU option `could have been the beginning of a truly European 
approach to both foreign and defence policies. . . 
it would have assisted the solution of the 
problem of a divided Europe and produced the political and economic unity which is so 
essential if Europe is to play its proper role in the world'. 131 Dougherty was to write in 
1962, `If the United States wishes to encourage the further integration of Europe, with the 
British fully participating, there is no more appropriate instrument at hand for the purpose 
than the WEU. ' 132 
127 The proposals envisaged that the UK put at least some of her nuclear warheads and V-bombers under the 
joint decision of the seven WEU member states, thus ending any UK special relationship with the US and her 
pretence at being a `super' power. Mulley, op. cit., 1962, p. 88. 
128 The WEU Assembly continued to articulate European anxieties about nuclear proliferation and the desire 
within Europe for a nuclear capacity to satisfy legitimate concerns. See Assembly Recommendation 57 
adopted 2 December 1960 and Recommendation 69 adopted 13 December 1961. See Moore, B. T. NATO and 
the Future of Europe, New York, Harper Brothers, 1958, pp. 207-209. 
129 Osgood, op. cit. p. 289. 
130 Mulley argued that since strategic forces had always been under independent national control and outside 
NATO, the `merging of European forces under the joint control of WEU would surely have made NATO 
defence arrangements easier rather than more difficult'. Mulley, F. op. cit., 1962, p. 90. 
131 Mulley, ibid, p. 89. 
132 Dougherty, op. cit., p. 412. 
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However, US preferences in regard to Europe's development did not auger well for the 
European deterrent option. President Kennedy's Grand Design of 1962 emphasised that 
whilst the US did `not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner', the 
Europeans clearly had some way to go in terms of `forming the more perfect union which 
will some day make this partnership possible'. 133 Until such time as this `perfect union' 
could emerge, the US would continue to support the economic and political development 
of Europe in the expectation that European policies would accord with American 
interests. 134 At a military level, Europe should be prepared to increase its share of the 
conventional force burden, forsake national nuclear deterrents and accept US control of 
nuclear weaponry until such time as a unified Europe could become a potential military 
partner, and could then have a share in the control of the alliance nuclear forces. 135 Just as 
the Marshall plan had been preceded by OEEC as a means of stimulating European co- 
operation, Kennedy concluded that Europeans must decide on the means by which they 
could develop a deterrent capability or a formula for joint political control, and a plan for 
development, deployment, and military strategy before the US could think of assisting 
them. However, since the US administration was not in favour of a European deterrent, 
officially on the basis that this would be a contribution to proliferation and to the 
complexity of strategic calculation, there would seem to have been an ambiguity in 
Kennedy's Grand Design concept. 136 
The ambiguity of successive US positions encouraged a general political malaise amongst 
European players, accustomed as they were to dependence, resistance to defence 
integration and the fear of a weakening US commitment. In addition, this ambiguity did 
little to offset the growing frustrations of an increasingly economically powerful Europe. 
133 For Kennedy's Grand Design ideas see his 4 July 1962 `Declaration of Interdependence', Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. 55, No. 1426,23 July 1962, p. 132. 
134 Note the interchangeability of `partnership' and `community' in the literature and policy statements of the 
time, reflecting, Pfaltzgraff argues, `uncertainty in the United States about the precise form which the `Grand 
Design' should assume' (op. cit., p. 331) Partnership as `two independent centres of power', differs from 
Community, certainly in terms familiar to the European experience of integrating institutions and procedures 
for common purpose and values. See Hof mann, S. `Discord in Community: the North Atlantic Area as a 
Partial Integration System' in Wilcox, F. O. and Field Haviland, H. (eds. ), The Atlantic Community, Progress, 
and Prospects, New York, Praeger, 1963. The Grand Design represents a `minimalist' view of community 
based on enhanced co-operation, communication and representation, rather than a `maximalist' or Atlantic 
Federalist approach. See also Herter, C. A. Toward an Atlantic Community, New York, Harper and Row, 
1963. 
135 See Heldring, J. L. `Atlantic Partnership: European Unity', Survival, Vol. 7, No. 1, January/February 1965, 
p. 36. Also see Cromwell, W. op. cit. 
136 Richardson, J. `The Concept of Atlantic Community', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
1964-5, p. 1. 
82 
Once again the US was attempting to push Europe further than it wanted to go down the 
integrative path, whilst appearing more than ambiguous about the potential `partnership' 
outcome in terms of defence. 137 The WEU had provided the compromise position in the 
past to the failure of Europe to meet US expectations, but its solution to the nuclear sharing 
problem proved not to be integrative enough for the Americans, Atlanticist enough for the 
British or French enough for the French. The deal struck at Nassau, on 18 December 1962, 
spelt the end of any truly European project in the nuclear field. Accepting the US offer of 
Polaris missiles for which the UK could provide submarines and warheads, Britain also 
agreed to assign its strategic V bomber and Polaris submarine forces to NATO. 138 Thus, 
Anglo-American agreement did little to satisfy the continental allies, as shown by activity 
within the WEU Assembly. 139 
The Duynstee reports, developed over the following two years and proffered by the DQAC 
of the WEU Assembly, proposed the development of a `single NATO nuclear force ... based 
on a European and an American component', under a single command, into which allied 
nuclear forces should be integrated. In directly addressing the issue of political control, 
Duynstee envisaged a single NATO Political Executive, with decisions based on a system 
of qualified majority voting within a weighted system. 140 In this way, this new force might 
satisfy both US concerns regarding the uncontrolled use of allies' national capabilities and 
137 Buchan argues that the language of partnership diverted US attention from the real problem of adapting 
American leadership of the alliance. A resurgent Europe would inevitably seek to have a more `responsible' 
role in the Alliance, although, in Buchan's view, this was in terms of influence over the formulating of 
strategy rather than operational terms. `The Reform of NATO', Foreign Affairs, 1962, p. 180. Also see Kraft, 
J. The Grand Design, New York, Harper, 1962, p. 334. Focus on `partnership' ignored the fact that economic 
and strategic trends were travelling in different directions, as the onset of missile technology increased the 
strategic distance or inequality between the US and Europe. Snyder, op. cit., p. 225. 
138 Although under the `supreme national interest' clause these forces could be withdrawn for national use at 
times of national emergency. US unilateral abandonment of Skybolt in 1961, into which the UK had bought 
after forsaking its Blue Streak project in 1960, had led Macmillan to hint, in his Commons speech of 24 June 
1962, at the possibility of a joint European deterrent 
139 Whilst Hoffmann suggests that `Nassau' had been an attempt at creating a permanent division of labour 
within the Alliance, Richardson argues, Nassau was intended to `restrain forces making for nuclear 
proliferation by taking the first step toward a supra-national nuclear force in Europe'. Whilst this would seem 
to be stretching the point, short-term provision to the UK having undermined medium term co-operation in 
Europe, it is true that Nassau ended US nuclear monopoly in the Alliance and so may be represented as `a 
victory of America's Atlanticists over "hegemonialists"'. See Hoffman in Wilcox and Field Haviland, op. 
cit., p. 541. See Richardson, op. cit., p. 9. Also see Buchan, A. and Windsor, P. Arms and Stability in Europe, 
London, Chatto & Windus, for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963 for a discussion of the implications of 
a joint European deterrent 
140WEU Assembly, Document 251 , 
`State of European Security: A NATO Nuclear Force', 16 October 1962; 
See also WEU Assembly `State of European Security' reports: Document 268, `The NATO Nuclear Force 
after the Nassau Agreement', 26 April 1963; Document 290, `The NATO nuclear force', 30 October 1963,. 
Recommendation 98; Document 320, `Aspects of Western Strategy', 20 October 1964, Recommendation 
110. 
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European fears of US unilateralism. However, despite general approval within the WEU 
Assembly, the NATO nuclear force proposals were poorly received in national capitals. 141 
In fact it was not until 1967, following the departure of France from NATO's integrated 
command and with the establishment of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group that the nuclear 
sharing problem was effectively 'resolved'. 142 
The French predicament 
By 1963, the crisis in the Alliance had intensified. In his press conference of 14 January 
1963, De Gaulle denounced British nuclear policy, rejected the MLF concept, 143 reaffirmed 
his determination to go ahead with an independent nuclear force, and announced the 
French veto of British entry into the Common Market. 144 This final decisive act spelt the 
end of Kennedy's partnership concept. 145 By 1965, in the light of increasing French anti- 
Americanism, the Secretary General of NATO declared ̀ France under de Gaulle as not any 
longer a full working member but rather as an associate member of NATO.. . the French 
will to co-operate in NATO has practically disappeared. ' 146 In a handwritten note to the US 
Government on 8 March 1966, De Gaulle announced the severance of French ties with the 
141 In 1964, the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson put forward his Atlantic Nuclear Force proposals for a 
UK/US nuclear force that might retain UK status threatened by the Assembly proposals. The notion of a 
European deterrent was raised again by Heath, as leader of the opposition in 1967, and by Carrington, as 
Defence Minister in 1970, neither idea being developed, and both may be seen as little more than Europhile 
rhetoric in the light of ongoing EEC accession negotiations. Aybert, G. The Dynamics of European Security 
Co-operation 1945-1991, London, Macmillan, 1997, pp. 118-119. 
'42This select group would report to the larger Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (including all but French 
and Iceland) and would share information regarding both US and Soviet nuclear force levels and discuss the 
development of doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the event of Russian aggression. 
143 Given French and British rejection of MLF, concerns regarding the development of a German-US axis 
gradually undermined the project as essentially divisive. In light of the negotiated US/SU nuclear test-ban 
treaty, the project was abandoned in 1964. See Lauris, `Defending Europe without France' interview in 
Atlantic Communities Quraterly, Vol. 4, Pt. 2,1966, p. 184. See Lodge, J. D. `Can NATO be restored? ', 
Orbis, Vol. 10, No. 3, Fall 1966, p. 724. 
1" President De Gaulle, Press Conference 14 January 1963, `President De Gaulle's views', Survival, Vol. 5, 
Pt. 2, March-April 1963. See Fromm, E. U. `President De Gaulle's vision of Europe', Atlantic Communities 
Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1966, pp. 224-8. Christopher Johnson was to note in 1963, `a cynic might 
point out that the British deterrent exists but is not independent, while the French deterrent is independent, 
but does not exist'. `France's Deterrent', Survival, Vol. 5, Pt. 2, March-April 1963, p. 60. 
145 As Hartley was to note `His exclusion of Britain from membership in his "Europe" prevents an Atlantic 
Partnership from being bilateral... he has made it impossible for his "Europe" to approach even partial 
equality with the United States'. Hartley, L. `Atlantic Partnership - How? ', Orbis, Vol. 8, No. 1,1964, p. 145. 
146 Stikker, op. cit., p. 197. See De Gaulle, Press Conference at the Elysee, 29 July 1963, Survival, Vol. 5, Pt. 
5, September/October 1963, p. 238. Calvocoressi noted that De Gaulle's anti-Americanism fitted a general 
European mood at the time; `Western Europe is in the process of creating a new European loyalty... It 
requires Europe to be distinct and separate from America - not necessarily hostile to America, though there is 
a danger of that excess'. `The Evolution of Europe', Survival, Volume 5 Part 5, Sept/Oct 1963, p. 199. See 
Buchan and Windsor, op. cit., p. 22. 
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military organisation of NATO. However, by virtue of the WEU accords, French forces 
would remain in Germany and France would remain a signatory of the Washington 
Treaty. 147 
Severely shaken by the French departure, the alliance experienced a crisis of confidence. 
However, despite some national dissatisfaction with the benefits of alliance membership, 148 
there remained a general consensus on the part of the European allies that the US 
commitment to NATO was a requirement of European defence. 149 Equally, the Americans' 
`empty chair' policy for France in NATO reflected their belief that France remained 
essential to the maintenance of an effective security order for the West. 150 Given the need 
to demonstrate European cohesion in defence, particularly in the light of emerging US 
burden-sharing concerns, 151 the WEU might have seemed the ready-made vehicle for this 
co-operation. However, the French rejected close co-operation within WEU on the grounds 
that it was too `Atlanticist' in its leanings. 152 The establishment of Eurogroup in 1968 
effectively sidelined WEU as a forum for European co-operation in defence by providing a 
`ginger group within NATO' in which Europe could demonstrate its commitment to 
alliance burden-sharing and efficiencies in the absence of French resistance. 153 
1476Reflections on the Quarter', Orbis, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 1966, pp. 3-6. See DQAC Report to the WEU 
Assembly, `SES: France and NATO', Document 375,11 June 1966. Also see Lacoutre, J. De Gaulle: The 
Ruler 1945-7, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1991, p. 382. 
148 For a discussion of national concerns see Lodge, op. cit., pp. 729-30. See discussion on West German 
Ostpolitik as a response to the failure of NATO to `deliver'. 
149 Fromm, op. cit., p. 226. That De Gaulle agreed to the renewal of the Washington Treaty in 1969 suggests 
that his interest was rather reform than dissolution. Miksche, op. cit., pp. 162-163. 
150 Acheson, D. `One of Our `Firemen is Resigning', Atlantic Communities Quarterly, 1966, Pt. 2, p. 163. 
Norstad, L. `Defending Europe without France', Atlantic Communities Quarterly, Vol. 4, Pt. 2,1966, p. 179. 
151 See for example Senator Stuart Symington to the Seante Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
Committee, 4 May 1966, quoted in Norstad, op. cit. By 1971 the Mansfield resolution was to call for a 50% 
withdrawal of US troops stationed in Europe by the end of 1971, although this and subsequent resolutions 
were defeated on the grounds that unilateral withdrawal would threaten the ongoing arms control process. 
Lee Williams, op. cit., p. 273. 
152 This resistance also reflected French displeasure at the manner in which the WEU was being utilised as a 
means of smoothing UK entry into the EC. French efforts to enhance bilateral co-operation, most notably 
through the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, had minimal success given German concerns to avoid any 
implied anti-Americanism, a commitment that dissuaded the French from pursuing the defence clauses. See 
Franco-German Treaty, Documents on Germany 1944-85, US Dept. of State Publications, 9446, Office of the 
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 834. 
153 Lee Williams, op. cit., p. 254. The Eurogroup provided for consultation on European defence matters, 
being most effective in those areas (such as its European Defence Improvement Programme), promoted by 
the US. It was to prove less effective in areas such as joint production of armaments `which might interfere 
with United States exports'. Burrows and Irwin, op. cit., p. 53) 
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Nevertheless, the WEU was to provide the only multilateral forum in which the Europeans 
could effectively `let off steam' without fundamentally damaging the Atlantic Alliance. By 
the inclusion of all three major European states and the exclusion of the US, the WEU 
provided a means of keeping the French involved in some level of defence dialogue, 
promoting collective thinking about European issues and dissipating the divisive 
nationalism of the Gaullist vision. As the Deputy Secretary General of WEU was to note in 
1970, the role of the WEU Assembly in providing a continuous exchange of information 
with member governments with regard to defence matters was `indispensable'. 154 Whilst 
the WEU was to sink into hibernation at the Council level after 1973, the Assembly and its 
Committees continued with this role in the absence of an Executive. This was the only 
forum in which this European defence debate could be heard. 
Conclusion 
The WEU was established in 1954 as a response to immediate and pressing needs. As part 
of a broader framework of security relationships established under the Paris Treaties, it 
played a central role in accommodating the requirements of European security concerns. In 
its subordination to NATO for defence, the WEU had become firmly part of the Atlantic 
defence vision, and thus the Cold War international structure, and reflected European 
acceptance of defence dependency. The structural overlay had resulted in a decline in high 
politics in Europe, the EDC having demonstrated that, in terms of integration, defence was 
not viable. As economic integration took shape between the ECSC `Six' within the 
emerging EEC context, with the Council of Europe taking on the social and cultural 
aspects of European co-operation, the role of the WEU in this new security order seemed 
questionable. Having established itself with the dual support role of promoting both 
collective defence and European integration, the lack of any vision for this `hybrid' 
institution, led to its reactive development. When tensions between state interests created 
difficulties in the either of the primary organisational structures, states sought to utilise 
WEU as a means of satisfying their interests. 
This contextual discussion serves to highlight the areas of major tension that existed 
between states seeking to pursue the WEU's broad functional pillars of furthering 
154 von Plehwe, op. cit., 1970, p. 151 
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European integration and alliance management. In terms of integration these tensions are 
manifest in terms of the breadth and depth of European integration whilst in the context of 
alliance management, they are most ably evidenced by an examination of the WEU's 
contribution to national and alliance arms control and co-operation, the nuclear debate and 
the French predicament with NATO. 
One major area of tension that persisted throughout this period was the question of the 
preferred nature and scope of European integration. The British free trade area approach 
was at odds with the deeper integration taking place between the Six within the EEC. 
Despite general support amongst 5 of the other 6 WEU members for British entry into the 
new community, the French, following De Gaulle's election in 1958, staunchly opposed it, 
believing the UK to be a `Trojan Horse', bent on establishing an Atlanticist order. Whilst 
accession desires led the UK to encourage increased political cooperation amongst 
European states, De Gaulle's nationalism was to constitute a significant hurdle to closer 
European integration during the period, restricting both the deepening of the community 
and its enlargement. 
Within the alliance context, the major issues of contention resulted from concerns over the 
nature of the US' commitment to Europe, and were highlighted by De Gaulle's rejection of 
NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. European concerns that their defence 
dependency was resulting in a lack of control over NATO strategy led to efforts to readjust 
their position within the alliance. However, efforts to enhance their independent and 
collective capabilities were met by `contradictory' US behaviour. On one hand the US 
encouraged increased burden sharing by their European allies, whilst on the other, it 
resisted any greater European competency that would undermine US leadership within the 
Atlantic relationship. These tensions were evidenced most clearly in the area of arms 
control, arms co-operation and the nuclear-sharing debate. 
The tensions resulting from the crossover between alliance and integrative interests also 
became more evident during this period. US insistence on the primacy of the Atlantic 
structure linked the development of an integrated Europe to the satisfaction of US interests, 
with the acceptance of the benefits of integration for Atlantic cohesion being questioned by 
the emerging `iceberg' of an economically competitive Europe. For Europeans, defence 
was seen to require a US presence, the defence alliance providing the stability for 
European developments in the `low politics' arena, where European economic integration 
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was to be the first step towards an even closer Union. As Europeans benefited from the 
successes of economic integration, US dominance within the alliance was seen to have a 
negative influence on Europe's ability to co-operate with it. Whilst enhanced European 
integration might provide a means of balancing the unhealthy asymmetry that had 
developed in their relationship with the US, a more assertive Europe might have 
undermined the cohesion of NATO. The search for a balance within the transatlantic 
relationship that would satisfy all players provided the context for developments within the 
alliance and community frameworks. The WEU's dual imperatives placed it at the 
crossroads between these two, potentially competing, designs. 
The WEU's ability to act as an `enabler' for European construction throughout the period 
pushed the development of WEU activity. In `isolating' defence from the evolving EPC 
structure, the WEU had ensured that the problematic area of defence integration did not 
`contaminate' the young Communities, who were not yet sufficiently developed to manage 
this assault on the core of national existence. In the `low politics' areas, alternative 
economic frameworks for European co-operation were debated within the WEU arena, as 
Britain promoted the WEU's political role as it sought to get closer to its European 
`partners'. On British application for EEC membership, the WEU Assembly was to 
become a significant element in the process of Europe-building in its provision of reasoned 
reports and debate on the details of the enlargement proposals and in providing a forum for 
discussion and negotiation. 155 Following French rejection of UK accession, the harmony of 
European relations was challenged by the De Gaulle's stranglehold on the EEC as the 
primary vehicle of European integration. The WEU, as the one institution that included at 
least and no more than the Seven, was able to step into the breach and prevent a schism 
developing between the UK and Continental Europe. Whilst Hoscheit suggests that WEU 
was `drawn into the dispute' between Britain and the Six, resulting in its `further 
relegation', 156 the evidence suggests that the WEU provided an effective lever not only for 
the British, but for the five EEC supporters of UK accession, in their efforts to pave the 
way for eventual British entry. As a `balancing factor in the oscillations of the process of 
European unification', the WEU proved itself to be a useful tool in managing this crisis in 
the European integrative process by providing an arena for keeping alive discussions on 
iss Salter refers to the Assembly as a `motor force', helping to `push governments in the direction toward 
which their thoughts were already turning'. op. cit., p. 38. 
156 Hoscheit, J. M. and Tsakaloyannis, P. `Relauncing the Western European Union; An Overview' in 
Tsakaloyannis, P. (ed. ), op. cit., 1985. p. 1. 
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British entry. 157 Once the British achieved accession, the WEU had effectively served its 
purpose. The pursuit of its political development appeared to have been only a `cosmetic 
initiative to pave the way for Britain's entry into the EC', 
158 once achieved, political 
development was effectively transferred to the evolving EPC of the primary organisation 
for European integration, the EEC. Nevertheless, the `manipulation' of this `new' function 
was useful in providing leverage against French resistance and had led to British 
acceptance of EPC within the emerging Community structures. Just as the WEU's social 
and cultural activities had earlier contributed to increased European co-operation until the 
transfer of these competencies to the Council of Europe in 1959, it has been argued that the 
development of the WEU's political competence was to provide a small step in the 
incremental process of European integration. 159 
Within the Atlantic alliance, concerns regarding the lack of European influence led to 
debate on acceptable levels of dependence that was reflected in efforts to enhance national 
capabilities and promote European co-operation. Given the WEU's subordinate position to 
NATO, it was identified as a means of rebalancing the Alliance, reflecting European 
desires for a greater say, whilst contributing to the overall efficiency of the broader alliance 
system. However, WEU was of limited utility in the development of a more balanced 
transatlantic relationship. US dominance had effectively hamstrung the institution and the 
minimalist position taken by the Council, reflected British insistence of NATO precedence 
and French resistance to European co-operation in the `Anglo-Saxon' framework. 
The arms control provisions of WEU had been designed to provide the internal security 
required by the Europeans to enable a managed rearmament of Germany in support of the 
Atlantic Alliance. However, the WEU failed to secure the necessary conventional forces 
for European defence, requiring a nuclear solution to NATO's defence needs. Equally, it 
failed to prevent both British, and more significantly, French nuclear development -a 
reflection of independent defence thinking. However, it continued to provide the context 
157 von Plehwe, op. cit., 1970, p. 152. 
158 Aybert, op. cit., p120. 
159 ̀ Within a contiguous area like Little Europe and against a background of common problems and 
traditions, the steady trickle of small steps in the direction of intensified social communications and 
increasing uniformity is more likely to wear off the solid rock of national exclusiveness than the same trickle 
in a more diffuse setting. Western European Union is only one of the growing number of international and 
European organisations which daily contribute to this steady trickle'. Haas, E. B. and Merkl, P. H. 
`Parliamentarians Against Ministers; The case of the Western European Union', International Organisations, 
Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1960, p. 42. 
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for a (reducing) British continental presence and for a constrained German contribution to 
European defence. These elements were equally relevant to the European dimension; the 
WEU's arms control provisions providing the means of securing a balance in Europe and 
the confidence for the promotion of further European cooperation in low politics areas. 
Whilst arms co-operation had been recognised as an area in which European co-operation 
might enhance the contribution of Europe to burden sharing within the alliance by 
providing for efficiencies and helping to overcome the technological dependency on the 
US, the WEU's SAC proved largely ineffective. The WEU succeeded however, in tying 
the multilateral arms co-operation emerging in FIG into the WEU framework and thus 
prevented a `competing' system from developing. However, US insistence on alliance 
preference and national resistance to the subordination of their own defence industries 
meant that Europeans saw little benefit from the SAC procedure. The NATO body, 
Eurogroup, was eventually to supplant WEU as the vehicle for co-operative arms 
arrangements in the light of US demands, the French `departure' from NATO leading to 
increased restrictions on the WEU as a body for effective Alliance management. In terms 
of nuclear sharing, the WEU was to prove unacceptable as a vehicle for developing a 
European nuclear deterrent, the UK and France resisting the loss of prestige and control 
evident in the European alternatives. Nevertheless, it provided a vehicle for articulation of 
European concerns regarding their lack of influence over NATO strategy and encouraged a 
reluctant US to consider the alternatives, resulting in the Nuclear Planning Group within 
NATO. WEU obliged NATO `to take the problem seriously'. 
The WEU did provide a forum for European dialogue on defence: a significant if 
constrained role following French departure from NATO. And in terms of alliance 
cohesion, the Assembly's recommendations may not have resulted in concrete action, but 
they did enable the establishment of joint positions and they frequently established support 
through a European Assembly for Alliance positions: an important role when NATO was 
losing European support. Its annual reports on defence preparedness and critiques of 
NATO strategy, as well as its debates on general defence matters provided `a certain 
degree of parliamentary supervision over the work of NATO and Western European 
defence policy in general. ' 160 Thus, in enabling the development of a European perspective 
and representation, the WEU was to contribute to a sense of Europeaness, which was a 
central element of the integrative process. This process of European cohesion, however, 
whilst sometimes at odds with NATO, was supportive of the overall interests of the 
160 Palmer and Lambert, describe this as the WEU's `most useful function' (op. cit., p. 346) 
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stability and cohesion of the alliance by promoting a perspective of Europeaness that was 
not, in substance, a threat to Atlantic cohesion. ' 61 By 1973 French resistance to NATO had 
crippled any possibility of effective ministerial consensus within the Council of the WEU 
on defence issues, European integration having taken the `low politics' path of the EEC 
after UK accession. However, the Assembly continued with its work even after the WEU 
Council had ceased to function. 
Examination of WEU development and activity during the period from its inception to its 
Ministerial hibernation in 1973 demonstrates some central themes. 
Firstly, the lack of agreement on the WEU's role resulted in institutional development as a 
response to the immediate interests of individual states, rather than in terms of any long- 
term plan for it. Consequently, the specific functions of WEU were to be inconsistently 
developed, evolving and devolving throughout the period according to `subjective' criteria. 
Whilst retaining its central role of a support to the primary organisations of collective 
defence and integration, states sought to utilise the WEU to pursue their interests in these 
arenas, but blocked WEU activity when further developments were not in their immediate 
interests. 
Secondly, as Dukes suggests, the WEU's ambiguity as both an `Atlanticist' and 
`Europeanist' institution served to undermine its effectiveness, 162 as evidenced by British 
resistance to its development as a vehicle of integration in its early years, 163 and French 
resistance to it as a promoter of political and defence dialogue in an Atlantic framework. 
Nevertheless, this ambiguity had also proved to be a strength of the WEU as it was utilised 
to support both alliance and integration, changing its focus to satisfy particular interests, 
whilst serving an articulating role in the management of the `sticky' parts of the broader 
co-operative process. 
16' Holborn, op. cit., p. 23. 
162 Duke suggests that `almost from the outset the WEU was viewed with suspicion. It was not the 
supranational foundation for European unity that the EDC could have been nor did it entirely escape 
federalist leanings. ' Duke, op. cit., 2000, p. 39. 
163 British, Noel Slater, Deputy Secretary General of the WEU Assembly from July 1955 - March 1963 
suggesting that `The measure of the unfulfilled promise of the WEU in these years is the measure of the 
political will of the British Government to use it. Had she [UK] come forward with bold political leadership, 
had she even honoured the political intention of the amended Brussels Treaty, Western European Union 
could have become the vehicle of future unity, which would then have included Great Britain', Salter op. cit., 
p. 35. 
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Finally, these factors are illustrative of the support nature of the institution, the WEU's 
development reflecting the primacy of NATO and the EEC as vehicles of collective 
defence and integration. The WEU was only utilised when the primary organisations 
proved insufficient to meet national interests. Consequently, when the WEU looked self- 
consciously at development it did so in the light of how it might contribute to the wider 
order, giving up responsibilities where they might be better achieved elsewhere. The 
devolution of functional areas by WEU may be seen as only a partial failure of the 
institution to be effective in its support role. Institutional rationalisation and the 
development of other organisations at the WEU's expense may be identified as a success 
of the institution as it sought to contribute to the `greater good' of the security structure for 
Europe. The release of much of its social and cultural activity to the Council of Europe in 
1959 and its political function to the EPC on enlargement provide example of this process. 
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Chapter 4 
The Path to Revitalisation: 1973 - 1989 
Introduction 
Throughout the 1970s the WEU in effect lay dormant, only its Assembly stoically 
maintaining an active role in the promotion of European discussion of defence issues. The 
evident lack of ministerial interest in the institution during this period of `somnolence', 
may be largely explained by the relative effectiveness of other organisations, notably 
NATO and the European Community, in satisfying the interests of national players. These 
had been articulated within the dual aims of the Brussels Treaty, collective defence and the 
promotion of European unity, providing for both external and internal security. The 
satisfaction of collective defence interests had been ensured through the coupling of the US 
capability to Europe within NATO, whilst European integration had taken place within the 
European Communities, provided for the `low politics' of `internal' security most notably 
within the economic arena. If viewed as a `first aid' institution designed to support the 
development of the broad range of `security' interests through the promotion of other, 
primary organisations, the revitalisation of WEU may be interpreted as a response to 
perceived `sickness' within the preferred organs. The WEU's `devolution' and subsequent 
`revitalisation' must be understood, therefore, in terms of this support function within the 
`dual context of the process of European integration and developments in the Atlantic 
Alliance. ' 1 
This chapter will begin with an examination of the period leading up to revitalisation in 
1984 in order to establish the forces behind WEU's reappearance. The subsequent 
discussion of WEU's activity during the final Cold War years will establish the 
organisation's contribution to dealing with the issues that were contributing to the 
undermining of the primary organisations. 
Transatlantic travails 
Throughout the period under examination significant pressures were to develop which 
called in question the nature of the relationship between the US and Western Europe. 
1 Cahen, op. cit., p. 391. See Pijpers in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1985, for discussion. 
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Whilst French `separation' from NATO may have enabled a less confrontational style of 
relationship to develop during the 1970s, general acceptance of dependence by the rest of 
the United States' European partners was at best fragile. 2 Kissinger's `Year of Europe' 
speech of April 1973 had called for an Atlantic Charter which was to reflect the linkage 
between defence and economics and was intended to reinforce US leadership at a time 
when a developing Europe was becoming a powerful economic, and potentially political, 
competitor. 3 European rejection of Kissinger's `insulting' proposals led to a worsening of 
transatlantic relations, the OPEC oil crisis, Arab-Israeli war and US/Soviet detente adding 
to areas of tension. Nevertheless, French efforts to arouse a European response met with 
indifference from European states all too aware of continuing defence dependency and 
unused to collective political action. 4 By the late 1970s a number of areas of divergence 
had arisen between Europe and its US ally, resulting in a crisis in transatlantic relations by 
the early 1980s. A significant body of contemporaneous literature reflects on the causes of 
this crisis. The broad based nature of the conflicts, including foreign policy, armaments 
policy, burden sharing and trade disputes, is evidenced by this debate. 5 
Concerns regarding the competence and reliability of American leadership, both in the 
global environment dominated by rapidly changing superpower relations, and more 
directly, in the US' policies toward its European allies, continued to grow throughout the 
period. The increasing divergence of transatlantic interests and the lack of coherence in US 
policy, were heightened by the breakdown of the hegemonial structures that had made for 
relative simplicity in Atlantic collaboration. For Europeans, the strategic, political and 
2 For discussion see Schaetzel, J. The Unhinged Alliance: America and the European Community, New York, 
Harper Row, 1975; Mendershausen, H. Outlook on Western Solidarity: Political Relations in the Atlantic 
Alliance, Santa Monica, Rand, 1976. 
3 The Year of Europe, speech by Henry Kissinger to the annual meeting of the American Newspaper 
Publishers Association, 23 April 1973. His demands for an Atlantic Charter, linking military and security to 
trade and monetary issues, had been seen as a means of shoring up US leadership in the light of an 
increasingly powerful and `competitive' Europe. See Wallace, W. `Atlantic Relations: Policy Co-ordination 
and Conflict. Issue linkage among Atlantic Governments', International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 2, April 1976, 
pp. 163-179. 
4 French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert was the most articulate of those speaking `for Europe' in his 
dealings with the US during the early 1970s. His proposals for the renewal of WEU in 1973 were rejected 
offhand by the other Europeans as usual French Anti-Americanism, particularly given French boycotting of 
the Union only three years previously. For the state of transatlantic relations in the early 1970s see 
McGeehan, R. `European defence cooperation: a political perspective', The World Today, June 1985, pp. 116- 
119; Hanreider, W. The United States and Western Europe, Winthrop, Maas, 1974; Keenan, G. F. `Europe's 
Problems, Europe's Choices', Foreign Policy, Vol. 14, Spring 1974, pp. 3-16. 
5 For the crisis in confidence in the Atlantic Alliance by the early 1980s see Bowie, R. R. `The Atlantic 
Alliance', Daedalus, Vol. 110, No. 1,1981, pp. 53-70; Geusau, A von. (ed. ), Allies in a Turbulent World: 
Challenges to US and Western European Co-operation, Lexington, Mass, Heath, 1983; Hyland, W. G. `The 
Atlantic Crisis', ibid, pp. 41-52. 
94 
economic implications of the US policy and rhetoric, particularly during the Reagan years, 
cast doubt on the continuing efficacy of the Atlantic Alliance structure and individual state 
interests within the global system. What had become evident by the beginning of the 1980s 
was that, given the degree of European resurgence, particularly in the economic field, the 
Alliance was in serious need of overhaul. 
Central to the developing crisis in Alliance relations was an evolving divergence in the 
American and European perceptions of threat. This became increasingly evident with the 
inauguration of President Reagan in January 1981, with his extreme Cold War rhetoric, his 
rejection of detente and his revitalisation of containment. 6 Whilst Reagan's ̀ simplistic' and 
`self-righteous' anti-communism may have won the hearts and minds of his people, for 
Europe, these same `attributes' had a very different significance. 7 For many in Europe, 
Reagan was `a bellicose ideologue leading the country into a dangerous global 
confrontation with international communism'. 8 
Despite the traditional foreign policy diversity of European states, what had been evident 
from the beginning of the 1970s was a broadening of the European perspective from a 
eurocentric introspection to a more `out-of-area' approach, which reflected Europe's rising 
status. Europeans' inability to influence effectively the external environment had been 
illuminated by emerging `out-of-area' crises in which transatlantic foreign policy 
divergence highlighted European impotence. 9 What was particularly significant about the 
Reagan Doctrine of global interventionism was that in interpreting international events 
6 For Reagan, detente had failed to prevent Soviet aggression, demonstrated in their invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1979 and the imposition of Martial Law in Poland in 1981, whilst for Europe detente had proven largely 
successful, reducing regional tensions and providing opportunities for increased trade. See Clarke in Clarke, 
M. and Hague, R. European Defence Co-operation. America, Britain and NATO, Manchester, Manchester 
University press, 1990, p. 35. See Allen, D. and Smith, M. `Western Europe in the Atlantic System of the 
1980s: Towards a New Identity', in Gill, S. Atlantic Relations Beyond the Reagan Era, New York, St 
Martin's Press, 1989. p. 92. and Palmer, J. op. cit., 1988, p. 21. For a useful discussion of the first Reagan 
administration's `containment' policy see Wolf, C. Jnr, `Beyond Containment: Redesigning American 
policies' in Washington Quarterly, 1985, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 107-117. 
7 Reagan said of his use of ideology, '... to grasp and hold a vision, to fix it in your senses - that is the very 
essence, I believe, of successful leadership - not only on the movie set, where I learned it, but everywhere'. 
cited in Deibel, T. 'Reagan's Mixed Legacy', Foreign Policy, Vol. 75,1989, p. 51. 
8 Osgood, R. 'Reagan's Foreign Policy in a Post-War Perspective', in Goldstein, W. (ed. ), Reagan's 
Leadership in the Atlantic Alliance, New York, NYUP, 1986, p. 29. Also see Rielly, J. `Foreign Policy in the 
Second Reagan Administration: Alliance Interests, Ideology, and Domestic Pressures', in Goldstein, ibid, 
p. 106. 
9 Europe's collective impotency during the Arab-Israeli War and the OPEC oil crisis as early as 1973 had led 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Jobert's to complain that European dependency was resulting in 
her being `treated like a non-person, humiliated in its non-existence'. Jobert cited in McGeehan, op. cit., 
p. 118. 
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through a Cold War lens, Washington had come to expect its NATO allies to co-operate 
outside of the immediate Atlantic Area in the pursuit of `communist containment' " 
10 
European worries regarding the Americans' `dangerous and counter productive bias toward 
ideological oversimplification, public posturing, and premature force"' in regional 
situations, principally in the Middle East, 12 led them to seek a means by which to distance 
themselves from too close a connection with American policy. 
A fundamental break from traditional post-war US policy came with Reagan's 
announcement, in March 1983, of plans for the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or `Star 
Wars' programme. Widely unpopular amongst European strategists, 13 SDI represented a 
dramatic shift in strategic doctrine away from the traditional NATO strategy of deterrence 
and towards a scientifically improbable and futuristic defence system that would, in 
Reagan's words, have the effect of making nuclear weapons both `impotent and 
obsolete'. 14 Despite Reagan's assurances of American commitment to European defence, 15 
SDI heightened alarm in the Western European states regarding the de-coupling of 
American and European strategy, and a return to something resembling a `fortress 
America' emphasis in US strategic doctrine. 16 Inevitable Soviet counter-research and 
deployment would leave even the limited British and French deterrents valueless and force 
them into a conventional arms build-up, whilst any breach of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty would predictably lead to a further stimulation of the superpower arms race and 
increase instability on a global scale. Clearly the Star Wars issue offered little to increase 
European confidence in the strategic guarantee of the US or the future efficacy of NATO 
doctrine. 
10 Layne, C. `Atlanticism without NATO', Foreign Policy, Vol. 67, Summer 1987, pp. 26-27. 
11 Calleo, D. P. Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, Oxford, Wheatsheaf 
Books, 1987, p. 80. 
12 US' Israeli bias in its policy for the Middle East led the E. E. C. member states to adopt the ineffective, but 
politically significant Venice Declaration of July 1980, announcing a co-ordinated policy position for the 
region, based on desires for a long-term Middle East settlement to include consideration of the Palestinian 
problem and the stabilisation of pro-western Arab regimes. See Kolodziej, E. A. `Europe: the Partial Partner', 
International Security, Vol. 5, No. 3,1980-8 1, pp. 104-131. 
13 For discussion see Bertram, C. `Strategic Defence and the Western Alliance', Daedalus, Vol. 114, No. 3, 
Summer 1985, pp. 279-296. 
14 Reagan cited in Osgood in Goldstein, op. cit., p. 31. See Smith, S. `The Strategic Defence Initiative: is it 
Technically and Strategically Defensible? ', in Goldstein, op. cit., p. 176. 
15 Reagan, R, Address to the Nation by the President Ronald Reagan, 23 March 1983, ̀ Peace and National 
Security', in Daedalus, Vol. 114, No. 3, Summer 1985, pp. 369-371. 
16 Cyr, A. US Foreign Policy and European Security, London, Macmillan, 1989, p. 133. 
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Somewhat ironically, the SDI issue materialised only shortly after the controversial 
deployment of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Western Europe (December 
1983) intended to reassure the Europeans as to American commitment and to fill the 
alleged `window of vulnerability' in NATO's flexible response strategy. Part of Carter's 
original `dual track' negotiating strategy, INF deployment became another element of 
Reagan's position of negotiating from strength. Although welcomed by participating 
European governments as a means of ensuring continued US `coupling', the siting of 
Cruise and Pershing II in Western Europe had been accompanied by a growing and 
vociferous peace movement and increased concerns amongst European publics regarding 
Reagan's apparent belief in war-fighting strategies limited to a European theatre. '7 
The SDI project had exacerbated concerns in Europe over the extent of European 
dependence on American technology. Europe was increasingly aware of its growing 
technological backwardness and economic vulnerability to both US and Japanese capital - 
tensions which were to build up by the mid 1980s with, for example, the Westland 
helicopter affair of 1986 which led to Defence Minister Heseltine's resignation from the 
British government over US `commercial imperialism'. 18 At the same time the concept of 
joint arms projects seemed attractive in terms of `the need to avoid duplication of systems, 
to rationalise the use of resources, to promote standardisation, and to face the growing 
costs of weapons'. 19 As Reagan's arms projects threatened European producers so it 
became clear that a high level of European co-operation would be necessary in order to 
rationalise production. However, this would require not only common manufacture and 
export, but also a political commitment in terms of force postures and defence strategies. 
By the mid 1980s it was generally acknowledged in Europe that arms co-operation might 
provide the only acceptable alternative if they were to be able to produce the next 
generations of sophisticated weaponry. 
The burden sharing debates of the 1970s, which were to be a constant accompaniment of 
Alliance relations, had led to suggestions that greater European co-operation in defence 
research, development and production might enable the Europeans to contribute to defence 
requirements in a more efficient manner. Consequently, the Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG) had been established in 1976 to help to overcome the burden- 
" Hillenbrand, S. `American Foreign Policy and the Atlantic Alliance', in Goldstein, op. cit., p. 46. 
18 Palmer, op. cit., p. 21 
19 Dezcallor, R. `On Western European Defence', Washington Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1,1987, p. 166. 
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sharing problem by harmonising national defence equipment schedules, and so avoiding 
duplication of the defence effort. 20 Nonetheless, by the 1980s, the perennial problem had 
reached a new peak. Inflationary tendencies had added to rising equipment costs and 
affected the real value of defence budgets at a time when new-generation technology was 
adding to defence expense. The marginally defeated Nunn-Roth Amendment of 1984 
demonstrated growing American opinion regarding the ungrateful and costly failure of 
Europeans to meet their share of the defence burden, 21 and served as an impetus to 
European defence co-operation in the knowledge that declining US commitment was 
inevitable in the future. 22 Defence analysts on both sides of the Atlantic were beginning to 
see the need for the development of a greater European `independence' in security 
identity, 23 but what the burden-sharing debate chiefly illustrated was the need for the 
Europeans to do something actively to keep the US in Europe. 
Developments in the EC 
Whilst the link between integration and security co-operation had been largely absent 
within the EC following the failure of EDC in 1954, events during the late 1970s began the 
process of `reconnection' by renewing interest in security and defence in Western Europe. 
The European Political Co-operation (EPC) denoted the separation of security from 
political-economic relations, and was a backward step when compared with EDC or 
Fouchet development. However, by the mid-70s, the ineffectiveness of the EPC in dealing 
with the growing number of external issues that evidently required some form of common 
European position began to have a negative effect on European confidence. By the mid 
1970s it was widely believed that `the disintegration of Western Europe as a political entity 
20 The IEPG consisted of all of Europe's NATO members bar Iceland and including the French, but was 
independent of NATO. National and commercial interests ensured that progress in co-operation remained 
limited. 
21 Europe's hidden defence costs included- low numbers of draftees and high land costs, especially in West 
Germany, whilst US defence spending of 7.6% GDP was largely directed outside of Europe, the US 
benefiting from 7 times the arms sales of Europe. See discussion in Corterier, P. `Two Views from West 
Germany: What do we need changed in NATO? ', in Goldstein, op. cit., p. 86. 
22The 1984 Amendment threatened a 30,000 US troop withdrawal from Europe if the Europeans failed to 
meet specific performance expectations in line with the annual 3% of GDP defence spending increases 
agreed in 1979. Failing by 3 votes in the Senate, it was followed in 1985 by a successful amendment to 
provide extra funding for particular transatlantic co-operative NATO projects as a reward and inducement for 
good allied performance in burden sharing. See Zakheim, Dr D. S. "'New" Western European Union: Uniting 
Europe or Dividing NATO? ', Armed Forces Journal International, December 1987, pp. 86-87; Gambles, I. 
op. cit., p. 11. 
23 See Bull, H. `European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO', Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 
1983, pp. 25-43; Lellouche, P. `Europe and her Defence', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4, Spring 1981, 
pp. 812-834. 
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could well occur if by the end of the decade no common institutions or common goal have 
been forged in the field of defence and foreign policies'. 24 
The Tindeman report of December 1975 had been rejected as too radical in suggesting that 
Europe would be incomplete without a common defence policy. 25 However, by the early 
1980s pervasive unilateralism in both the style and substance of American policy had 
begun a profound change in the European public's perception as they began to feel that 
their security was in some way out of their hands. 26 For the West Europeans, a greater 
degree of self-sufficiency would help to restore the `loss of dignity' which had 
accompanied years of dependence on the US and satisfy the rising nationalisms of 
regenerated polities. Whilst economic reconstruction had taken priority in the 1940s and 
1950s, a rejuvenated Western Europe became more assertive in its relations with the 
Americans and a number of issues began to surface, which had previously been overlain by 
the structural imperatives of the time. 
As perceptions of transatlantic divergence increased, European concerns were reflected in 
a report by the four leading Western international relations institutes in 1981 which stated 
the need for a new transatlantic bargain in which `Europe would assume greater 
responsibility in dealing with the Soviet threat and in securing Western interests in the 
Third World; in so doing it would acquire new influence over US policy and gain more 
sensitive attention to its perspectives'. 27 The institute's `principal nations' approach, 
which proposed a European security core of `capable' states, was largely rejected by those 
24 Lee Williams, op. cit., p. 255. The EPC did have some success in converging views through diplomatic 
concentration on issues such as CSCE and UN representation and the use of trade and aid. For discussion of 
EPC in the 1970s see Wallace, W. `A Common European Foreign Policy: Mirage or Reality' in Burrows, B., 
Denton, G. and Edwards, G. Federal Solutions to European Issues, London, Macmillan, 1978. 
25 That foreign and security policy was important for European Union was evidenced in the Copenhagen 
Foreign Ministers Report (23 July 1973) which followed the 1973 enlargement of the Community, although 
the EPC vision was essentially of Europe as a `civilian power'. For a critique of the concept see Bull, H. 
`Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? ', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21,1982. 
26 Cahen refers to a `... marked coolness of a growing sector of European opinion with regard to Atlantic 
security and, in the Atlantic context, to European security. ' Cahen, A. `Relaunching WEU. Implications for 
the Atlantic Alliance', NATO Review, Vol. 34, No. 4, August 1986, p. 11. Also see Cahen, op. cit., 1989, p. 6. 
See Hoffmann, S. `Cries and Whimpers: Thoughts on West European-American Relations in the 1980s', 
Dcedalus Vol. 113, No. 3, Summer 1984, p. 23 1. 
27 Kaiser, K., Lord, W., Montbrial, Th. De and Watt, D. Western Security: What has changed? What Should 
be Done?, Bonn, New York, Paris, London, 1981. Palmer notes that European efforts to develop a co- 
ordinated foreign policy stance were `very much a response to growing differences with the United States'. 
Palmer, op. cit., p. 22. 
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who feared a `directoire' from whose decision making they would be excluded. 
28 
Nevertheless the report had spelt out some serious concerns that prompted a European 
response. In the London Report of December 1981, promoted by the British Foreign 
Minister Douglas Hurd and made possible by Mitterand's accession as French President, 
EPC had been given competence in the political aspects of security. 29 The Genscher- 
Colombo initiative30 led to the adoption of the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart in June 
1983, an important step toward European Union, but again only providing the Ten with 
competence in areas of political and economic aspects of security. 31 
The lack of practical cooperation within EPC, demonstrated by responses to the crises in 
the Middle East, Afghanistan, South Africa and the Falklands, served to further undermine 
confidence in the EC providing an answer to what was seen by many as a significant 
European problem. 32 Continued opposition by the Atlanticist Danes, anti-Atlanticist 
Greeks and neutral Irish to further development of security co-operation within the EC led 
to frustration amongst the other members. 33 Cahen suggests that it was `the accumulation 
of these failures, or near failures, each time efforts are made to give the European 
Community genuine opportunities for working together in the security field - as well as a 
growing interest, at both the public and at the governmental level, in problems concerning 
28 Speaking some years later the WEU Secretary General rejected the `principal nations' approach stating that 
`I am therefore convinced that we should accept the leading role of some nations in Western Europe, but only 
if that is firmly embedded in a multilateral structure, be it the EC, the WEU or the IEPG'. Van Eekelen in 
Tsakaloyannis, P. Western European Security in a Changing World: From the Reactivation of the WEU to 
the Single European Act, Maastricht, EIPA, 1988, p. 43. 
29 For the London Report, see Bulletin EC, Supplementary, 3,1981, p. 14. 
30 See `Draft European Act', Europe Documents, No. 1178,19 November 1981. The West German and 
Italian Foreign Ministers had sought the inclusion of defence issues within the EPC remit, with European 
Parliament and Commission input enhancing linkage to the EC. 
31 The European Council was to provide general guidelines for EPC, the Council Presidency to report to the 
European Parliament. By the time of their second Report in 1983, the worsening Transatlantic crisis led the 
institutes to call for the EC to `make a deliberate effort to become the European pillar of a Western security 
policy' in order to counter Reaganist unilateralism, worsening East/West relations and the rise of the `peace 
movement' across Europe. Kaiser, K., Lord, W., Montbrial, Th. De., Wallace, W., Wellenstein, E., The 
European Community: Progress or Decline?, London, 1983, p. 11. 
32 Hoscheit notes, providing the example of the 1980 Venice Declaration on the Middle East, that 'the more 
ambitious the Ten's political initiatives had been, the starker their political limitations (and the credibility gap 
between words and actions) has been'. Hoscheit and Tsakaloyannis in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1985, p. 13. 
33 Keatinge notes the `logical incompatibility' between Irish doctrine with regard to European integration, 
which 'insists on the parallel evolution of political and economic integration with the transfer of decision- 
making competences matching economic convergence' and their position of permanent neutrality. Keatinge, 
P. `Ireland and the Western European Union' in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1985, p. 106. 
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the defence of Europe - which are the basis for the initiatives aimed at re-launching 
WEU. '34 
Motivations for WEU revival 
The previous discussion serves to illustrate the major political challenges that now faced 
the members of the WEU and which required adaptation of the institutional framework of 
European defence and security. Having neglected the WEU since 1973, different countries 
discovered different motivations for supporting its revitalisation. How was the WEU to 
fulfil the requirements for European defence as perceived by the `Big Three' of Europe, 
the French, West Germans and British? 
The French were the prime movers in the re-activation of the WEU. The significant shift in 
French attitudes towards NATO in the 1980s had a considerable effect on attempts at 
European defence co-operation on a number of levels. The credibility of the French 
`independent' strategic nuclear deterrent rested upon the larger interdependence of the 
security environment. French autonomy required a strong NATO and West Germany 
within it. In the light of developing events there were concerns that NATO was becoming 
increasingly incoherent at the same time as French concerns were growing with regard to 
Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Africa. 
Whilst President Mitterrand was evidently less anti-American than his Fifth Republic 
predecessors, his basic strategic philosophy was not fundamentally different; believing 
Moscow to be in the ascendant, France would seek to alter the Superpower balance in 
favour of the US so as to maintain an equilibrium that would ensure Europe's 
independence. 35 If NATO was losing its way, the Europeans must seek a means of re- 
establishing it. Whilst the French were not prepared to return to NATO's military 
command, they increasingly realised that their security was dependent on NATO 
coherence and that this might require a degree of European co-operation to adapt its 
position within the Alliance. 36 The possibility of West Germany moving towards some 
34 Cahen, A. op. cit., 1986, p. 9. 
35 Garnham, D. The Politics of European Defense Cooperation, Cambridge Mass, Ballinger, 1988, p. 35. 
36 Poos, J. F. op. cit., p. 16. 
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kind of neutralism, 37 particularly given the unprecedented rise of peace movements in 
Europe, heightened French fears already increased by the weak response of the Federal 
Republic to the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981.38 By upgrading 
Franco-German security co-operation, 39 the French hoped to strengthen West Germany's 
stability and tie it more firmly into the Western system. 40 
From the start of his Presidency in May 1981, Mitterrand made reactivation of WEU a 
central theme of his European policy. 41 The organisation had the significant attribute of 
being already in existence, if not evidently awake, and so might be put into operation fairly 
rapidly and without adding to the institutional weight of the defence regime. The WEU 
could play a symbolic role in terms of European Identity and provide a convenient 
international forum for consultation and debate, without incorporating the supra-national 
elements that might be damaging to French autonomy. The WEU had within it a body for 
armaments co-operation, the S. A. C., and a framework that could provide for the 
symbolically and politically important removal of conventional arms limitations still 
imposed on the Federal Republic. By bringing France ̀ back into the reckoning', the WEU 
would satisfy France's European partners, who were also keen to seek a rapprochement 
with France at a time of strategic uncertainty. 42 As Poos states ̀ Since such a consultation 
process could not take place either within the Alliance framework or under the aegis of the 
European Communities, the only viable alternative, for the time being, was WEU. '43 
In fact, the WEU was to serve the two apparently contradictory elements of French defence 
policy. On the one hand it would bring France nearer to its allies, complementing NATO 
37 This is what Schmidt refers to as 'neutrality pacifism' and Grant as 'the three West German isms - 
nationalism, neutralism, and pacifism'. See Schmidt, P. op. cit, 1986, p. 391 and Grant, R. `French Defence 
Policy and European Security', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 3, Fall, 1985, p. 417. 
38 Many in France took this `as an index of their neighbour's anxiety about its own security before the Soviet 
threat'. Wells, S. F. `The United States and European Defence Co-operation', Survival, Vol. 27, No. 4, July- 
August 1985, p. 161. 
39 The French had instigated the revision of the 1963 Franco-German Treaty in October 1982, establishing 
regular Defence Minister and Head of Government meetings and the three joint Commissions on strategy, 
military cooperation and arms procurement. In 1983 the Force d'Action Rapide was established, consisting of 
an airmobile and armoured force for use in Central Europe, suggesting a new French commitment to protect 
the FRG. 
40 Yost, D. `France, West Germany and European Security Co-operation', International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 
1,1988, pp. 97-100. 
41 See 1982 WEU Assembly reports, where WEU increasingly acts as a platform for the views of the French 
Defence Minister M. Charles Hernu. 
42 Both from Clarke in Clarke and Hague op. cit., p. 40. 
43 Poos, op. cit., p. 16. 
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solidarity, whilst on the other hand it would maintain French distance from NATO's 
integrated command, and enhance an independent view of European security in line with 
France's broader European interests. In this sense it is true to say that the French were 
`playing both a European and Atlanticist role'. 44 
Whilst the Federal Republic of Germany had declined French initiatives to help rejuvenate 
the WEU in 1973, a growing unease had been developing since the 1970s based on an 
underlying `perception of a conflict between national and foreign interests'. 45 Whilst the 
maintenance of the NATO `umbrella' and the development of detente were central, 
although often incompatible, elements of the West German security position, the policies 
and style of the American leadership, particularly in the early 1980s, had significant 
effects. 46 For some, the American guarantee had become a dangerous condition, the 
Alliance a means of German containment and the Soviet threat an unrealistic myth. 47 West 
European integration has traditionally been seen as a legitimate area in which Germany 
might pursue its foreign policy, but unlike France, the Federal Republic had avoided taking 
any position of leadership of the integrative process. However, given its rising economic 
power, the Federal Republic began to seek a greater political role within a more assertive 
Western Europe. At the same time, Alliance stability would require that West Germany 
take on the larger costs and responsibilities that would go with that role. Given the decline 
of overt French anti-Americanism, the way was made clear for the Federal Republic to act 
without having to make a political choice between the US and Europe. For the Germans, 
then, the WEU held certain promises in terms of both short and long term interests. It could 
provide for the removal of the last of the restrictions on West German conventional 
44 Holmes, K. R. `Europeanising NATO', Washington Quarterly, Spring 1984, p. 60. Also, Heisbourg, F. `The 
British and French Nuclear Forces: Current Roles and Challenges', Survival, Vol. 31, No. 4, July/Aug 1989, 
p. 301-20. 
as Dezcallor, op. cit., p. 160. For a discussion of the principle security dilemmas for the FRG see Seidelmann, 
R. `German Defence Policy' in Fedder, E. H. (ed. ), Defence Politics of the Atlantic Alliance, Praeger, New 
York, 1980, pp. 67-82. 
46 For a discussion of divergent German/US perceptions of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian 
hostage issue see Smyser, W. R. `Turmoil in German-American Relations', Washington Quarterly, Vol. 3, 
No. 3,1980, pp. 106-17. Also see Kramer, D. and Yago, G. `Germany's hostility to the US', New York 
Times, 7 June 1982, p. 23 and Edinger, L. D. `The German-American connection in the 1980s', Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 4, Winter 1980-1, pp. 589-606. 
47 See Pond, E. `The Security Debate in West Germany', Survival, July-August 1986, pp. 322-336. An 
opinion poll, conducted in January 1989 amongst the West German public, found that only nine percent felt 
that nuclear deterrence was an acceptable basis for NATO strategy, whilst other polls revealed that less than 
one quarter saw the Soviet Union as a military threat. See Schmahling, E. `German Security policy beyond 
American Hegemony', World Policy Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2,1989, pp. 379-381. 
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weapon production, 48 bring France nearer to NATO, demonstrate to the German public that 
the Federal Republic was not dominated by the US and provide a step towards closer 
European co-operation. In the longer term a regenerated WEU would provide a framework 
for co-ordinating European security policy and would therefore give greater weight to 
German concerns in its dealings with the US. 
Britain proved to be the most unenthusiastic of the `big three' in its approach to WEU 
revitalisation. Certainly, the UK did have concerns regarding American leadership, not 
least in terms of the `unilateralism' of American policy towards its NATO and global 
interests. Whilst the UK was less at odds with US policy towards the East, especially after 
the election of the Thatcher Government in 1979, burden sharing costs at a time of 
declining public spending created a dilemma for a government determined to maintain its 
`second amongst equals' position within the Alliance. 49 Keen to promote more effective 
use of defence resources, Britain was concerned that any moves in the direction of 
European defence co-operation should neither undermine nor overlap with the work of 
NATO. Shying away from co-operation that might overtly promote any grand project for 
European Union, the UK had promoted alternative multilateral fora in its search for 
defence efficiencies. 50 By 1981, however, growing transatlantic divergence on foreign 
policy matters had led the British government to promote the extension of dialogue on the 
economic aspects of security within the EPC. As Franco-German defence co-operation 
developed during the early 1980s the British were largely dragged along in their lukewarm 
acceptance of WEU revitalisation by concerns that `France and West Germany might just 
get their collective act together and jointly ensure their own leadership of a new 
development' as they had in the economic sphere. 51 Having treated the WEU with what a 
senior British official referred to as `benign neglect', the UK now faced a situation in 
48This had finally covered only some types of strategic bombers, mines and long-range missiles, but was a 
significant symbolic change. See Hoscheit and Tsakaloyannis in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1985, p. 15. 
49See Statement of the Defence Estimates, Defence in the 1980s, London, HMSO, 1980, p. 41 for British 
defence posture. Freedman refers to `the irresistible force of economic constraints meeting the immovable 
object of Alliance commitments', Freedman, L. `British Defence Policy' in Fedder, op. cit. Also see Hartley, 
K. `The Political Economy of UK Defence Expenditure', RUSI Journal, March 1980, p. 30. For an 
interesting discussion on the 'special relationship' and its implications see Clarke in Clarke and Hague. op. 
cit., pp. 28-41. 
so In the case of technological co-operation, the UK promoted Eurogroup (1970) and the IEPG (1976). See 
Forster, A and Wallace, W. `A Common Foreign and Security Policy: A new policy or just a new name? ' in 
Wallace, H. and Wallace, W (eds. ), Policy Making in the European Union, Oxford, OUP, 1996, p. 415. 
51 Allen, D. `Britain and Western Europe' in Smith, M., Smith, S., and 'hite, B. (eds. ), British Foreign 
Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation, London, Allen and Unwin, 1988, p. 179. Also see comments 
by Admiral Sir James Eberle in Wells, op. cit., p. 166. 
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which the costs of ignoring this `irrelevant' institution might prove too high. 
52 For 
London, as for Bonn, the WEU offered a means of drawing France closer to NATO whilst 
restraining excesses of `Euro-fancy' and providing what Forster has described as 
`multinational cover' 53 for a directoire between France, West Germany and the UK, 
acceptable to the smaller European states, 54 and supportive of the broader transatlantic 
alliance. 55 
For the Americans, efforts toward greater European competence in defence created a 
dilemma, reflecting what was to become the central paradox of transatlantic relations. 
Whilst the concept of a European pillar of an equal transatlantic partnership56 had gained 
official support in the US as the Alliance had begun to lose credibility in the late 1970s, 57 
the assumption that a 'stronger Europe would necessarily be `unambiguously in the United 
States interest' had been irrevocably called into question by Kissinger's 1973 `Year of 
Europe' speech. 58 Whilst a degree of what Geoffrey Howe referred to as `Europessimism' 
had developed in the US, the dilemma for the Americans was that a more competent 
European pillar would also be a more assertive one. 59 Consequently, Europeans found 
themselves in an unenviable position, if they were to satisfy American concerns, of having 
to meet what were essentially contradictory requirements. If the pillar remained essentially 
a symbolic one, the Europeans would be chastised for failing to take on their share of the 
52 Interview at UK Ministry of Defence, 19 July 1991. 
53 Forster in Deighton, op. cit., 1997, p. 32. 
sa Italy and the Benelux countries had resisted the exclusive Principle Nations approach and sought to 
exercise influence over the Big Three through the auspices of WEU. See Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1988, p. 4. 
"The British Secretary General of NATO, Lord Carrington, was particularly concerned about the effects that 
WEU might have on transatlantic relations, stating that `to build a European defence identity by weakening 
the security link between Western Europe and North America would put at risk the security we seek to 
strengthen'. Carrington cited in Agence Europe, No. 4164,18 September 1985. 
56 The concept of a pillar was largely criticised in the literature as essentially a `structural impossibility'. See 
Bertram, C. Western Europe's Strategic Role: Towards a European Pillar, Adelphi Papers, No. 235, Spring 
1989, pp. 109-111. Also see Holmes, J. W. `The dumbbell won't do', Foreign Policy, Vol. 50,1983, p. 3. Van 
Eekelen noted that, given the incongruence of membership and scope of the EC and NATO, `the image of a 
dumbbell or two pillars upholding the same frieze is too neat and tidy to fit international realities'. Eekelen, 
W. van. Future European Defence Co-operation: The Role of the WEU, ESG Occasional Paper, September 
1989, pp. 32. 
57For discussion see Clarke and Hague, in Clarke and Hague, op. cit., p. 154.; NATO in the 1990s', Special 
Report of the North Atlantic Assembly, Belgium, May 1988; Greenwood, D. `Constructing the European 
Pillar: Issues and Institutions', NATO Review, No. 3, June 1988, pp. 13-17. 
58 See Smart, I. `The new Atlantic Charter', The World Today, June 1973. 
s9 Howe, Sir G. `The European Pillar', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2, Winter 1984-5, p. 338. See Kelleher, 
C. `America looks at Europe: Change and Continuity in the 1980s', Washington Quarterly, Winter 1984, 
pp. 33-49, for decline in US support of Europe. Also see Ravenal, E. `Europe without America: The Erosion 
of NATO', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 5, Summer 1985, p. 1030. 
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defence burden. If it became effective it would threaten to undermine domestic American 
support for the Alliance, certainly in the transitional stages. What the Americans sought, in 
one view, was a means to `alter the Alliance without changing it. ' 60 
As for the French plans for WEU revitalisation, the US was at first suspicious, as it was of 
any independent European initiative. 61 The revitalisation of WEU was only likely to add 
another competing procedure for defence dialogue and co-operation, resulting in 
unnecessary duplication of efforts and greater strain on already limited budgets. 62 Whilst 
the WEU had clearly been seen as a means of supporting NATO in the 1950s, the changing 
structural environment raised American fears of the effects that a vehicle with competency 
in a distinctly European defence dimension might have for their position within the 
Atlantic Alliance. Consequently, the official government position, as presented by 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt in February 1985, was that the US could see no 
need to revitalise the WEU. 
Revitalisation 
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Claude Cheysson, made tentative proposals for the 
re-launching of the WEU in the French National Assembly as early as 2 December 1981. 
With West German support, French proposals were circulated on 2 February 1984.63 
Following a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris on 12 June 1984, the Rome meeting of 
Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Seven (26 - 27 October) led to the adoption of the 
Rome Declaration, 64 which initiated the process of WEU revitalisation. In this `certificate 
of rebirth', the Seven member states identified those areas which had become of serious 
concern in transatlantic relations - defence questions, disarmament and arms control, 
European arms co-operation, European contributions to the Atlantic Alliance, and the 
60 Mattox refers to the American attitude as 'supportive in principle, but somewhat schizophrenic, or at least 
ambivalent, in practice'. Mattox in Clarke and Hague, op. cit., p. 123. Also see discussion in Calleo, op. cit., 
pp. 134-137. 
61 Zakheim, noted that `Not everyone in Washington supports French efforts to revive WEU. Suspicion of 
France is nothing new to the State Department, and particularly when it is a Gaullist seeking to promote 
European cooperation'. However, `though a Gaullist, Chirac is not De Gaulle, nor is his defense minister, 
Andre Giraud, anti-American. Defense relations between France and the US are better than they have been 
for years'. Zakheim, op. cit., pp. 86-87 
62 Wallace in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1985, p. 39. 
63 Mr Tindemans, the Belgian Foreign Minister produced a report published in Le Monde on 23 December 
1983 anticipating French proposals. 
64 Implemented in Bonn, 22 - 23 April 1985. For text of relevant communiques see Western European Union, 
The Reactivation of WEU, Statements and Communiques 1984 -1987, Batley, West Yorkshire, WEU, 1988. 
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development of East/West relations - as those in which to hold `comprehensive 
discussions'. This Declaration noted that the Atlantic Alliance `remains the foundation of 
Western Security', and stated that `better utilisation of the WEU' would contribute to 
Western Security, creating `greater solidarity' amongst all the allies. In restating the treaty 
goals, the long-standing aim to `promote the unity and encourage the progressive 
integration of Europe' is highlighted, as is the objective of closer member-state co- 
operation internally `and with other European organisations'. 
In order to carry out the stated aims of enhanced co-operation, the WEU was to be 
redesigned, the Rome Declaration providing for a new diplomatic framework including 
foreign and defence ministerial meetings at least twice yearly and regular meetings of 
political directors or ministers of foreign affairs with representatives from the ministries of 
defence. In providing for establishment by Council of subsidiary bodies, the Rome 
Declaration paved the way for the creation of Special Working Groups (SWG), with 
experts from ministries of defence and foreign affairs meeting to deal with specific 
matters; the first area for study, in 1985, was the implications of SDI for European 
security. 65 The Rome Declaration also defined the relationship between the Council and 
the Assembly, Article 9 emphasising the Assembly's increasingly important role as the 
only European parliamentary body treaty-mandated to discuss defence. 
For all the symbolic importance of reactivation, 66 the process of `breathing new life' into 
the organisation had proven disappointingly slow. Indeed, one year after the Rome 
Declaration, the President of the WEU Assembly was moved to complain, `There we have 
the WEU Treaty charging us to define a policy on security and defence; we have a Council 
in London which is organised in such a way as to be able to operate continuously - but 
instead of using this forum the members engage in bilateral talks and the foreign ministers 
travel around as if the WEU were non-existent. '67 This initial `sluggishness' may be 
explained by a number of factors. Notably, the British maintained their reservations 
65 The long and drawn out process to report stage opened the WEU up to considerable criticism at the time. 
See Assembly of the Western European Union, Extraordinary Session, ̀The European Pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance: Part 1, The Reactivation of the WEU', Doc. 1089,16 March 1987, p. 7. 
66 Jorgnesen suggests that during the revitalisation process the WEU's most "substantial" qualities seem to be 
located at the rhetorical and symbolic levels'. Jorgensen, op. cit., 1990, p. 150. 
67Quoted in report by Ruge, P. `Terrorismus bedroht Europa'. Die Welt, 25 April 1986, p. 6. See Bloom, B. 
`Enthusiasm wanes in Europe for reviving the WEU', Financial Times, 29 April 1986. For an unsurprisingly 
more optimistic account see Secretary General Cahen's speech to the plenary session of the WEU Assembly, 
2 December 1985, `The future of Western European Union', text published in Europe Documents, No. 59,31 
December 1985. 
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regarding the potential impact of enhanced European co-operation on NATO, concerns 
shared in particular by the Dutch and enhanced by US responses to the SWG's SDI 
discussions. Despite the commitment to enhanced consultation, if WEU was neither to 
duplicate NATO activity, nor undermine it through the establishment of an effective 
caucus, it remained unclear what was to be its role. Alfred Cahen, the new Secretary 
General in 1985, also noted the institutional dimension, recalling how difficult it had been 
to `concretise' the organisational structures of the WEU, defence officials finding the 
working practices of foreign affairs officials over- deliberative and indecisive. 68 Given the 
clear limitations of EPC to overcome national preferences in its low-politics deliberations, 
high expectations of a newly revived and institutionally reformed WEU may have 
contributed to an unreasonable sense of disappointment in the institution's early 
performance. 
Efforts had continued within the EC context and in bilateral agreement to further enhance 
European defence co-operation. 69 The Draft Treaty establishing European Union approved 
by the European Parliament in February 1984 gave the Union competence in security 
matters, although France and West Germany were unsuccessful in their attempt at the 
Milan Summit of June 1985 to `introduce binding political consultation on security matters 
within the framework of `Political Union'. 70 The Single European Act, which entered into 
force in July 1987, called for closer co-ordination of policies, although again this was 
placed in the context of political and economic security considerations. The failure of EC 
members to agree on a defence dimension for Europe contributed to the revitalisation of 
WEU as a representation of a defence identity of the willing. Conversely, it has been 
argued, WEU's contribution to integration may be identified in the impact that its 
revitalisation had on the `defence-shy' states within the EC. In what has been described as 
a `vortex effect', WEU reactivation `impelled' states to concentrate their thoughts and 
adopt a more positive attitude to the political aspects of EC, not least in agreeing to the 
inclusion of political and economic security aspects under Title III of the 1987 Single 
68 Interview with Cahen, 25 January 1997. 
69 For discussion of Franco-German co-operation see Mattox in Clarke and Hague, op. cit., p. 125. Also 
Bertram, op. cit., 1989, p. 108. See Kaiser, K. and Roper, J. on `British-German Defence Co-operation - 
Partners within the Alliance', London, RIIA, 1988; Wallace, W. `European Security: Bilateral Steps to 
Multilateral Cooperation' in Boyar, Y. et al. (eds. ), Franco-British Defence Cooperation , London, 
Routledge/RIIA, 1989, pp. 171-80.; Gambles, op. cit., pp. 48-53. 
70 See Schmidt, op. cit., p. 395. 
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European Act (SEA), 71 to avoid the risk of exclusion from this important area of European 
debate. 72 Significantly, the provisions of the SEA stipulate that it must not impede closer 
cooperation 'within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic 
Alliance'. Thus precedence was given, in the absence of EC consensus, to WEU as a 
vehicle for developing the elusive European defence identity. 73 
The issue that first compelled a significant joint European response was the Reykjavik 
debacle of October 1986. In summit-level superpower talks in the Iceland capital, Reagan 
turned what was intended as a `preparatory prise de contact' into a serious negotiating 
summit. 74Only his insistence on maintaining SDI saved him from embarrassing Soviet 
acceptance of proposals that would have unilaterally seriously damaged his European 
allies' vital security interests and decoupled West European and American strategies only 
three years after INF deployment. 75 In the realisation that European interests would only be 
heard if they managed to find a way of articulating and acting upon a common position in a 
coherent manner, the WEU Ministerial meetings of 13-14 November 1986 resulted in joint 
conclusions, enabling Prime Minister Thatcher to gain agreement, at her Camp David 
meeting with President Reagan later that month, that allied priorities in arms control would 
be recognised. 76 Cahen was to note the importance of the concerted WEU response to the 
Reykjavik talks, stating that, as Thatcher acted on the brief wired to her from WEU, `then, 
71 Agreed at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1985, the SEA was intended chiefly to create a 
single market by 1992. Under Title III Article 30, the SEA provided for `the formalisation of what already 
existed in EPC practice, plus an EPC Secretariat', retaining the emphasis on intergovernmentalism, but 
strengthening coordination between the EPC and Commission and improving consultation between EPC and 
EP. For structure, rules and security competence see Jannuzzi, P. `European Political Co-operation: Moving 
towards closer integration', NATO Review. No. 4, August 1988. p. 11-16; Duke, op. cit., 2000, pp. 69-72. 
72 See Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1988, p. 3. Also see Tsakaloyannis, P. `The EC from Civilian Power to military 
intervention, in Lodge, J. The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, London, Pinter, 1989, 
p. 471. 
73 Interestingly, no formal consultations between EPC and WEU were provided for in the Rome Treaty or 
SEA, whilst the MBT stipulates that WEU works in close coop with NATO, the Council and it Agencies 
relying on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters. 
74 Howard, M. `A European Perspective on the Reagan Years', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3,1987-1988, 
p. 479. See Schlesinger, J. `Reykjavik and Revelations: A Turn of the Tide', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65.1986, 
p. 430. 
75Reagan's stated commitment to the 'elimination of all ballistic missiles from the face of the earth', was not 
only generally of concern to the members of the WEU in terms of the effects on NATO strategy and the 
nuclear guarantee, but was particularly worrying to the British, given its dependence on US supplies and 
satellite targeting back-up for its planned Trident replacement. Reagan cited ibid. p. 479. 
76 In securing the Anglo-US Trident agreement, Thatcher also gained agreement with Reagan that an INF 
agreement would be secured and that a 50% reduction in Superpower strategic weapons within 5 years and a 
ban on Chemical weapons would be sought. See Barber, L. and Riddel, P. `Thatcher wins Reagan promise on 
modernizing UK deterrent', The Financial Times, 17 November 1986. This won her some respect from 
Europeans despite her Euroscepticism. See Erlanger, S. `Mrs Thatcher under European eyes', New 
Statesman, 26 June 1987. 
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for the first time, we were in business'. 77 Whilst Thatcher `stressed the great importance of 
NATO and warned against any development (as a result of Franco-German initiatives) of 
the Western European Union as an alternative to it', concerns regarding Reagan's apparent 
willingness to phase out US commitment to Europe, with its impact on UK Trident 
procurement, had evidently led the UK government to accept greater WEU competence. 78 
Under the leadership of Cahen, a number of decisions were taken to consolidate the 
organisational structure in order to make the WEU more `dynamic and effective', 79 the 
reactivation being officially approved and acknowledged at the Luxembourg foreign and 
defence ministers' meeting of 28 April 1987.80 The process of revitalisation was 
effectively completed by the promulgation at The Hague, on 27 October 1987 of the 
`Platform' Declaration. 81 A `watered-down' version of the European Security Charter 
called for by the French, the `Platform' can nevertheless be seen as something of a 
diplomatic watershed for the WEU, representing an expression of European intentions for 
the organisation and defining an embryonic European security identity. 82 Whilst reflecting 
a clear commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, and recognising the criteria for security in 
such terms, the Platform underlined the interdependent nature of the transatlantic 
relationship. 83 In the context of ongoing arms control negotiations, the Platform served to 
reaffirm the centrality of nuclear deterrence, with explicit mention of the role of French 
and British national capabilities, 84 at the same time recognizing the importance of detente 
77 Cahen, interviewed 25 January 1997, Paris. 
78 Thatcher's Bruges speech to the College of Europe, Summer 1998, cited in Thatcher, M. The Downing 
Street Years, London, Harper Collins, 1993, p. 745- 
79 Poos, op. cit., p. 17. 
80 For discussion see A. Cahen. The Emergence and Role of the WEU in Clarke and Hague, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 
Also see WEU Assembly, Extraordinary Session. `The European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance: Part 1. The 
Reactivation of the WEU', Document 1089,16 March 1987. 
81 WEU Ministerial Council, Platform of European Security Interests, The Hague, 27 October 1987. 
82 Cahen, op. cit., 1989, p. 47. Britain had been resistant to the notion of a `security charter' for fears that it 
might in some way undermine the Atlantic Charter, even the name being a matter of contention amongst the 
Seven. As Helmut Sonnenfeldt noted, 'There is a certain air of unreality here - while the text of the platform 
declares the intention to build the security dimension of an 'integrated Europe' the title dares not even suggest 
that NATO might be affected'. `The European Pillar: The American View', Adelphi, No. 235. Spring 1989. 
p. 98. 
83 'The security of the Alliance is indivisible. The partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic rests on 
the twin foundations of shared values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American 
democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is 
vital to the security of North America'. 
84 See UK Foreign Office commentary on the Platform in their memorandum, `The Political impact of 
disarmament and Arms Control', Third Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 1987-1988, HC 280, 
HMSO, 1988, pp. 22-24. 
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and arms control as complements to defence, a position dear to the Germans. 85 
Significantly, it also identified the WEU as an important contributor to the broader process 
of European Unification', a process which `will remain incomplete as long as it does not 
include security and defence'. The Platform thus placed the new intention to `develop a 
more cohesive `European defence identity' firmly within the dual context of European 
Construction and Atlantic Community. 86 
WEU and the substance of change 
Having examined the process of revitalisation and the motivations behind that process, it 
remains to consider the substantive activity of WEU during the period from its rebirth to 
the events that accompanied the ending of the Cold War in 1989. In examining the 
development of the four areas under consideration in this section, the motivations behind 
change are identified and the contribution of WEU to the emerging security order is further 
illuminated. 
Arms control 
Arms control issues came to dominate much of the security debate of the 1980s. Because 
of the implications of arms control agreements for force plans and arms production, not to 
mention basic strategy and commitment, what had become clear was the importance of 
Europe knowing its own collective mind in order to have some influence on the developing 
regime. The WEU was to provide the forum in which this consensus could be achieved and 
articulated, the 1984 Rome Declaration committing WEU members to `seek to harmonise 
their views' in this area central to European interests. 
In terms of `internal' arms control, the role of the Agency for the Control of Arms had 
diminished throughout the 1970s. Controls on conventional armaments had been gradually 
relaxed in order that the FRG might contribute more effectively to NATO. In the Rome 
Declaration the `remaining quantitative controls on conventional weapons' were to be 
entirely lifted by January 1986, although ABC controls remained. Given that the ACA had 
85 Whilst the Platform seemed to offer something to everyone, Garnharn notes that there was some 
resentment in Italy over the Franco-British prominence in the Platform, the nuclear fixation at a time of flux 
in East/West relations and the possibility of encouraging US isolationism, concerns largely shared by the 
Dutch. Garnham, op. cit., p. 120. 
86 See Communique of the Atlantic Summit, 2-3 March 1988, that almost duplicates the platform. 
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never shown itself successful in establishing ABC controls, 
87 its residual activity was to 
follow up the work of the multilateral disarmament talks that had become a key feature of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, the ACA was to be reorganised and downsized and, 
following discussions within the Permanent Council, it was agreed at the Bonn Ministerial 
of 23 April 1985 to establish three small `Agencies for Security Questions' to consider the 
areas of arms control negotiations, security, and arms co-operation respectively, the ACA 
coming under the first of the new Agencies until their demise in 1989.88 
Whilst the European powers generally welcomed the new era of arms control made 
possible by the accession of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in 1985, summit-level 
negotiations raised concerns in Europe as to the development of too close a Soviet-US 
dialogue. US' insistence that Europeans refrain from discussing ongoing arms control 
issues within the WEU, fearing that signs of allied dissent might undermine or complicate 
negotiations, did little to reassure her European allies. 89 Whilst the Europeans were broadly 
supportive of Reagan's zero option on INF, it was felt that the implications of the proposed 
INF Treaty, without subsequent and significant expenditure on conventional arms build up, 
would result in incoherence in the flexible response doctrine as applied to Europe, and cast 
doubt on the US' commitment to remaining a `European power'. 90 Consequently, the 
WEU's Council of Ministers Venice Communique of 30 April 1986, stressed `the 
particular interest to Europe' of the INF negotiations, underlining the need for balanced 
conventional forces throughout Europe and emphasising WEU members' efforts in the 
context of multi-lateral fora such as the Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons talks in 
Geneva and those on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna. 
87 WEU Assembly Report, Rapportuers Mr Henares and Mr Tummers, `Western European Union: 
Information Report', February 1993, pp. 18-19. 
88The establishment of a new Institute for Security Studies was agreed in 1989, with the tasks of carrying out 
research, encouraging awareness through seminars and meetings and to establish a data base of issues 
relating to European security. See WEU Assembly, Proceedings, Vol. 3,1989, p. 313. 
89 In February 1985 the WEU were explicitly informed by the US `that they did not wish a European position 
to be expressed at the time the Geneva negotiations were being started'. Consequently the British government 
were to veto any joint statements on the issue by the WEU Council, which suspended arms control 
discussion. See Assembly of the Western European Union, Extraordinary Session, The European Pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance: Part 1, The Reactivation of the WEU, Document 1089,16 March 1987, p. 6. Also see 
`Washington s'inquiete des initiatives de l'Union de Europe occidentale', Le Monde, 3 April 1985; Bloom, 
B. 'US objects to European moves on defence policies', The Financial Times, 2 April 1985. 
9' Hunter, R. `Will the United States Remain a European Power', Survival, Vol. 30, No. 3, May-June 1988, 
p. 215. 
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The Reykjavik experience in the winter of 1986 had a significant positive impact on 
Europeans' confidence in their collective voice. By 1987 the tone of WEU statements with 
regard to its arms control interests had become markedly more assertive. The Hague 
Platform asserts that `Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into 
account the specific European security interests in an evolving situation. It must be 
consistent with the maintenance of the strategic unity of the Alliance and should not 
preclude closer European defence co-operation. ' 
Consequently, whilst Reagan's `zero option' on INF had been largely accepted due to the 
extent of Soviet concessions involved, NATO's March 1988 discussions on the removal of 
longer-range INFs (the double zero option) resulted in an `ambiguous compromise' 
reflecting a lack of Alliance consensus. 91 Further negotiations on shorter range INFs 
(around the Soviets' triple zero proposal), whilst welcomed in some quarters of the Federal 
Republic, where concerns about the singularity of these `German killers' proved politically 
influential, were resisted by British, French and West German officials who feared the 
progressive de-nuclearisation of Western Europe and its conceptual separation from US 
strategic interests. 92 
Whilst the Americans were proving, by the end of the decade, to be more in tune with 
European opinion, the implications of Reykjavik and the INF issue had effectively 
permeated the European psyche and attitudes towards further dismantling of existing 
NATO strategy. 93 By September of 1987, Giscard d'Estaing was recommending that 
Europeans should find themselves a forum `for example that of the Western European 
Union, to define a method to undertake the clarification of their strategic concepts before 
discussing them with our American allies within the European-Atlantic alliance'. 
94 The 
Council's high level Special Working Group, which was to supplant the SDI specific SWG 
in April 1987, took on the task of looking at `a broader range of issues relating to European 
security interests' on which to report to the Council. At their meeting of the 18-19 April 
91 Dunn, L. `Considerations after the INF Treaty: NATO after the Global Double Zero', Survival, Vol. 3, No. 
3, May-June 1988. p. 22. Also see Joffe, J. `Europe's American Pacifier', Foreign Policy, No. 54. Spring 
1984, p. 80. 
92 In fact, WEU members could not come to an agreed position over the `triple zero option' at their April 
1987 Ministerial in Luxembourg, agreeing only to the need for a measured and `unhasty' response. See 
Bonnart, F. `West Europeans agreed they had nothing to say', International Herald Tribune, 28 May 1987. 
93 Given the implications of arms control measures the UK's Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe supported 
WEU as a forum to prepare for a potential reduction of US defence commitment to Europe. See Report on 
Brussels Speech, `Howe hints NATO must be ready for US cuts in Europe', Guardian, 17 March 1987. 
94 Valery Giscard d'Estaing, `Un bon accord, une chance pour 1'Europe' Le Monde, 23 September 1987. 
113 
1988, Mr Van den Broek, the Dutch Foreign Minister, was able to assure the WEU's 
Ministerial Council that, `... Ministers had addressed the current major issues relating to 
arms control and defence requirements from a European perspective and [that] they had 
instructed the special working group to study these questions with the aim of harmonising 
European views. In this way, a more effective European input into Alliance thinking on 
such issues as the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament could be 
achieved, thereby contributing to a further strengthening of the Alliance as a whole. '95 
Equally, Geoffrey Howe was moved to comment at the end of the British Presidency of the 
Union in 1989 that `we have had valuable exchanges of views on all the main arms control 
issues over the past year'. 96 
Indeed, the WEU member states proved themselves invaluable during the Conventional 
Forces, Europe (CFE) negotiations in March 1989, particularly in the supervision of force 
reductions, the management of recalled personnel, and in the verification procedures. 97 In 
terms of negotiation and decision-making, though much of this may have been unilaterally 
American, NATO's High Level Task Force (HLTF) had a considerable role and this is 
significant in that the WEU representatives within the HLTF were identical to those within 
the WEU's Special Working Group. Given this `coincidence' and `depending on 
procedures, timing and objectives' Jorgensen suggests that it seems not to be unlikely that 
`the WEU indirectly plays a considerable role in conventional arms control policy- 
making' 98 
Arms co-operation 
The scepticism of the 1970s with regard to European arms collaboration began to be 
replaced in the early 1980s by an acceptance that a way had to be found to make 
collaboration work. The `3% approach' of the late 1970s had been politically damaging to 
the alliance. Equipment costs were increasing, made worse by the rising inflation of the 
1980s and the requirement to replace front line capabilities with latest generation 
technologies. Concern over the emerging technical dependence of Western Europe, 
95 Taken from Cahen, op. cit., 1989, p. 46. 
96 Howe, Sir G. `The WEU: The Way Ahead', NATO Review. No. 3, June 1989, p. 13. 
97 Jorgensen, K. E. `The Western European Union and the Imbroglio of European Security', Co-operation and 
Conflict, Vol. 25,1990, p. 147. 
98Jorgensen, ibid, pp. 146-147. 
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implicit in the Star Wars programme, had led President Mitterrand to urge Europeans to 
take a common stand against SDI co-operation on the grounds that participation would 
involve further subordination to the American military-industrial complex with damaging 
implications for Europe's technology trade. Equally, if the Europeans were to devise any 
European defence identity it would seem to depend on some level of joint arms production 
and standardisation and a move away from dependence on American technologies, and this 
would have to take place within the context of a broader political commitment. 
For member states, WEU provided only one potential mechanism for co-operation, the 
French developing the European Research Co-ordination Agency (EUREKA) in 1985 as a 
response to SDI and intended to promote research into the civil use of lasers and emerging 
technologies. 991n its Rome Declaration, the WEU had committed itself to `provide a 
political impetus to institutions of co-operation in the field of armaments'. Indeed, the 
WEU had a commitment to arms co-operation since 1955 with the development of the 
Standing Armaments Committee, but this role had been largely taken over by the IEPG, 
given its broader European membership. In fact, despite the WEU's mandate for arms 
collaboration, it tended to `defer' to the IEPG or NATO's arms co-operation body, CNAD, 
identifying its own role in terms of `providing the necessary political impetus for, and 
practical contribution to, the various efforts undertaken in this field'. loo In the Rome 
Declaration the IEPG had been identified as an institution to be particularly encouraged 
given that its `main objective is to promote European cooperation and also to contribute to 
the development of balanced cooperation within the Atlantic Alliance'. 101 
Nevertheless, despite a developing awareness of the need for increased European arms co- 
operation, national interests continued to predominate. Having agreed at their Bonn 
Ministerial in April 1985 to `continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as 
far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United 
States to participate in the [SDI] research programme', 
102 WEU members could reach no 
common position and US sweeteners, in the form of lucrative contracts, were quickly 
99For discussion of EUREKA see Wells, op. cit., pp. 163-4; Fenske, F. `France and the Strategic Defence 
Initiative: speeding up or putting on the brakes? ', International Affairs, Vol. 62, Spring 1986, p. 235. 
100 See the Bonn Communique, 23 April 1985. 
101 Rome Declaration, 1984,1113d. `The IEPG is Janus-faced. Transatlantic cooperation is one face; the 
second face is improved European competitiveness against American defense contractors, a US armaments 
market two and a half times larger than Western Europe's, and research and development spending 
approximately five times greater than Europe's'. Garnham, op. cit., p. 126. 
102 Bonn Communique of 23 April 1985 
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snapped up by the military industrial groups. '03 Competition and national interest once 
again took precedence, as each state negotiated separate terms for its participation in the 
industrial research funding. 
American support for European arms co-operation had been uneven. Whilst collaborative 
arms projects might be efficient, cost effective, and lead to useful standardisation in theory, 
in practice they frequently lead to greater costs and less efficiency in production. 104 Even 
if European collaboration might create defence resource efficiencies, contributing to 
burden sharing and consequently to US security interest, as Ledogar was to note, it `may 
not be in the interest of certain United States defence industries or their friends in 
Congress, or of those desiring the surest, safest control of technology flow to the East, nor, 
perhaps, of United States commercial competitiveness in general. ' 105 
As European governments moved increasingly in favour of enhanced European arms co- 
operation, 106 the WEU's role became that of a `talking shop'. Functional co-operation was 
to take place within alternative fora. The WEU's role extended into making better use of 
existing resources, which might give the US signals that Europe was taking it 
commitments seriously, but this proved a difficult area given that force planning carried 
the inevitable implications of treading on the toes of NATO. What is evident is that, whilst 
greater efficiency might serve to placate some of the American concerns regarding the 
Europeans load carrying, arms co-operation served longer-term interests in a more 
specifically European perspective. Interestingly, Garnham notes that `as the WEU revived, 
states such as Denmark, Norway, and Spain, which were excluded from the WEU, sought 
103For discussion see Howard, op. cit., p. 480. and Carmoy, G. de, `Changing French Perspectives: the 
Atlantic Alliance and the United States', in Goldstein, op. cit., p. 96. 
104The European Fighter Aircraft, for example, costs an estimated $60 million each, compared to around half 
this for F-16 Agile Falcon or F-18 Hornet 2000. See Sonnenfeldt, H. The European Pillar: The American 
View, Adelphi Paper, No. 235, Spring 1989, pp. 96-97. 
105 Steven Ledogar, cited ibid, p. 97. 
106 For the British position see Statement on the Defence Estimates, Vol. 1, London, HMSO, 1987, p. 46, 
where it is argued that `a more cohesive European effort will strengthen the Alliance in a number of 
important ways: politically, by demonstrating our ability to work closely together; militarily, by reducing the 
inefficiency that comes from having different and incompatible versions of the same equipment on the 
battlefield; and industrially, by helping to produce a more competitive European industrial base'. Also see 
discussion in Taylor, T. and Hayward, K. The UK Defence and Industrial Base: Issues and Future Policy 
Options, London, RUSI/Brassey's, 1989; Schmaling, E. `German Security Policy Beyond American 
Hegemony', World Policy Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2,1989, p. 384. 
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to energize the IEPG as well'. 107 In the same way as the WEU revitalisation had promoted 
development and co-operation in the EPC framework, this may have been a case of the 
excluded looking to develop the frameworks in which they are included in order not to be 
sidelined. Additionally, Aybert has suggested that by providing for a dialogue on the 
`higher politics' of European security, a kind of reverse spill over was taking place where 
functional cooperation within IEPG was, at least in part, a response to the revival of high 
politics within WEU. 108 That WEU was to be utilised as a support organisation rather than 
a primary centre for arms co-operation is made clear by the documents relating to 
revitalisation. Indeed, efforts to rationalise the WEU in order that it might more effectively 
perform the duties for which it was reactivated, led to the transferral of the SACs 
Secretariat to one of the newly formed `Agencies for Security Questions' in January 1986, 
the SAC itself not meeting after 1985. In November 1989, as arms co-operation developed 
in the broader framework of IEPG and in EC industrial policies, 109 the SAC was finally 
disbanded, along with the other Security Agencies. ' 10 
East-West dialogue and `out of area' debate 
The growing disparity between European and American perceptions of foreign policy 
interests, most significant in regard to the US' `globalised' view of the East-West conflict, 
had led to efforts within the WEU to develop a European dialogue with the East Bloc. 
Having committed itself to `the improvement of East-West relations through the promotion 
of contact and dialogue' in the Venice Communique of April 1986, the WEU established 
official relations between its Assembly and the Supreme Soviet in April 1987.111 Indeed, 
the Assembly had proven itself a useful arena for European `joint reflection' on a range of 
foreign and security policy issues, alongside that taking place within the EPC framework. 
107 David Garnham, op. cit., p. 123. The UK's Defence Minister Heseltine was particularly encouraging of 
IEPG utilisation. 
108 Aybert, op. cit., p. 160. 
109 See Heisbourg, F. `A European Defence Industry: Dream or Reality', NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 33, 
No. 8, January 1989, p. 29. In fact, by 1989, national and collaborative weapons projects had lost much of 
their political impetus as a consequence of the `arms control blight'. See Taylor, T. `Conventional Arms 
Control -A threat to Arms Procurement', The World Today, Vol. 45, No. 3,7 July 1989, pp. 121-4. 
110 Assembly of the WEU, WEU: Information Report, February 1993, pp. 18-20. For Cahen, transforming the 
Agencies into the Institute for Security Studies was not a `suppressive' act, but rather an example of the 
dynamism of the organisation. Interview, 25 January 1997, Paris. 
111 The 1987 Hague Platform states the intention of developing confidence building measures, and opening 
channels for communication and dialogue, providing for `mutually beneficial possibilities in the fields of 
economy, technology, science and the protection of the environment'. 
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112 However, in areas in which the Europeans did not share the foreign policy perspective 
of the Americans, 113 the role of the WEU in developing and articulating concerted positions 
had been generally weak. This lack of a substantive European position was only partly the 
result of American pressure on European governments to comply with Washington's 
strategic demands. 114 European states continued to act essentially on individual interest. 
The British, most closely concerned with their special relationship with the US, acceded to 
Reagan's demands, although with increasing reluctance. 115 The French sought an 
independent line, increasingly distancing themselves from American policy. None proved 
ready to accept the costs of joint action, and even in those areas where a common 
European position was established, the combination of their own inadequacies, national 
orientations and US pressures ensured their inability to translate common interests into 
substantive Policy. 116 Consequently, whilst the WEU was to provide for continuous 
dialogue amongst member states on issues of European significance, the lack of ready 
convergence led to the WEU developing, in Forster's words, as a `ginger group rather than 
a caucus, concerned with consultation rather than policy-making'. 117 
Operational Activity 
A significant shift for the WEU in the late 1980s was in moves to develop the ability to 
respond to crises outside Europe that could affect European security interests. This 
development must be largely understood in terms of the increased European resistance to 
112 See for example WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Muller, `Africa's role in a European security 
policy - Chad', Doc. 957,31 October 1983; WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Lord Reay, `Situation 
in the 
Middle East and European security', Doc. 978,24 May 1984; WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr 
Martine, `Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq', Doc. 1162,10 November 1988. 
'"Areas of contention included the US bombing of Libya, the mining of Nicaraguan harbours and American 
actions in Grenada, aggravated by the Irangate debacle that 'threw not only the substance of American 
policies but also the credentials of the foreign policy machine into the melting pot'. Smith, op. cit., 1984, 
p. 24. 
114 Kissinger had warned against any independent European foreign policy when he commented, in response 
to criticisms of the Libyan bombing, that 'if this kept going on, if the United States felt obliged to intervene in 
many places and if the Europeans..... participated in the opposition against us, then the Alliance.... would lose 
support in the United States. ' Channel 4 interview, 24 September 1986, cited in Palmer, op. cit., p. 169. 
115 A MORI poll in the Sunday Times. 23 February 1986 found that half of all polled thought the US as big a 
threat as the Soviets, 59% considered Reagan to be untrustworthy with British interests and 54% thought that 
Reagan did not have sound judgement. 
116 An interesting point to note here is the ECs support for the Contadora group's peace initiative of 1984 and 
the Arias plan of 1987, which were attempt to deal with the troubles in Central America, and represented a 
position directly opposed to Washington's interests and policy for the area. For discussion see Allen and 
Smith in Gill, op. cit., p. 105. 
117 Forster in Deighton, op. cit., 1997, p. 34. 
118 
US foreign policy activity, which had led to US efforts to enhance `out of area' co- 
operation through the NATO framework. Following limited European support for US 
policy in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the fall of the US 
backed Shah of Iran in the same year, President Carter had proposed the establishment of a 
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. This would be an `out-of-area' deployment force, 
drawn from US forces assigned to NATO, with a subsequent requirement for increased 
European presence to cover the shortfall in the NATO area. 
This idea was taken further by the Reagan Administration, which proposed the 
formalisation of allied contributions to out-of-area activity, including direct military 
participation, peacetime military presence, and provision for US access to airspace and 
bases. 118 For the Europeans, who neither shared the globalised vision of the East-West 
conflict, nor necessarily the Americans' manner of managing it, traditional European 
diversity of out-of-area interest prescribed a more ad hoc informalism in the management 
of external crisis. For the UK, the Falklands experience in 1982 had served to illustrate the 
benefits of being able to act quickly, unconstrained by the requirements of broad coalition 
building. France continued to resist any American-prescribed constraints on her 
independence of manoeuvre, whilst for the Federal Republic, the potential for 
entanglement in external conflicts could be an explosive problem, given its constitutional 
constraints. ' 19 In order to resist US pressure for formalised NATO-based cooperation `out- 
of-area' without undermining the alliance, the Europeans needed to demonstrate their 
effectiveness in informal cooperation outside NATO. 120 
As the Iran-Iraq war escalated in 1986-7, the danger to maritime navigation in the area 
provoked the first step in the development of WEU's operational role. US efforts to use the 
NATO framework to coordinate shipping protection were rejected by the Europeans, 121 
who were keen to divorce the crisis from any East-West connotation through UN, rather 
than NATO, involvement. The UK had been operating the Armilla patrol to protect British 
shipping in the Gulf since 1980 and in the summer of 1987 announced its intention, along 
1's See Ikle, F. `The Security Role of South West Asia and the Role of the Alliance', NAC, 16 October 1981. 
1'9 Hoscheit in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1985, p. 17. 
120 As Schmidt states, for the sake of Alliance cohesion the Europeans needed to find a means of countering 
the growing American perception that the Europeans 'are interested everywhere but engaged nowhere'. 
Schmidt, op. cit., p. 398. For discussion of the development of the `out-of-area' issue see Aybert, op. cit., 
pp. 153-156. 
121 Following attacks on US shipping, the US proposed NATO based co-operation at the meeting of NATO's 
Defence Planning Group on 26 May 1987. 
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with the French, to send ̀ independent' minesweepers to the area. Keen not to be excluded 
from European-based action in the area, the other European members of WEU were also 
constrained by public opinion from pursuing nationally independent or US-lead activity. 
By August, Italy and the Netherlands' Presidency of WEU had instigated political 
consultation within the WEU on the crisis. Invoking Art VIII (3) of the Modified Brussels 
Treaty for the first time, the WEU Council issued a political statement on 19 April 1988 
expressing its concern at the increase in hostilities in the region and calling for an end to 
hostile acts against shipping. Unfettered by the geographical limits imposed by the 
Washington Treaty, the consultations consequent on the Brussels Treaty obligations `with 
regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat 
should arise', led, following the July 1988 ceasefire, to `Operation Cleansweep'. A 
concerted mine-clearing operation, the operation involved the deployment of naval vessels 
from five of the seven WEU member states, with the remaining two offering solidarity and 
assistance. 122 Working side by side with the US in the Gulf, the WEU structure coordinated 
national operations on three levels: at the Foreign and Defence Minister level, at the level 
of naval staffs meeting in the capitals, and in regular consultation between naval 
commanders in the Gulf. Van Eekelen was to state that, `... our practical arrangements 
within the WEU framework have been justified, are workable and have been put into 
practice, because in this operation, for the first time, not only the Belgian/Netherlands unit 
under joint command and in close tactical co-ordination with the British frigates, has been 
operating successfully, but in that same operation also British mine-hunters and Italian 
mine-hunters have been active and an Italian frigate has extended its protection to the 
whole fleet of vessels, at present. So from a European point of view, I think it is a 
successful operation, especially in showing that our combined operations are workable. ' 123 
But the success of the Gulf operation needs to be recognised not simply in terms of the 
political and operational cooperation that was achieved under the WEU. This `successful 
piece of improvisation' 124 had raised the visibility of the WEU, and by demonstrating that 
it could play a supportive role in relation to NATO, the Gulf operation had significant 
effects on both American and European attitudes to the Union. 125 The success in the Gulf 
122The Federal Republic, constitutionally forbidden from taking part, agreed to replace within the Alliance 
area units sent to the Gulf, whilst Luxembourg sent financial contributions. 
123 van Eekelen speaking at a Press Conference concluding the WEU Ministerial Council on 19 April 1988, 
cited in Cahen. op. cit., 1989, p. 48. 
124 Interview, UK MOD, 19 July 1991. 
125 Clarke in Clarke and Hague, op. cit., p. 39. 
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had demonstrated that the WEU could perform useful roles that lay effectively outside of 
NATO's remit, it could enable Europeans to disassociate themselves from too close a 
connection to US policy whilst still enabling them to participate in areas of European 
interest, and it could provide for an emerging European identity in very substantive and 
visible terms without undermining Atlantic cohesion or being seen as anti-American. 
Cahen has gone so far as to identify Hussein and Gorbachev as `sponsors' of WEU, given 
the specific dynamics of the period, where glasnost had undermined the potential for 
Soviet opposition to European activity in the Gulf. 126 In the development of its `out of 
area' competency, the WEU had proved an asset both to Europe and to the Alliance in 
general. 
Enlargement 
The other important WEU development of the 1980s was the accession of Spain and 
Portugal, a process initiated during the Hague negotiations beginning 26 May 1988, and 
continued in London when the UK took over the Presidency of WEU on 1 July of that 
year. Provided for under Article IX of the original Brussels Treaty, accession criteria 
include the acceptance of the sentiment, conditions and commitments of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, the Rome Declaration and the Hague Platform. Despite some 
complications in the case of the Spanish accession, 127 the Accession Protocol was signed 
on 14 November 1988 and was generally considered a success. It was to provide greater 
balance to the previously northern dominated Union without diluting the organisation in 
which there was a consistently affirmed `determination to develop a more cohesive 
European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligation 
of solidarity contained in the (modified Brussels) Treaty and in the North Atlantic Treaty. ' 
For Spain, as for France, WEU would provide a multilateral forum for military 
cooperation, inclusive of states `serious' about defence and consequently undermining the 
potential for the development of an inner `informal directorate' . 
128 Greece and Turkey, 
126 Interview with Alfred Cahen, Paris, 25 January 1997. 
127 The Socialist Government of Felipe Gonzalez, spurred on by leftist opposition, negotiated for special 
status for Spain. This was to entail Spanish exclusion from the integrated command of NATO, non- 
deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil during peacetime (though accepting the Platform reliance on 
them), an agreement on the creation of a rapid action force to be ready by 1991 for deployment to Northern 
Italy, and the dodging of the Gibraltar issue by interpreting the arbitration requirements of the Brussels 
Treaty to be only relevant to post-accession disputes. 
128 See Garnham, op. cit., p. 121; Eekelen in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1988, p. 43. 
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who had shown interest in membership since revitalisation, agreed on a joint consultation 
mechanism at ministerial level in 1989. 
Conclusion 
Following British entry into the Communities in 1973, the Western European Union had 
regressed into a period of ministerial slumber. In consort with the French rejection of the 
`Atlanticist' Union as a vehicle for defence co-operation, British disinclination to 
undermine the primary NATO structure for the provision of European defence security 
ensured that WEU fell into disuse: only the Assembly maintaining its role of keeping alive 
a defence dialogue between European states. By the early 1980s however, a number of 
changes had occurred within the international environment that called into question the 
continuing efficacy of the primary institutions of alliance and integration with tensions 
emerging within and between both of these ̀ communities of interest'. The revitalisation of 
WEU in 1984 and its subsequent development throughout the decade has been examined in 
the context of this changing security environment, in which a range of competing tensions 
are demonstrated and the WEU's utility as a means of satisfycing them ably demonstrated. 
Within the broad functional pillars of furthering European integration and alliance 
management, tensions existed that were similar in origin to those seen in previous periods 
of the WEU's history, although they were to become manifest in different ways. 
Integrative tensions arose from disparate perceptions of how European development should 
take place within the EEC context, whilst in terms of alliance, the increasing belligerence 
and foreign policy unilateralism of the Reagan administration formed a schism between the 
US and European players in NATO. 
Developments within the European Community framework provided for both an economic 
and political dimension to European construction, but the scope of further integration had 
become an issue of contention amongst European partners. For many, the logical `next 
step' in the integrative process was the development of a European defence competence, 
but those who sought to retain the Community as a `civilian power' resisted this. Whilst 
efforts to develop further the EPC as the `natural home' of a European Security Dimension 
for an evolving European Union had met with only limited successes, events within the 
broader security environment emphasised, particularly for the French and Germans, the 
requirement for a strengthened European `voice'. Frustrations within the Community thus 
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threatened to undermine the fragile consensus on which the developing Union was to be 
built. 
The unilateralism and dogmatic anti-communist bellicosity of US foreign and defence 
policy activity during the first Reagan Administration raised tangible concerns amongst 
many Europeans as to the possible entanglement of Europe in an `unnecessary' Reaganite 
conflict: US' desires to draw Europe into `out-of-area' co-operation within NATO to meet 
its global agenda serving only to intensify these concerns. Furthermore, the proposed 
Strategic Defence Initiative had rocked the relative contentment with the strategic 
relationship in terms of deterrence doctrine and nuclear guarantees that had persisted 
during the 1970s and bilateral superpower arms control activity further undermined 
European satisfaction with the alliance as the 1980s progressed. This constitutes an 
abandonment/entrapment dilemma that racked the Alliance during the period. 129 As 
perennial burden-sharing issues re-emerged, so did a recurrent alliance dilemma: whilst the 
US required greater European efforts in support of `alliance' interests, the greater 
European assertiveness which was likely to accompany any declining dependency 
threatened to undermine Atlantic cohesion. This familiar tension was intensified by the 
growing interest of many within an increasingly powerful Europe to pursue the 
development of a security dimension for the integration of the European space. 
The new competencies of the WEU, formulated under the Rome Declaration and 
reinforced in the Platform Document, established the WEU as the European centre for co- 
operation and consensus building on security matters with a commitment to the 
development of European unity. However, the resurrected WEU was to satisfy two 
contrasting interests. In one sense, the WEU must be seen as `an EPC on security', 
130 
providing both example and momentum for future developments in this area and was a 
response, at least in part, to the limitations of the Community in developing its own `high 
politics' competencies. The WEU thus provided an alternative constituency in which such 
interest could be met until such time as the EC Twelve could resolve their differences. 
However, for the British, amongst others, the resurrection of WEU was a means of limiting 
European integration within the EC by the creation of a competing multinational arena, 
whilst preventing the emergence of any alternative Franco-German directoire. From either 
129 For discussion of this security dilemma see Sharp, J. `After Reykjavik: arms control and the allies', 
International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2, Spring 1987, pp. 239-257 and Snyder, G. `The Security Dilemma in 
Alliance Politics', World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4, July 84, pp. 461-496. 
130 Cahen in Clarke and Hague, op cit., p. 59. 
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perspective, acting as a `lightning conductor', 131 the WEU was to provide `political relief 
in the Europeanisation process, 132 in providing a vehicle for dialogue and co-operation in 
those security areas of concern to many in Europe without apparently compromising the 
civilian nature of the European Community. However, the political implications of 
revitalisation served to push the `reluctant' EEC members to accept a greater level of 
political competence for the emerging Union at the risk of being `delegated to the second 
league', 133the acceptance of WEU precedence in the SEA being a short term expedient in 
preparation of further political developments within the Union. Through the provision of 
institutional knowledge and functional mechanisms for core state dialogue and co- 
operation, the WEU was to provide for a timely and pragmatic development of European 
defence co-operation which did not undermine the internal consensus of the Community, 
but which did provide for increased European confidence in their collective interests and 
ability in the security field. Consequently, whilst the full extent of a European security 
identity was not realised during the 1980s, WEU had taken important steps in maintaining 
the momentum towards its eventual development. 
In alliance terms, the Platform document, in restating the European commitment to the 
Alliance as the primary vehicle for collective defence, identified the range of alliance 
contentions as those in which closer European co-operation would serve to enhance the 
security of all allies. As a tool for edging France closer to NATO, the WEU provided for 
defence dialogue and co-operation in keeping with Atlantic requirements for a more 
effective European contribution, with the WEU benefiting from the exclusion of those EC 
members not `serious' about defence. 
Whilst accepting the IEPG mechanism as the most effective forum for arms co-operation 
activity, satisfying US concerns over burden sharing and European interests in over- 
dependency, the arms control elements of the WEU were dropped in order to provide for 
an effective German contribution to defence. Nevertheless, in its commitment to the 
discussion of arms control activity, the WEU provided for a European contribution to the 
arms control debate, acting as a vehicle for the articulation of European concerns over the 
impact of the Superpower agreement on the strategic viability of the emerging European 
131 Keatrige in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1985, p. 107. 
132 Seidelmann in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1985, pp. 72-73. 
'33Tsakaloyannis in Tsakaloyannis, op. cit., 1985, p. 100. 
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order. Perhaps most significantly, as a result of its counter mine operations in the Gulf, it 
demonstrated to the US that it was neither attempting to undermine nor replace NATO, and 
that it might have a significant role in specific defence areas not covered by the 
Washington provisions. It was not the Atlantic answer, but it proved an acceptable 
solution. 
The most significant function of the WEU was in providing a bridge between alliance and 
integrative interests. For the pragmatic British, who remained sceptical of European 
rhetoric, WEU's bridging role was significant in that it provided for `a healthy relationship 
with our North American allies, which remains the key to European security. ' 134 Britain's 
perception of WEU was as an adjunct to the existing European security arrangements and 
its success was seen only in terms of the support and strengthening effect that it had as `a 
servant of NATO, not an understudy'. 135 The alternative European approach to WEU was 
however, characterised by the French who saw the WEU as an embryonic defence 
arrangement for Europe that occupied a position incorporating both a `security policy' and 
a `European policy'. 136 In accommodating these disparate perspectives and facilitating the 
emergence of a European security identity, WEU was most effective. Given the potential 
for a European defence dimension to compete with Alliance interests, the WEU provided 
for a transition in the transatlantic relationship, in which a resurgent Europe could assume 
an increasing defence role without undermining the fundamental cohesion of the Alliance, 
by addressing more contentious issues within the broader and generally more collaborative 
arena of Atlantic Alliance. In facing the new challenge of bridging the divide between the 
traditionally Atlantic-oriented security organisation and the West European economic 
structures, WEU was able to provide a co-ordinated institutional response to the blurring of 
this previously clear distinction. As Clarke was to state, `The WEU presently stands as a 
half-way house between NATO and the EC; supplementing the existing defence work of 
one and encouraging more defence work within the other'. 137 The Western European 
Union had both the framework and the remit to serve this function, and provided the 
Europeans with the wherewithal to acquire the experience necessary for the development 
of a substantive and effective pillar within the Alliance. As Geoffrey Howe MP 
acknowledged at the time, `All the members of WEU agree that the North Atlantic 
134 Howe, op. cit., 1989, p. 15. 
131 Clarke and Hague, op. cit., p. 154. 
136 Poos, op. cit., p. 18. 
137Clarke and Hague, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
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Alliance needs to have a strong European pillar. At the same time, we have felt the need to 
develop a common defence identity as Europeans. The work on which we are embarked 
responds to both needs. ' 138 
In sum, WEU was reactivated and developed on the basis of convergent rather than shared 
motives, the lack of any clear vision of the WEU's role reflected in the protracted nature of 
its revitalisation. Proving itself useful to both sides of the Atlanticist/Europeanist debate, 
developments within the WEU context could be promoted as a contribution to both 
Atlantic solidarity and European integration. Consequently, WEU's inherent ambiguity 
and capacity to be `all things to all people' allowed, against a background of faltering 
institutional mechanisms elsewhere, for adaptation of both the Alliance and Community to 
meet particular interests. The WEU's role was, by necessity, a dynamic and transitional 
one, that remained responsive to the full gamut of western security-interests and reflective 
of the environment to which they related. WEU thus served as a symbol for gradual 
institutional adaptation, whilst concurrently providing support to both the Atlantic Alliance 
and an embryonic European security identity. 
Whilst it could be argued that WEU's actions during this period were largely symbolic and 
achieved little of absolute significance, there was a recognition that `something must be 
done' if the primary organisations were unable to host the debate. Notwithstanding the 
Gulf Operations, its achievements could be considered meagre in the grand strategic 
context of the period, but their significance was in establishing WEU as a vehicle for the 
pursuit of structural change in a growing Europe. 
138 Howe cited in Cahen, op. cit., p. 9. Also see Howe, op. cit., 1984-1985, pp. 330-343. 
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Chapter 5 
Post-Cold War Challenges and Opportunities: 1989 - 2001 
The ending of the Cold War had changed fundamentally the global strategic environment 
and called into question the role of those bodies designed, developed and institutionalised 
according to Cold War determinants. ' In attempting to adapt to meet new challenges, the 
institutions sought to develop new roles, and an examination of institutional development 
in the post-Cold War period illustrates the interconnectedness of the European security 
infrastructure. NATO's rationale had been based on the enormity of the perceived Soviet 
threat and the requirements of an ineffectual Europe for strong American leadership. 
Shaken by the new external environment and matched by internal dissent, 2 NATO's 
continuing relevance was to be fundamentally questioned. In seeking to define its post- 
Cold War role, NATO's London Declaration on a Transformed Alliance of July 1990 
identified the broadening of the security environment, and the need to overcome the Cold 
War heritage of suspicion and mistrust. Consequently, NATO's new role was to be 
essentially political, offering `the hand of friendship' to its former adversaries in the East 
and scaling down its force capabilities, whilst maintaining an insurance defence capability 
in case of a resurgent threat. 3 
The impetus created by the Gulf War and desires for greater European defence 
independence, coincided with the decline in threat from the East, the unification of an 
economically and politically strong Germany, and the increased likelihood of a declining 
American commitment to Europe. The European Community had become `the foremost 
proponent of `soft security' because of its huge internal market and economic strength', 4 a 
feat made possible by its reliance on the US for its `hard' politics. However, increasingly 
the West Europeans had been struck by the inability of the Community to match its 
1 Rummel, R. `Integration, Disintegration, and Security in Europe: Preparing the Community for a Multi- 
institutional Response', International Journal, Vol. 47, Pt. 1, Winter 1991- 92, pp. 66-91. 
2 'Collective defence no longer is the overriding priority of transatlantic relations and therefore no longer 
functions as a blanket dampening irritations in other fields'. Transcript of a speech by Eekelen, W. van. `The 
Changing Dimension of European Security', 39th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, 
Athens, 1 October 1993, p-2- 
3 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NATO, November 1991, paragraph 40. 
4 Delors, J. European Unification and European Security, Adelphi Paper, No. 284, January 1994, p. 11. 
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international influence with its economic capabilities. 
5 The challenges of a changing world 
order provoked many in Europe to question the Community's place and the extent to which 
a `new world' may require a more dynamic and assertive Europe, equipped with common 
policies and capabilities beyond the traditionally `soft' options of economic and social 
integration. Under the auspices of EPC, the EC had increasingly come to recognise and 
represent its joint interests in its broader policy orientation toward the international 
environment. 6 For many, defence was the inevitable next step in the integrative process 
toward a fully-fledged European Union. 7 
And what of the WEU's role in relation to these internal and external requirements of 
European security organisation? WEU had, since its revitalisation in 1984, institutionalised 
a defence forum for the discussion of those issues of concern to Europeans in relation to 
their security interests. Whilst the coordination of military activity in the Gulf had 
demonstrated an embryonic capability to serve the operational interests of European 
defence, its potential political and military competencies seemed to offer an obvious ready- 
made vehicle for enhancing European security and defence collaboration. In political 
terms, the WEU might prove less problematic as a means of developing a European 
defence dimension than the EC, given its exclusion of the neutral states, its 
intergovernmental nature and its long experience of defence dialogue. The WEU could 
also prove sufficient to `assure America's military coupling to Europe, to meet 
Washington's demands for burden sharing, to better balance transatlantic security relations 
according to relative shift of weights between the United States and Western Europe and 
last, but not least, provide a safety net in case the United States retreats'. 8 However, whilst 
there was agreement amongst both Europeans and US that some level of Europeanisation 
was necessary to reflect the new realities of the post-Cold War environment, and that WEU 
might provide a `first step' in this process, the extent of that Europeanisation was a matter 
of considerable disagreement. 
5A RAND study went so far as to call Europe `an economic giant, a political dwarf and a worm in defence 
terms'. Eekelen, W. van. op. cit., 1993, p. 14. 
6 See Zandra, R. `Towards a European Identity' in Gantz, N. and Roper, J. Towards a New Partnership: US - 
European Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, 1993, pp. 70-71. 
Delors, J. `European Integration and Security', Survival, Vol. 33, No. 2, March/April 1991, p. 107. Also see 
Alford and Hunt. (eds. ), op. cit. 
8 Jopp, M. Rummel, R. and Schmidt, P. `Integration and Security in a new Europe: Inside and Beyond a West 
European Pillar', in Jopp, M., Rummel, R. and Schmidt, P. op. cit., 1991, p. 289 
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The processes leading to the eventual ratification of the Maastricht Treaty were illustrative 
of the debate taking place at both the national and institutional level over the future 
direction of the integrative process in Europe, the continuing relevance of both NATO and 
the transatlantic security link, and the role that WEU might play in this uncertain and 
evolving environment. An examination of the stances developed during the Inter- 
governmental Conference (IGC) on Political Union (EPU) illustrates the divergence of 
opinion on the possibilities, and indeed desirability, of any new European security 
competency. Of the two broad based coalitions that developed during the conference, the 
UK and the Dutch, with some support from the Portuguese and Danes, took an essentially 
Atlanticist position in which NATO and the transatlantic link remained the core of 
European security, whilst the Europeanists, led by the French and including Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Spain, sought an explicit defence role for the new European Union. 
However France concurred with the UK view that any Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) should be on an intergovernmental basis. 9 Germany had chosen to walk a 
difficult `tightrope' between these two positions. 
National perspectives in the build up to Maastricht 
Having played a significant role in the development of the existing security framework in 
Europe, Britain had pursued an essentially negative line toward European integration, 
choosing not to be isolated by abstention, but essentially dampening the integrative process 
where possible. Whilst seeking to maintain its `special relationship' with the US, 10 and to 
strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, the British government had acted with great scepticism 
when confronted with European proposals to develop a common, independent (of the US) 
and effective defence entity. For the British, as the Foreign Secretary was to state, 
`European security without the United States simply does not make sense. ' 11 As the 
provider of capabilities and leadership, the US' role in the Alliance was indispensable, 
whilst talk of a European defence identity was deemed unrealistic, impractical and likely to 
9 See Menon, A. `Explaining Defence Policy: the Mitterand Years', Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, 
1995, pp. 279-299. 
'oThere has been a recognisable shift in the influence that the UK is able to exercise over the US, as a unified 
Germany, with its economic and technical pre-eminence in Europe, and its particular relationship with 
broader European issues, may be seen by the US as a stronger security partner in the management of Europe. 
See Keohane, D. `Britain's Security Policy and NATO in the 1990s', Arms Control, Vol. 12, No. 1, May 
1991, p. 75. 
" For the text of his Berlin speech see Hurd, D. `Europe's defence and security in the 1990s', Arms Control 
and Disarmament Quarterly Review, No. 19, January 1991, pp. 18-26. 
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damage the fundamental relationship on which European defence rested. NATO would 
require adaptation to meet the challenges of the new world `disorder', but any 
developments towards an enhanced European defence dimension must be tempered, indeed 
directed, by the requirements of keeping the Americans `in' and committed to Europe. At 
the same time, the UK would need to retain a measure of influence over European 
initiatives, the British recognising that failure of involvement could result in the 
marginalisation of influence both in the Community and in the transatlantic relationship. 
Given this predisposition, the British government attempted to sustain a policy orientation 
that allowed for sufficient European defence development to satisfy American demands, 
whilst outwardly promoting the Alliance against European 'excesses'. 12 
Although France took some tentative steps toward greater deliberative co-operation with 
NATO, 13 its basic independent position with regard to nuclear forces, multinational corps 
and the integrated alliance structure remained. For the French, keen to restrict US influence 
in Europe, the ending of the Cold War opened up the possibility of a declining US 
presence. Equally, it had remained a basic principle of French policy that West European 
unity would only be complete once it included defence and security matters. However, 
there had been a distinct lack of definitional clarity in official positions as to just what this 
might entail. 14 The prospect of a unified Germany served to clarify French thought, with 
integration providing the means of ensuring that it might contribute to French interests. 
The opportunity now presented itself for Europe to assert its interest in developing an 
effective security and defence identity to complement its economic strength, even if this 
might require some decline in French independence. Hence, the French sought to confine 
NATO, and thus the US, by limiting its range of action to the provision of an insurance 
12 FCO Representative, Leicester Conference, 1993. These objectives remain substantially true across the 
spectrum of the British political system. See Keohane, D. `The Approach of British Political Parties to a 
Defence Role for the European Community', Government and Opposition, Vol. 27, Summer 1992, p. 301. 
Labour Opposition Leader Neil Kinnock is reported as commenting `I do not accept a defence identity for the 
European Community. The best assurances for European security lie in our existing relations with the 
countries of North America', Palmer, J. `Kinnock blocks EC socialists' plan', The Guardian, 5 December 
1991, p. 8. Also see Kinnock, N. `International Security in a Changing World: the Labour Party Perspective', 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 136, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 1-5. 
13 Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, commenting on the French decision to join the Strategic Review Group 
in March 1991, stated that this `changes nothing in France's relationship' to NATO and there is `no question 
of returning either surreptitiously or more openly' to the integrated military command structure. Cited in 
Yost, D. `France and West European Defence Identity', Survival, Vol. 33, No. 4, July 1991, p. 331. 
la Yost, ibid, p. 335; Menon, A., Forster, A. and Wallace, W. `A Common European Defence', Survival, Vol. 
34, No. 3, Autumn 1992, p. 104. 
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function against any emergent military threat, and to the provision of those resources for 
peacekeeping and enforcement efforts that were beyond European capabilities. 15 
For Germany, the post-Cold War world presented new challenges, but resolved many 
traditional concerns. As the key `beneficiary' of the Soviet demise, unification having been 
at the heart of FRG policy since its inception, Western Europe's largest and most 
competitive economy would, on unification, also support the largest conventional force in 
Europe. 16 NATO had served the post-war interests of the FRG, provisioning a German 
military rehabilitation acceptable to her neighbours whilst preventing Soviet aggression. 
The new environment raised questions over the continuing utility of an Alliance originally 
intended to `keep Germans down', and traditionally directed against Germany's Eastern 
neighbours, the stability and reconstruction of whom had become a paramount German 
concern. Whilst Germany continued to accept the relevance of NATO as an insurance 
against a renewed eastern threat and emergent neo-isolationism, 17 the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) had drawn favour as the institutional 
framework for pan-European security co-operation, incorporating the economic co- 
operative mechanisms required for eastern European reconstruction. Entrenchment within 
the institutional framework of European integration had enabled the FRG to establish for 
itself a pivotal European role. The further Europeanisation of German security policy was 
seen to be politically expedient; as Bluth pointed out, `the kind of leadership that Germany 
now needs to exercise in Europe is politically acceptable only in the context of European 
integration' 
. 
18Given domestic unrest following unification, resulting in electoral successes 
for the extreme right wing republican party, 19 embracing the EC and clinging to NATO 
'5Steinberg articulates the French view when he states that `The US security relationship has prevented the 
emergence of a political structure capable of addressing Europe's security requirements, both in Europe and 
globally, as well as the military structures to support it... Europe can only achieve its rightful international 
stature if it becomes more independent from the United States'. Steinberg, "The Case for a New Partnership' 
in Gantz and Roper, op. cit., pp. 111-112: Also see Lellouche, P. `France in Search of Identity', Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2, Spring 1993, p. 128. 
16 Mortimer, European Security after the Cold War, Adelphi Paper, No. 279, London, Brasseys, 1992, p. 9. 
17Germany has renewed its renunciation of nuclear weapons in the WEU and non-proliferation treaties within 
the context of the 2+4 agreement, therefore continuing to require the nuclear guarantee the United States 
offers in this area. See Rummel, op. cit., 1991-1992, pp. 69-70. 
18 Bluth, C. `Germany: Towards a New Security Format', The World Today, Vol. 48, No. 11, November 
1992, p. 198. The Former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was to comment that it was `good that 
our political leaders - aware of the rising discomfort of our neighbours - work for a transformation of the 
European Community into a political union and a currency union and thus firmly unite Germany with the 
other nations of Europe', cited in Caitlin, K. `The New Europe', World Press Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, 
February 1992, p. 32. 
19 Bluth, op. cit., p. 197. 
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were ways of saying `Temptation, get thee behind me. '20 Consequently, the German 
Foreign Ministry was keen to develop a joint security policy within the EPC framework, as 
a natural progression of the integrative process and a means of providing an enhanced 
German security role, without intimidating its neighbours. Particularly keen to enhance its 
working relationship with the French , 
21 but concerned not to anger the US, 22 Germany 
identified the WEU as the best medium term option. `Both the Defence Minister Ruhe, and 
Foreign Minister Kinkel, saw the development of a transatlantic pan-European network of 
collective security involving NATO, the WEU and the CSCE as a policy priority for the 
peaceful transition to a new Europe'. 23 
The US had similarly gone through a process of re-evaluating its security interests in the 
light of the Soviet demise. The likelihood that the future security problems of Europe 
would be regionally confined, and that the integrative process itself would prevent the 
development of a hegemonic threat within the Community area, raised questions of the 
continued desirability for an American presence in Europe. Indeed the costs of alliance and 
increased interests in other areas of the globe, 24 suggested to many the desirability of de- 
coupling US and European security, limiting US support to UN/CSCE mandated actions. 
As the requirements of the domestic agenda drew attention `back home', Europe was seen 
by some as `an increasingly unreliable partner'. 25 Nevertheless, the official US position 
remained that the allies shared common interests and goals and in a time of transition, the 
alliance was a basis for stability, and if the East did not provide the traditional concerns of 
the Cold War period, those concerns were only muted and transformed into fears of 
proliferation, weapons and technology transfer, and potential re-nationalisation of defence: 
all of which might fundamentally affect American interests. Increasingly, the US had 
recognised the need for European support for its international action, illustrated not least 
20 Brenner, M. J. `EC: Confidence Lost', Foreign Policy, Vol. 41, Summer 1993, p. 35. 
21 The Germans sought to keep French troops on German soil, after Mitterand's announcement at end of the 
London NATO Summit in July 1990 that France would withdraw all such troops by 1994. For discussion of 
German policy, see Gutjahr, L. `Stability, Integration and Global Responsibility: Germany's Changing 
Perspectives on National Interests', Review of International Studies, Vol. 21,1995, pp. 301-317. 
22 ̀ If a decision was forced, Paris was more important to Bonn than London, the preferred (if difficult) 
partner with which German governments had worked closely for more than 30 years. However, Washington 
was as important as Paris, because the United States offered a special relationship for global economic co- 
operation, as well as for European security'. Menon, Forster and Wallace, op. cit., p. 105. 
23 Bluth, op. cit., p. 198. 
24 New non-European threats, such as the economic threat from Japan, would require the fostering of new 
relationships, a cause which could be damaged by too close ties with Europe. 
25 Steinberg, `The Case for a New Partnership', in Gantz and Roper, op. cit., p. 7. 
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by the recent Gulf operations, and clearly the new challenges of the post-Cold War world 
required the development of a new and more balanced partnership. This process of re- 
definition began in effect with James Baker's `New Atlanticism' speech; delivered in 
Berlin on 12 December 1989, in which he outlined the changes in relationships, both 
between East-West and between western states, in which the EC would increasingly act as 
an international actor through common institutions. The Transatlantic Declaration of 20 
November 1990 was to lay `the foundation for a revived partnership based on increased 
transatlantic solidarity and acknowledges the existence of a European identity in the field 
of security policy, pointing the way to an equitable sharing of responsibilities and 
burdens. '26 However, the US' interest in redefinition was largely confined to the pursuit of 
burden sharing. The US was clearly opposed to any Europe military role which might 
permit European action without NATO consent, or which might undermine NATO and the 
role of US leadership within it. Thus, US policy suffered from inherent inconsistencies, 
repeatedly supporting a stronger West European defence role, whilst warning Europeans 
against taking any substantive moves in that direction. 27 
The debate 
In April 1990, Mitterand and Kohl had requested of the European Council an IGC on EPU 
to run in parallel with that on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as agreed in June 
1989. Whilst the impetus for closer economic union was seen by many as largely a 
response to the dominance of the German mark within the Community, 28 political union 
would help to corral a united and powerful Germany within the institutions of a politically 
cohesive and competent Europe. During the early stages of the IGC on EPU, which began 
at the end of 1990, it was clear that the role of the WEU was to be a central consideration 
in the debates on future European security arrangements. The Mitterand/Kohl request had 
proposed that the IGC `Study how the WEU and the political Union could establish a clear 
organic relationship and how, consequently, the more operational WEU could in the long 
run be part of the political union and elaborate its joint security policy'. 29 This document 
26 Delors, op. cit., 1994, p. 105. See Europe Documents, No. 1622,23 November 1990. 
27 ̀Hence the United States opposition to a structure in which the European Council provides directions to the 
WEU'. Rummel, op. cit., 1991- 92, p. 84. 
28 Economic integration had `virtually turned Western Europe into a Deutschmark zone, prompting the 
French and Italian governments to demand an economic and monetary union (EMU), which would give them 
some say in German monetary policy'. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 53. 
29 French Foreign Ministry, Bulletin d' information, 10 December 1990. 
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also recommended that joint security policy decisions could be taken within the European 
Council based on majority voting procedures. Foreign Minister's Dumas and Genscher 
repeated the French and German positions in a joint statement in February 1991, when they 
suggested that `the WEU will constitute the channel of co-operation between the European 
Political Union and NATO' and that integration of WEU into EPU should be considered 
for decision by 1996-7.30 
The British, in the meantime, had come to identify WEU as a means of resolving their 
particular dilemma, by providing for both an enhanced intergovernmental European profile 
and capability, without undermining the Atlantic Alliance itself. Thus, in February 1991, at 
the Churchill Memorial Lecture in Luxembourg, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas 
Hurd, was to go further than ever before in foreseeing closer links between the EC and the 
WEU. He recognised the potential advantage of European Council co-ordination and 
guidance on security policy, 31 and a (limited) responsibility for the EC and WEU in areas 
of security policy including `arms sales and proliferation, counter-terrorism, (and) action 
outside Europe when carried out under a United Nations mandate and policy within the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)'. 32 Whilst rejecting French, 
German and Italian proposals for the absorption of the WEU into the future European 
Union, the British government sought to demonstrate its new-found commitment to greater 
European unity, by backing, in March 1991, the development of an independent European 
reaction force under the control of the WEU, for use outside the NATO area in 
consultation with the Alliance. 33 By acknowledging that the WEU could develop an 
operational role, 34 the British Government identified it as a bridge between the EC and 
30 French Foreign Ministry, Bulletin d' information, 5 February 1991. These statements suggested that France 
might be prepared to move away from its standard independent position in the development of a European 
defence dimension, and it would certainly need to establish closer co-ordination with its WEU partners to 
fulfil its basic objectives. 
31 Van Eekelen went on to propose in February 1991 that the WEU might be brought under the European 
Council, the periodic summit meetings of the EC heads of government, although he accepted that there might 
be problems in terms of the binding nature of decisions on the WEU, given that there were 3 non-WEU 
members in the Council. See Palmer, J. The Guardian, 16 February 1991, p. 9. 
32 See The Guardian, 20 January 1991. 
33 Palmer, J `Hurd supports independent European force', The Guardian, 27 March 1991. See John Major's 
foreword to the British White Paper, Developments in the European Community, Cmd. 1457, London, 
HMSO, 1991. Given that future European security interests were likely to be dominated by out of area 
concerns, William H Taft IV, former US Permanent Representative on the NAC, was of the view that, "If 
NATO is not to be used outside Europe, Europeans should develop the political and military capability to 
defend their out-of-area interests in some other way'. NATO Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, June 1991. 
34 Defence Secretary Tom King is cited as stating, "I see the WEU as being ready to play a role in areas 
where NATO could not operate or would choose not to operate", cited in `Waking up the Sleeping Beauty: 
EEC-Community in Agreement over Joint Defence Policy', Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 January 1992, p. 21. 
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NATO. The WEU option thus representing a `compromise with those of its European 
Community partners who are anxious to construct quickly a European defence identity, 
whilst in no way threatening the highly valued Atlantic security relationship. '35 The British 
Government maintained throughout the IGC the position that the WEU `should remain 
autonomous, subservient to neither NATO nor the European Community, feeding its ideas 
to NATO `in an open manner" . 
36 
British concerns over US perceptions of European action on defence were given substance 
in the infamous Bartholomew Memorandum sent by the Bush Administration to its 
European partners and presented to the WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers meeting in 
Paris on the 22 February 1991. The letter cautioned the Europeans on the dangers of 
developing closer links between the WEU and the European Community, stating that `a 
European security identity... would duplicate NATO's functions ... 
Developing a European 
security component solely within the European Community ... could 
lead to NATO's 
marginalisation. '37 Whilst the Europeans shared concerns that European competency 
might lead the US to reconsider its commitment to Europe, this heavy-handed message did 
much to harden European attitudes and served to move them further toward the French 
position on the necessity of a European defence component. By March 1991 it was 
reported that eight of the twelve EC governments were ready to back the Franco-German 
plans, with the WEU, under the supervision of the European Council, acting `as a `bridge' 
between the EC and NATO until such time as it could be `absorbed into the Community's 
foreign policy'. 38 
Following the Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning 
Group of NATO in May 1991, during which NATO's new force structure was agreed, 
3s Keohane, op. cit., 1992, p. 307. 
36 John Major cited in Pick, H. `Major draws line on defence links', The Guardian, 8 November 1991, p. 11. 
Britain's position with regard to a European security identity remaining minimalist and pragmatic, and indeed 
it could be argued that it was British intransigence on this issue which preserved the WEU as the 
intergovernmental institutional vehicle for enhanced European security co-operation. 
37 For text see Eekelen, W. van. op. cit., 1998, pp. 340-344. These views were given further substance by 
official US statements including President Bush's November 1991 comment that, `If you want to go your 
own way, if you don't need us any longer, say so', cited in The Independent, `Bush warning to Europe', 8 
November 1991. A leaked Pentagon draft paper of February 1992 stated that the US should "prevent any 
collection of friendly or unfriendly nations from competing with the United States for superpower status', 
although this was toned down in the final version of the paper, National Military Security 1992, in which it 
was simply stated that `the preservation and expansion of alliances was given the highest priority'. Beveren, 
R. `Military Aspects', in Gantz and Roper, op. cit., p. 138. 
38 Palmer, J. `Britain faltering in effort to tie EC defence to NATO', The Guardian, 28 March 1991, p. 9. 
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including a multinational Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) for Allied Command 
Europe under United Kingdom leadership, the WEU Assembly met in plenary session (3-6 
June 1991) to define the WEU's role. Resistant to WEU incorporation into the EC, the 
WEU's Secretary General Van Eekelen suggested that WEU should soon have `autonomy 
of action' which would permit `a minimum of military structures' in order to allow it to be 
involved in regional crises in and outside of Europe. In an effort to promote WEU 
capabilities, he called for permanent structures of command and control, and a European 
grouping of air and land forces with amphibious capabilities, common training of some 
forces and the development of common armament programmes. 39 
The June meeting of the NAC in Copenhagen saw the beginnings of a convergence of 
views, as the French felt able to agree to the final Communique, which established that 
`NATO would not be pre-empted by agreements reached in a purely European forum; that 
NATO's integrated military structure would not be superseded by a purely European one; 40 
and that NATO members should benefit from transparency and complementarity with EC 
and WEU, with NATO members adequately involved in decisions that might affect their 
security'. In exchange for restated European support for NATO, the US was prepared to 
offer explicit encouragement for greater European co-operation in defence. In further 
identifying NATO's new military and political tasks, and the importance of links based on 
transparency and complementarity, it was Washington's view that there was no possible 
substitute for NATO. 41 Significantly, a statement was included welcoming `efforts further 
to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration' and `the 
progress made by the countries of the European Community toward the goal of political 
union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy. '42 
39 Van Eekelen stated 'I can see a role for the WEU in tackling security crises in eastern Europe without 
immediately involving NATO since to bring in NATO might be to risk the involvement of the Soviet Union 
which we wish to avoid' in Palmer, J. `NATO may reject overture', The Guardian, 16 February 1991, p. 9. 
See WEU Assembly Report of June 1991, WEU and the European Community: Report submitted on behalf 
of the Political Committee. 
ao The second point disappeared in the Rome Declaration of November, probably as a means of assuring 
French signature. 
41 For Copenhagen Communique see NATO Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, June 1991. 
42 This position was held not least because of the operational incapacity of alternative institutions. In October 
1991, NATO Secretary General Woerner stated `We must be realistic and realise that neither the emerging 
European Political Union nor the WEU will have for the foreseeable future an operational defence capability 
able to be deployed without US/NATO assistance in domains like air support, strategic lift, logistics and 
communications requirements'. Secretary General's Washington speech, 9 October 1991, cited in Hartley, A. 
'Maastricht's Problematical Future', The World Today, Vol. 48, No. 10, October 1992, p. 181. 
136 
However, for the Europeans, the debate was far from concluded. The European Council 
meeting in Luxembourg failed to find substantive agreement on the main points of a future 
European CFSP. The Draft Treaty, circulated by the Presidency in April, proposed a 
separate intergovernmental pillar, removed from the standard decision-making machinery 
of the EC and reporting to the European Council: a position which gained support 
following the Dutch Presidency's attempts at the EC's September ministerial meeting to 
introduce an alternative draft treaty. The Anglo-Italian joint proposal of 4 October 1991, in 
building on the WEU's discussions of 27 June at Vianden, proposed that the future 
European Union work toward the formulation of a common defence policy, but not yet a 
common defence, and the WEU operate on a twin-track, serving both as the defence 
component of the European Union and the European pillar of the Alliance. `NATO would 
`remain the essential forum' for defining the security and defence commitments of the 
European members of the NATO alliance'. 43 The proposal also envisaged the creation of a 
European action force, although it was to be limited to action out-with the NATO area, and 
was to be subordinate to NATO. 
In response to these proposals, and drawing on British preparedness to consider the 
possibility of a new European defence force, France, Germany and Spain, in a joint 
statement, argued that `foreign and security policy is a necessary component of a Political 
Union. Such a union should include all questions relating to security and defence and 
should lead to a common defence; the execution of the foreign and security policy should 
be decided by qualified majority voting'. 44 Heralding `a significant expansion of Europe's 
responsibility and a more pronounced role of the WEU as an instrument of security in the 
Community', 45 Mitterand and Kohl reiterated their proposals in a statement on 15 October, 
a footnote to which, announced the decision to broaden the existing Franco-German 
brigade as the basis of a 70,000-100,000 strong European corps (Eurocorps), initially 
responsible to the WEU, but with the possibility of later adoption by the EU. 46 The Franco- 
German proposals extended the scope of this European force beyond that of the Anglo- 
43 Pick, H. `Britain softens on EC defence policy, The Guardian, 5 October 1991, p. 8. 
44Van Beveren, in Gantz and Roper, op. cit., p. 133. 
as Roper, `Yugoslavia and European Security: EC, NATO, WEU, CSCE: Which task for Whom? ', Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. s 1-3,1 March 1992, p. 1. 
46 The Eurocorps arrangement was to strain NATO relations until it was agreed in 1993 that NATO could 
have first call on the force, Eurocorps to be deployed as a unified corps in the framework of the WEU to 
serve the goals of the European Union if NATO fails to act or if the Europeans choose to act outside the 
Alliance. See 'Franco-German corps strains NATO's post cold war strategic relations', Aviation Week and 
Space Technology, Vol. 136, No. 22,1992, p. 23. For discussion of Franco-German bilateral co-operation see 
Schmidt, P. 'The Franco-German Council on Defence and Security', Aussenpolitik, Fall 1989, pp. 388-399. 
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Italian proposals in neither limiting its potential action to out-of-NATO-area, nor 
subordinating it to NATO. For the French, the new force was to represent `a symbol ... of 
common defence in the making, of European military integration outside the structure of 
NATO', 47 whilst for Germany, Eurocorps was to provide an enhanced European capability, 
that would gratify the pressurising French, and represent to the Atlantic Alliance a means 
of binding France more closely into NATO's military structures. 48 The Franco-German 
plans were welcomed enthusiastically by Belgium, 49 and received a positive response from 
Spain and Luxembourg, with Italy's Foreign Minister, Gianni de Michelis, stating that `I 
do not see any contradiction between the Anglo-Italian statement and the Franco-German 
initiative' despite the very clear differences in proposed scope and institutional `fit'. 5° It 
was these differences that led, during the WEU Ministerial meeting of 29 October 1991 to 
`sharp disagreements over the future shape of European defence policy'. 51 The British and 
Dutch saw the Franco-German proposals as a means of setting up rival military structures, 
which might undermine NATO. 52 However, Britain signalled a move towards compromise 
in its statement of 31 October 1991, in which, whilst still unprepared to see a separate role 
for the WEU inside Europe, it could envisage `a neutral review' at a `certain time' to 
consider the need for revision `in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy 
compatible with the common defence we already have with our allies in NATO'. 53 
Whilst the British continued to push for the `equidistance' of WEU between EU and 
NATO, the French sought a closer WEU/EU link that could be reflected in membership 
and control, with forces only available to NATO after consultation. 54 On the eve of the 
NATO Summit in Rome, Chancellor Kohl, in a speech warmly received in the Bundestag, 
47 Menon, Forster and Wallace, op. cit., p. 110. 
48Bonn inferred that a Eurocorps `would be a way of returning France by the back door to the NATO 
integrated command'. Pick, H `Britain signals doubts on Bonn-Paris joint force plan', The Guardian, 14 
February 1992, p. 8. Brenner suggests that German concerns about the possibility of American disengagement 
and the potential for being placed in strategic limbo, led Bonn to accept French `pushing' over the Franco- 
German corps and that this `placed Germany in the position of being whipsawed between the Americans and 
the French, between NATO and the sovereign, independent Europe envisaged for the future'. Brenner, op. 
cit., p. 37. 
49 Palmer, J. `Bonn and Paris plan EC army', The Guardian, 16 October 1991, p. 1. 
so Palmer, J. `EC backs proposals for European army', The Guardian, 17 October 1991, p. 10. 
51 This was particularly the case over the area of action for any new corps. The UK wanting NATO to keep 
the in-area role, the new corps having only an OOA remit. Gow, D. `WEU leaders divided over future role', 
The Guardian, 30 October 1991, p. 6. 
52 Rummel, op. cit., 1991-1992, p. 86. 
53 Pick, H. `Britain sets out its summit stall', The Guardian, 1 November 1991, p. 14. 
54 Van Beveren in Gantz and Roper, op. cit., p. 134. 
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recognised the alliance's `existential importance... but that does not relieve Europeans of 
the task of reflecting on what specific, particularly political, contribution we can make to 
confront the new challenges and risks facing us... A united Europe without a common 
defence is, in the long run, not feasible. That is not an expression of doubt in the durability 
of the Atlantic alliance, nor an effort to set up a competing body', rather he identified it as 
a move toward responding to long-standing US demands for greater European 
responsibility. 55 
The NATO Summit in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, represented an important step in the 
development of future options both for the Alliance and for Europe. 56 The Rome Summit 
acknowledged the requirement for a new security architecture for Europe, where 
challenges `cannot be addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of 
interlocking institutions', a framework in which `NATO, the CSCE, the European 
Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe compliment each other. '57 In recognising 
that `The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the 
preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security 
and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity', 58 NATO signalled US acceptance of a 
European defence role. In giving approval to the development of European Multinational 
forces such as the new `Eurocorps', it also witnessed the convergence of British and 
French positions, acknowledging that NATO was essential, but clearing the way for a 
decision at Maastricht. 
The Maastricht Treaty 
The Treaty of European Union, established a CFSP as an external pillar of the Union 
stating that this policy should include all questions related to the security of the Union, 
`including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a 
common defence'. 59 Article J. 4, paragraph 2 of the Treaty stated that `the Union requests 
s5 He identified that only in agreement with NATO would troops be assigned to the WEU, and that Germany 
would not reassign any of its NATO troops. Cited in Gow, D. `Kohl affirms Germany's support for the 
alliance', The Guardian, 7 November 1991, p. 14. 
56 'The challenge today, both in the Intergovernmental Conference on European Union and under the NATO 
review is to continue the "cross-roads' function and ensure the twin essentials of transatlantic and European 
co-operation'. Eekelen, W. van. `The WEU: Europe's best defence', European Affairs, No. 4, Winter 1990. 
57 WEU Ministerial Council, Rome Declaration, 27 October 1984, Para. 3. 
" The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Paragraph 22. 
59 Title V Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Article J4, para 1. 
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Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the 
Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications'. Article J2 identifies the co-operation mechanism where common position 
could be defined on the basis of unanimity within the Council, Article J3 of the treaty 
providing for decisions on joint action by weighted majorities on a limited range of issues 
which did not have defence implication, to be defined by the European Council in their 
Lisbon Report of June 1992, and including arms control considerations, CSCE questions, 
nuclear non-proliferation, and arms technology transfer to the Third World. 60 However, the 
lack of clear definition, determined by the failure to reach a definitive position on the 
nature of a common defence arm for the Union required the additional provision of a re- 
negotiation commitment on the basis of a report by the European Council in 1996. Until 
such time, the WEU was to play the role of the defence arm of the Union, effectively 
separating `hard' security from the remit of the European Union itself. 61 
Both the Atlanticists and the Europeanists ̀ sold' Maastricht as a success. The Europeanists 
succeeded in breaking the taboo on defence and established a commitment to future action, 
whilst the Atlanticists succeeded in keeping defence outside of the integrated institutions, 
by placing responsibility with an institutionally distinct WEU, and the Union commitment 
being only in terms of the `eventual framing' of Common Defence Policy. Whilst the 
treaty was a break from the past in that it placed no limit on the scope of the security 
debate to be considered by the Union, the established `division of labour', in which the 
defence role fell to the WEU, was acceptable only in the short term to integrationists who 
saw this division as an unnatural block to the integrative process. However, the treaty's 
lack of a clear path for action may be seen as one of its virtues, given that the principle of a 
political union with a common defence policy was established. The post-Maastricht 
potential for the development of an effective European CFSP would inevitably be dictated 
by the Union's capacity to identify and define common interest. 62 
For many, overloading the European Community system with the premature introduction 
of `hard-core' security policies, given the diversity of national security interests and the 
lack of a common European identity in defence, could create a negative spill-over into 
60 See Atlantic News, No. 2438,30 June 1992. 
61 See comments in WEU Assembly, (Session 38: Part 2), Proceedings, February 1993, p. 23. 
62 Gnesotto, N. `European Union after Minsk and Maastricht', International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2,1992, 
pp. 224-225. 
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other policy areas. 63 In placing defence with the WEU, and assuming only a gradual 
development of Union competencies in these areas, the Maastricht treaty recognised the 
failures of the defence-first strategy attempted in the early years of the European 
integrative process. Delors was to note the importance of `transitional arrangements' in this 
incremental process, ̀ notably in the area of defence where the West European Union can 
play a very useful role', providing that the end vision of a single European Union remained 
clear. 64 Zandra suggests that the Maastricht agreement provided `a door leading towards 
the possible long-term goal - full commitment by all European Union member countries to 
a common foreign and security policy, including defence'65 and it had intrinsically 
connected the WEU to the European security architecture. 
The processes that resulted in the Rome and Maastricht decisions could be regarded as 
something of a funnelling exercise, in which institutional competition was compromised 
and national interests satisfied in at least the short to medium term. The role of WEU in 
this process was central to the development of this compromise. As a ready formed and 
institutionalised arrangement, WEU was identified by both sides of the 
Atlanticist/Europeanist divide, as a useful tool for transition purposes. Whether an 
impermanent body awaiting subsumation into an emergent security and defence 
component of EU, or a substantive expression of a European defence identity (and 
competency) within a new and more equal Atlantic partnership, the WEU was to facilitate 
the development of two divergent approaches to European defence co-operation during the 
early post-Cold War years. Through the development of a greater operational capability, 
matched by an institutional will, the WEU took on the challenge of an adapting alliance 
whilst moving closer to the integrated community. 
The post-Maastricht environment and the WEU 
63 'The complexity of traditional interest lines and the task of aggregating national positions would become 
so enormous that the present system would stagnate or even collapse. ' M. Jopp and W. Wessels, 
"Institutional frameworks for security co-operation in western Europe: developments and options', in Jopp, 
Rummel and Schmidt, op. cit., 1991, p. 59. 
64 Delors, op. cit., 1994, p. 105. 
65 Zandra in Gantz and Roper, op. cit., p. 59. 
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The Maastricht and Rome Treaties opened the door to a range of options for European 
defence management and institutional development in the early 1990s, and reflected the 
developmental uncertainty of the declaratory compromise. Continuing instability in Russia 
and its near abroad, Central and East European overtures for institutional inclusion and a 
developing Yugoslavian crisis provided the broader environmental context for a European 
security quandary influenced by changes in national government. The continuing debate on 
the pace, breadth and depth of European integration and the continuing management and 
value of the transatlantic relationship remained essentially unresolved. 
The `Declaration on Western European Union' appended to the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union, defined the WEU's dual role and its relationship with EU and NATO. In 
recognition of the position that `WEU member states agree on the need to develop a 
genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on 
defence matters', WEU was to form an `integral part of the process of the development of 
the European Union and [will] enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic 
Alliance'. 66 The Declaration established the objective to `build up WEU in stages as the 
defence component of the European Union' and, to this end, `at the request of the 
European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which 
have defence implications'. On a practical level, this was to be facilitated by the 
development of a closer working relationship between the two European institutions, 
through co-operation and the harmonisation of working methods, the synchronisation of 
meetings, and the eventual harmonisation of the sequence and duration of respective 
presidencies. To enhance this process, the WEU Secretariat and Council seats were to be 
moved to Brussels. 67 In identifying the WEU as `the means to strengthen the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance' the WEU and NATO were also to develop closer working 
links and sought to introduce joint positions into the consultation process as a means of 
intensifying co-ordination with the Alliance. 
68 In the development of its capabilities, 
responsibilities and role, WEU was to act `in conformity with the positions adopted in the 
66 Declaration 1, Introduction, paragraph 1. 
67 To include the `establishment of close co-operation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU 
on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other', 
arrangements for closer co-operation and consultation with the Commission as appropriate, and the 
`encouragement of closer co-operation between the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU and the European 
Parliament'. Declaration 1, Section A. 
68 Declaration 1, Section B. `Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronised and 
working methods harmonised. Close co-operation will be established between the Secretariats-General of 
WEU and NATO'. The first formal meeting of the Councils of NATO and WEU took place in Brussels, 21 
May 1992. 
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Atlantic Alliance', which was to `remain the essential forum for consultation among its 
members and the venue for agreements on policies bearing on the security and defence 
commitments of Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty'. In order to strengthen its role, 
WEU committed itself to the formulation of a common European defence policy whilst 
providing for its implementation through the further development of its own operational 
role'. This was to be facilitated by the creation of a `planning cell' which aimed to 
establish `closer military co-operation, particularly in respect of logistics, transport, 
training and strategic surveillance, hold meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff and set 
up military units answerable to WEU'69 The Declaration also recognised the need for 
enhanced co-operation in armaments, with the aim of creating a European armaments 
Agency, and it foresaw the development of the WEU Institute in Paris into a European 
Security and Defence Academy. 70 
WEU and the Question of Membership 
The WEU Council's Petersberg Declaration of the 19 June 1992 moved forward the 
position taken in the Maastricht Declaration, by outlining substantive areas for progress. 
One significant area of the post-Maastricht declarations was WEU enlargement, intended 
to `put the relationship between the WEU and the European States on a new basis for the 
sake of stability and security in Europe'. WEU invited European Union members `to 
accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, or to become observers'. 71 At the same time, European member states of 
NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU `in a way which will give them 
the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU'. 72 Following discussions 
within the framework of the Special Working Group, a protocol of accession for Greece, 
the admittance of Denmark and Ireland as observers, and of Iceland, Norway and Turkey 
69 Declaration 1, Section C, Paragraph 5, on the Operational Role of the WEU. 
70 The WEU was to establish the West European Armaments Group (WEAG) in December 1992, into which 
the IEPG was to merge, and in 1996 the West European Armaments Organisation was established as an 
`executive' arm of the WEAG, although arms co-operation proved disappointing in the face of national 
resistance. For discussion see Van Eekelen, op. cit., 1998, pp. 282-290. 
711t was, however, established following the Danish `no' campaign on ratification of the Maastricht 
agreement in June 1992, that while the Maastricht treaty does make reference to the eventual goal of a 
`European defence', it imposes no obligation on Denmark or any European Community member to join the 
WEU or any future European army. Palmer, J. `Opting to opt back in', The Guardian, 29 October 1992, p. 21. 
72 Declaration attached to Maastricht. These arrangements were further developed in the Petersberg 
Declaration. See WEU Assembly Report, The Western European Union, 38th Ordinary Session (Part 2), 
February 1993, p. 28. 
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as associates, was agreed at the Rome meeting of 20 November 1992.73 Through this 
process of enlargement, the WEU was able to provide a link between NATO and the EU, 
preventing the isolation of non-EU European NATO members from the evolving European 
process by providing for transparency in the working method. 74 
The WEU was also to contribute to the broader question of Institutional enlargement 
consequent upon the search by the CEE states for a framework that might offer them 
military and economic security in the new post Cold War order. 75 Unable to isolate 
themselves from the security risks raised by the fragmentation of the Eastern bloc, the 
primary institutions of European security had begun to consider the potential for 
enlargement as one element of their broader outreach to the East. Consequently, the 
European Union had embarked on a programme of expansion in December 1991, 
establishing a practical plan for east European integration whereby the states of CEE might 
be linked stage by stage to the Community. This was to begin with Association, `Europe 
Agreements' being offered to the most `progressive' states, to be followed by membership 
of the Union once certain criteria had been met. 76 NATO had begun the process of 
`outreach' to its former Cold War antagonists by the establishment, in the same month, of 
the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), a forum for dialogue between NATO 
and the former Warsaw Pact states, with discussions to include civil-military relations, 
arms control measures, defence conversion and political consultation on regional disputes 
such as that between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. 77 WEU 
also began to establish a climate of co-operation and understanding with the CEE states, its 
Assembly having initiated a dialogue in the spring of 1990,78 that was reinforced by the 
73 For discussion of accession issues see Pick, H. `After the summit: NATO declares points win to Britain', 
The Guardian, 12 December 1991, p. 2; Palmer, J. and White, M. `Maastricht Summit / Votes, vetoes and 
compromises: issues which have caused divisions', The Guardian, 11 December 1991, p. 3. 
74 'Of course, we hope that all the members of the EC will also become full members of WEU, because 
otherwise the potential for convergence would not be exploited and ambiguities would arise between the 
CFSP of the EU and the operational activities of the WEU. ' Van Eekelen, op. cit., 1993, p. 11. 
75Mortimer, op. cit., p. 27. Both east and west recognised the potential psychological benefits that might 
accrue from `belonging' to a security community based on a commitment to democracy and human rights. 
See discussion in Rohan, S. `Constructing a European Security Community: the role of institutions' in Popa, 
V. (ed. ), International Public Law: Between Desires and Reality, Timisoara, Helicon Publishing House, 
1999. For the seminal work on Security Communities see Deutsch, K. et al. Political Community and the 
North Atlantic Area, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1957. 
76 Delors, op. cit., 1994, p. 12. 
"See NATO Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, April 1992, pp. 34-35. 
78 At the Assembly's Extraordinary Session in Luxembourg in March 1990 representatives from the WTO 
and their national parliamentarians attended as observers to discuss issues of concern. Van Eekelen identifies 
the importance of the Assembly in "pooling ideas and drawing together the new strands of thinking being 
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Secretary General's diplomatic visits to the area in the following months. 79 In line with EU 
policy, WEU sought to develop a strategy of differentiation in its relationships with its 
eastern neighbours, in which countries which reached particular political standards, could 
benefit from a closer level of co-operation with WEU. 80 Formalising this co-operation at 
the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council on the 19 June 1992, the Forum for 
Consultation between the WEU Permanent Council and the Ambassadors of Bulgaria, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania 
met for the first time, in London on 14 October 1992. Based on a commitment to promote 
dialogue, consultation and co-operation, the emphasis was to be on `formulating 
mechanisms for consultation on crisis situations, with a view to developing co-operation 
on conflict prevention and crisis management'. 81 Meeting some resistance from NATO on 
the grounds that it might detract from the work taking place within the NACC, the WEU's 
Forum proved itself to be a support to the broader co-operation taking place within the 
NATO body, constituting as it did a smaller group of CEE states, selected on the basis of 
their proximity to the criteria for EU membership. The Forum was to prove its 
effectiveness in developing consultation partner co-operation when, following decisions 
taken at the Luxembourg meeting of 5 April 1993, and the Memoranda of Understanding 
between the WEU and the 3 riparian states of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, practical 
civil aid was provided which formed the basis for the first Danube operation of June 1993, 
enforcing the embargo against Serbia. 82 This development of co-operative practice had 
long-term implications, helping to establish a `community of interests' between WEU and 
those states seeking accession to the EU. 
developed in both east and west". Eekelen, W. van. 'Building a new European Security: WEU's 
Contribution', NATO Review, No. 4, August 1990, p. 20. Also see Brussels Communique, Council of WEU, 
23 April 1990. 
79 Eekelen, W. van. op. cit., 1992, pp. 13-17. 
80 Communique of WEU Council, Paris, 10th December 1990 and Communique of WEU Council of 
Ministers, Vianden, Luxembourg, 27 June 1991. For discussion see Gambles, op. cit. 
81 Eekelen, W. van. 'WEU prepares the way for new missions', NATO Review, Vol. 41, No. 5, October 1993, 
p. 21. The forum was to meet annually at Ministerial level, consultation between the Permanent Council and 
the ambassadors of the CEE countries taking place at least twice a year, with an ad hoc troika at senior 
official level pursuing consultations on security issues. 
82 10 patrol boats, 270 specialists seconded from the WEU member states to monitor river traffic, in close co- 
operation with EC and CSCE. See WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur, Mr De Decker, `The Situation in the 
Former Yugoslavia', Doc. 1468,12 June 1995. 
145 
The issue of institutional enlargement had been a contentious one, with the British 
favouring EU widening as a means to block further deepening of the integrated space. 
83 
However, they rejected both WEU and NATO enlargement on the basis that this might 
undermine the cohesion and efficiency of both organisations, whilst unilateral WEU 
enlargement might set the organisation up as a European competitor to NATO. The French 
were resistant to any early enlargement of the institutions, but for very different reasons to 
the British. Concerned that the extension to new states should not be allowed to undermine 
the development of a security dimension for the EU, the French argued that `The Twelve 
should first consolidate its Economic, Monetary and Political Union before contemplating 
the admission of the post socialist east European countries'. 84 Whilst the presence of new 
states in WEU might serve only to dilute the process of developing a European defence 
dimension, NATO enlargement was resisted on the grounds that it could only enhance 
American influence in Europe: the French preferring the CSCE as a vehicle for pan- 
European security co-operation. The Germans remained consistently pro-enlargement both 
for the EU and NATO; just as the economic and political stability of Europe post World 
War II was dependent on German recovery, enhanced by its participation in both Alliance 
and Community, the situation of the CEE states post-Cold War required an institutional 
response. Drawing these states in to a political, economic and security framework that in 
turn could draw them up a `developmental' ladder of economic growth and political 
`maturity' could assure European stability and development, whilst Germany would cease 
to be a `front-line' in a divided Europe. 
It was clear that any enlargement of the primary institutions would create complexities 
given the linkage between NATO, EU and WEU. The enlargement of EU, with its inferred 
access to WEU membership, raised the difficulty of new member access to WEU 
collective defence guarantees for those states not members of NATO. 85 This `Royal 
Road' 86 to NATO guarantees had been closed as WEU accepted the principle that any new 
83 The British argued that as a `civilian power', able to include neutral powers and extend links with the east, 
Europe might `turn out to be more effective in crafting a stable European peace system than a Community 
moving toward the assumption of a traditional (super)power role. See for example Lodge, J. op. cit., 1993. 
The Community may find that its self-image, institutional capabilities and organisational structures are ill 
suited to any foreign policy role. 
84 Jopp, Rummel and Schmidt, 'Integration and Security in a New Europe: Inside and Beyond a West 
European Pillar', in Jopp, Rummel and Schmidt, op. cit., 1991, pp. 73-74. 
85 Given that NATO has always provided the Article 5 guarantees of WEU. The neutral states of Austria, 
Sweden and Finland had become observers of WEU on joining the EU in 1995. 
86 Dutch Foreign Minister Peter Kooijmans comments `the political objective is to prevent destabilisation 
within Europe. That was the reason why the Royal Road was conceived in the first place; that way no one 
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full, and therefore guarantee carrying, members must also be full members of NATO, 
whilst the prerequisite of EU membership was established in order to maintain the 
coherence of WEU's role as the instrument of the EU's emergent defence policy. 87 
Given continuing resistance, not least from the Russians, to any NATO enlargement and 
the inevitably slow pace of the economic developments required for EU expansion, WEU 
sought to further enhance its own role in the process of integrating the East. Further to the 
mandate provided at their previous meeting on 22 November 1993,88 the WEU Council of 
Ministers, meeting in Luxembourg on 9 May 1994, issued the Kirchberg Declaration that 
established the status of Associate Partner of the WEU. As Associate Partners the (now 
defunct) Forum members89 would have access to Council meetings and could take part in 
discussions, although without the power to block decisions of the Council. They could be 
invited on a case by case basis to take part in the WEU's Special Working Groups, have a 
liaison arrangement with the Planning cell, associate themselves with decisions taken with 
regard to humanitarian, peace-keeping and peacemaking tasks and take part in their 
implementation. Presented as `a concrete contribution by WEU towards preparing these 
states for their eventual accession to the European Union', 90 this initiative was seen as 
complementary to the broader `good neighbours' consultation and negotiation process to 
be established by the EU's `Stability Pact' launched in the same month. 91 The Kirchberg 
initiative was also presented as being `fully complimentary to co-operation within the 
Alliance framework', in particular to that occurring through NATO's Partnership for Peace 
could take offence, because that would mean objecting to the E. C. A country becomes a member of the E. C. 
and thus of the WEU and then becomes a member of NATO, because the security guarantee in the WEU is 
the same as in NATO'. `Kooijmans on NATO, US Relations, Europe, ' De Volksrant, 19 October 1993, cited 
in Mihalka, M. `Squaring the Circle', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 12,25 March 1994, p. 9. 
87 This is known as the `Cahan Doctrine'. For a discussion of the complexities of the memberships question 
see Flockhart, T. `The Dynamics of expansion: NATO, WEU and EU', European Security, Summer 1996, 
pp. 96-218. 
88 The WEU Council agreed that 'these (CEE) relations should be broadened and deepened in parallel to the 
closer co-operation of these states with the European Union'. Cited in Zandra, R. 'Widening and Deepening', 
Newsletter, Institute of Security Studies, WEU, Paris, No. 11, April 1994, p. 1. 
89 Slovenia was to become the 10th Associate Partner in 1996. 
9' WEU Ministerial Council Meeting, Kirchberg Declaration, Luxembourg, 9 May 1994. 
91 ̀ Stability Pact in Europe: The documents adopted by the Paris Conference', Europe, Document 1887,31 
May 1994. The Pact committed CEE states through bilateral agreements to principles of `good neighbourly 
relations', areas indicated for consideration including trans-border co-operation, minority issues and issues of 
cultural, legal, economic and environmental co-operation. 
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Programme (PfP), initiated in January 1994 as a vehicle for enhanced military co-operation 
without guarantees. 92 
As NATO membership moved tantalisingly closer following NATO's acceptance of the 
principle of imminent enlargement in 1995,93 the new status of WEU Associate was to 
provide for the enhancement of the CEE states' consultation and co-operation with 
NATO's European members. 94 At the same time, given the evident requirement to pacify 
the Russians in the light of future NATO enlargement, WEU efforts in promoting dialogue 
and co-operation would seem to have been propitious. 95 Seen as essentially a `toothless' 
organisation, WEU's low profile enabled it to offer a non-threatening forum linked to the 
integrating process in Europe that had been generally supported by the Kremlin. Initiated 
in 1994, political consultation both at ambassadorial and Parliamentary level had resulted 
in practical co-operation with both Russia and the Ukraine96 whilst serving to promote 
understanding between Russia, her neighbours and the west. 97 The decision taken at the 
NATO Madrid Summit of 8-9 July 1997 to begin accession talks with Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech Republic was accompanied by the `offering' of an intensified dialogue with 
the `excluded' states within the NACC replacement, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC) and the enhanced PfP. 98 A parallel process of enhanced co-operation with Russia 
92 Kirchberg Declaration, Part II. Extending co-operation to all CSCE members, PEP was to establish 
bilateral accords between NATO and individual CSCE states, acting effectively as a staging post for longer 
term enlargement on the basis of states demonstration of their intent and acceptability for membership. Co- 
operation was to develop in the areas of peace-keeping, crisis management and disaster relief and was 
facilitated through joint training and planning. See Mihalka, op. cit., p. 1. 
93 Robert Hunter, US Ambassador to NATO, Briefmg, House of Commons, 16th May 1996. See `Study on 
NATO enlargement', NATO, September 1995. 
94 See Wohlfeld, M. `The WEU as a complement - not a substitute - for NATO', Transition, 15 December 
1995, pp. 34-36 & 64. 
9s See WEU Assembly Report, `The consequences of the Madrid NATO Summit and the development of 
WEU's relations with central and eastern European countries and Russia', Document 1585,5 November 
1997. 
96 In November 1995 a commercial deal was struck between the Russian state armaments company, 
Rosvoorouzhenie and the WEU Satellite Centre for the supply of Russian satellite imagery, whilst 
negotiations had taken place on the provision of long haul transport assets for WEU Petersberg operations. 
See Tibbels, R. 'WEU's Dialogue with Russia and the Ukraine', NATO's Sixteen Nations, Special 
Supplement, 1998, pp. 43-45. 
97 28 being all levels of WEU membership including Associate partners. 
98 The Madrid Declaration did leave the door ajar for future memberships, stating that the `Alliance expects 
to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and 
obligations of membership'. `Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation', Madrid, 8 July 
1997. 
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was established by the `Founding Act', 99 establishing a Permanent Joint Council for 
increased consultation and practical co-operation. In the light of NATO enlargement in 
1999, the three acceding states became Associate members of WEU, the organisation 
providing continuing reassurance to those states excluded from the first `wave' that their 
security interests remained high on the agenda of the evolving security architecture. 
WEU's Operational Role 
The Petersberg Declaration of July 1992 had sought to move forward WEU's operational 
capability by identifying forces and mission types and by establishing the concomitant 
planning mechanisms. The concept of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) was 
developed whereby member states designated those military units and headquarters they 
would be willing to make available for use under the authority of WEU, to act on decisions 
taken by the WEU Council and co-ordinated under the Planning Cell. 100 Given the 
intention that WEU become more `assertive in international peacekeeping and even 
peacemaking efforts' in support of the CSCE and NATO, the role of these forces would 
extend beyond the Article V commitment of collective self defence to include the 
`Petersberg Tasks' of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping, peace-making and 
crisis management. 101 In stating that NATO should be consulted before such forces were 
used on WEU operations, `Petersberg' recognised that the majority of WEU military forces 
would be `double-earmarked', and thus also assigned to NATO's integrated structure. 
Nevertheless, the path was established for a wide range of possible missions. The 
operational viability of the WEU was to be further developed through the establishment of 
Situation Centre for monitoring crises, an Intelligence Section and a Satellite Centre in 
Torrejon to be functional by April 1993. Intended to provide for verification of arms 
control agreements and the monitoring of environmental and out-of-Europe crisis, 
(proliferation and ballistic missile protection being emergent European concerns), the 
99 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations', Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian 
Federation', Paris, 27 May 1997. 
100 In addition to keeping up-dated lists of FAWEU, the Planning Cell, was to have the role of establishing 
generic plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices including recommendations for the 
necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for 
head quarters which might be selected. See Van Beveren, in Gantz and Roper, op. cit., p. 143. 
'o1The peacekeeping role of the WEU was identified by van Eekelen as incorporating '.. the preventative 
deployment of forces; the enforcement of economic sanctions with the support of military resources; the 
provision of humanitarian assistance and protection of safe areas with the aid of armed forces, and the 
implementation of an approved peace plan, with recourse to force against any parties failing to comply with 
its provisions'. van Eekelen, op. cit, 1993, p. 22. 
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satellite and space based observation centre was a tangible example of operational co- 
operation. 102 
The Petersberg tasks had identified operations outside of the NATO area as a differentiated 
path for WEU, along which European interests could be met, co-ordination encouraged and 
broader Alliance interests supported without treading on NATO areas of activity. In fact, 
the WEU had been active in an `out-of-area' role in support of UNSC Resolutions 660- 
662, contributing to the naval embargo imposed in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
on 2 August 1990.103 However, the limitations of its `concertation' procedures were 
evident, 104 and with the initiation of the US-led Operation Desert Storm, WEU was to limit 
itself to acting as a joint coordinating body to ensuring the supply of necessary equipment 
and munitions to the British and French forces in Saudi Arabia. Following the cessation of 
hostilities on 28 February 1991, WEU sought to put into effect the co-ordination of the 
humanitarian aid provided by the member states and the Community in the region and to 
look at `means for logistic support from WEU in this regard' . 
los Although formally 
requested by the European Council in April 1992 to study the military aspects of this 
humanitarian relief, the lack of member state consensus led to it being conducted by 
national contingents under American leadership. As Zandra notes, the EC states were 
`united only in their verbal condemnation of the Iraqi action and on economic sanctions, 
and somewhat divided on the question of whether common military action was necessary 
as well'. 106 Failure to find any basis for action would have been inevitably damaging for 
Euro-American relations and it was largely in this sense that WEU was able to play its 
pivotal role. In providing the necessary institutional machinery, WEU was able to enhance 
102 The Torrejon centre was to be developed by a consortium of more than 30 European companies in co- 
operation. Interview with head of the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly, 12th July 1993. Van 
Eekelen comments on the active part taken by WEU members within the WEU framework throughout the 
CFE negotiations including `on trials inspections between member states, on multinational participation on 
national inspection teams, and on inspector training courses'. Van Eekelen, op. cit., August 1990, p. 22. 
103 Van Eekelen notes that WEU's co-ordination did go well beyond its 1987 arrangements, with a three 
tiered control structure co-ordinating activity from national capitals to forces in the area, leading to a level of 
harmonisation of national forces, ensuring their complimentarity and pooling logistic support capabilities. 
Eekelen, W. van. op. cit., August 1990, p. 22. Also see Eekelen, W. van. `WEU and the Gulf Crisis', Survival, 
Vol. 32, No. 6, November-December 1990, pp. 519-532. 
104 Duke notes that the embargo had proven `divisive' with France pushing for greater WEU command and 
the UK preferring to co-ordinate their activity with the `English speaking forces'. Duke, op. cit., 2000, p. 85. 
See WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr De Hoop Scheffer, `Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait: 
Continuing Operations in the Gulf Region', Doc. 1248,7 November 1990. See Grove, E. Maritime Strategy 
and European Security, London, Brasseys, 1990, p. 63. 
105 Decision of WEU Foreign Ministers meeting which coincided with the European Council meeting of 8 
April 1991. Cited in WEU Assembly Report, Western European Union, op. cit., p. 22. 
106 Zandra in Gantz and Roper, op. cit., p. 65. Also see Delors, op. cit., 1994, p. 102. 
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its profile, by protecting vital interests in a NATO Out of Area situation, the Gulf War 
providing `a perfect model for a Petersberg mission before that definition had been 
invented' 
. 
107 However, for the Community, the `feeble mechanisms' available for co- 
ordinating separate national policies in this area, had resulted in the frustration of non- 
WEU European states who were deprived of a forum for action, the Community as a 
whole, `having to respond to an agenda set by others, notably the United States'. 108 Thus, 
whilst the WEU was able to demonstrate its potential as a `convenient vehicle of collective 
responsibility for those countries that could not individually commit troops outside Europe 
for domestic political reasons', 109 Roland Dumas, the French Foreign Minister, was to note 
that `The Gulf crisis had revealed the limits and insufficiencies of Europe... we were 
beginning to live on incantations, illusions and lots of second thoughts' . 
110 
Whilst the limitations of the European response to the Gulf War may have led to a `loss of 
heart' amongst Europeans with regard to their plans for a security dimension for the Union, 
the crisis in Yugoslavia was to further undermine faith in the potential for an effective 
European response to their common security interests. Given US disinclination to become 
embroiled in this `European' problem, the Community was seen to have a central role in 
providing for a European consensus for action. ill In support of their position on the 
preservation of Yugoslavian unity, the EC provided for financial aid to the area and agreed 
to the `deployment' of a team of cease-fire observers, in what was recognised as `the 
European Community's first peacekeeping operation since it was established 34 years 
ago' . 
112 As Serb/Croat fighting intensified throughout July 1991, the EC deferred aid and 
instituted an arms embargo on all of Yugoslavia, acting within the framework of the CSCE 
for political legitimacy. Throughout the second half of 1991, an EC Troika of Foreign 
Ministers shuffled between Belgrade and Ljubljana in an attempt to broker peace, the 
107 Wilson, G. 'WEU's operational capability - delusion or reality', in Lenzo G. (ed. ), WEU at Fes, Paris, 
WEU Institute, 1998, p. 53 also see Eekelen, W. van. `Naval Co-operation in WEU', Marine policy, 1994, 
Vol. 18, No. 6, pp. 534-537. 
108 Palmer, J. `Defending the indefensible', The Guardian, 29 January 1991, p. 19. 
109 Haslach, op. cit., p. 19. 
110 The Guardian, 12 March 1991. Salmon, T. notes `the number of occasions on which foreign ministers 
went immediately from meetings in one forum to meetings in the other forum as they attempted to show that 
Europe was a significant element in the international response to events in the Gulf, `Testing times for 
European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-2', International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2, 
pp. 23 8-52. 
11' 'I assume the United States has no desire or ambition to police the world... for me its clear and the case of 
Yugoslavia proves that the United States increasingly expects regional organisations to take care of regional 
conflicts'. Roper, op. cit., p. 2. 
' 12 The Guardian, 15 March 1991. EC observer mission to Slovenia and Croatia on 10 July. 
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activity of the Community contrasting with the apparent inactivity of both NATO and the 
WEU at this juncture. 113 Initiating the Hague Peace Conference in September, the EC in 
effect, `issued political orders to the WEU', with the WEU Council agreeing to examine 
the feasibility of adopting a more active role including the provision of a `lightly armed 
military force' to protect EC cease-fire monitors within the war zones. ' 14 Discussions 
resulted in four options ranging from logistical support for EC monitors to the deployment 
of a sizeable peacekeeping force. 115 However, in response to Assembly Recommendations 
(51 land 512) for an immediate and co-ordinated response, the Council stipulated that `the 
provision of contingents for humanitarian or peace-keeping operations is a matter to be 
decided nationally and that any national decisions to commit forces should be taken with 
due regard for the overall political context, to be judged in the framework of a common 
foreign and security policy'. 116 In terms of a Community based response, Roper felt able to 
express, as early as March 1992, (only three months after the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty), that Yugoslavia can `lead one to conclude that a joint security and foreign policy 
is already being translated into reality'. 117 However, given the lack of EU Foreign Policy 
coherence, demonstrated by German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in advance of the 
date agreed by the EU Foreign Ministers, the opposite can be inferred and little further was 
to be achieved by European diplomatic efforts. 118 
Disagreement on the precise nature of WEU's `new' military role was reflected in debate 
within the Council of Ministers, meeting in Bonn on 19 June 1992.119 Nevertheless a level 
of consensus was reached within WEU and articulated in the Council's `Declaration on the 
Yugoslav Crisis' in which it was stated that `WEU is prepared, within the bounds of its 
possibilities, to contribute towards effective implementation of United Nations Security 
Council resolutions in connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia'. An Ad Hoc 
group of Foreign and Defence Ministry representatives was formed to consider the 
113 Palmer, J. `Yugoslav splits bring unity to EC', The Guardian, 15 July 1991, p. 7. 
114 Palmer, J. `Debate brings Union closer', The Guardian, 21 September 1991, p. 6. 
115 WEU Assembly Report, Western European Union, op. cit., p. 29. 
116 Ibid, p. 30. This was the `nearest the EC came to putting WEU troops into Bosnia - before the fighting 
even started.... The British refused to back the idea. ' Palmer, J. `Kohl faces crisis over air crews', The 
Guardian, 22 June 1993, p. 18. 
117 Roper, op. cit., p. 2. 
118 Treverton, G. `The year of European Disunification', Current History, Vol. 91, No. 568, November 1992, 
pp. 353-358. Palmer, J. `Bonn urges recognition of breakaway republics', The Guardian, 14 November 1991. 
19 'This disagreement about the scope. of the WEU's new military role, particularly the nature of 
'peacemaking', came on a day which Volker Ruhe, the German defence minister, described as a milestone in 
the organisation's history'. Gow, D. 'Blockade of Yugoslav army urged', The Guardian, 20 June 1992. 
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specifics of implementing these Resolutions and on 10 July 1992, the WEU Council agreed 
to a limited operational role in policing the Adriatic coast against sanction-busting. 
Beginning on 16 July 1992 Operation Sharp Vigilance, deployed to the northern Adriatic. 
The WEU flotilla was placed under the operational control of the Italian Naval Staff 
Headquarters and it consisted initially of Belgian, French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and 
British warships with four patrol aircraft and ground based helicopters. The WEU force 
was matched by a NATO taskforce, Operation Maritime Monitor, in the same month, after 
the NAC agreed at its Oslo Ministerial in June to support the UNSC sanctions, 120 and this 
UN support role having been made official during the subsequent Ministerial Session in 
December. Thus, NATO effectively assumed an out of area role under the auspices of a 
UN mandate, asserting the organisations role and bringing the US into the conflict. 121 On 
16 November 1992, in support of UNSC Resolution 787, WEU and NATO began separate, 
but co-ordinated enforcement support imposing an arms and economic embargo in the 
Adriatic, if necessary by `stop-and-search' operations. 122 At the WEU Rome Council 
meeting, on 20 November, the President of the EC and the Secretary-General of NATO 
were invited to attend for the first time to discuss the crisis and at a joint session of the 
NAC and the Council of the WEU, held on 8 June 1993, a combined NATO/WEU single 
command and control arrangement was agreed under the joint authority of both 
organisations for the combined Operation Sharp Guard. 123 The joint military command, 
MILCOM ADRIATIC was to represent the `birth' of a `genuine partnership' 124 and, in 
meeting French demands for a European operation, demonstrated the potential for a 
European capability to act alongside NATO in accordance with broader Alliance interests. 
However, the US' unilateral decision to withdraw from the embargo operation in 
120 Statement on the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Oslo Communique, NAC, June 1992. 
121 Fairhall, D. 'WEU considers cover for convoys', The Guardian, 31 July 1992. 'Both organisations have 
flotillas of warships patrolling the Adriatic, even though there is virtually nothing for them to do - because 
the main sanction-busting is taking place along the Danube'. Fairhall, D. 'Yugoslav civil war', The Guardian, 
11 August 1992, p. 6. 
122 Operations Sharp Fence and Maritime Guard. Pick, H. 'WEU and NATO to enforce UN sea blockade 
against rump Yugoslavia', The Guardian, 21 November 1992. 
123 For discussion of Operation Sharp Guard see NATO DATA, NATO/WEU Operation 'Sharp Guard', 
NATO public data service. 
124 Eekelen, W. van. Op. cit., 1993, p. 22. 
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November 1994 drew unusually harsh criticism from the WEU states who continued their 
operations in the US absence. 125 
The WEU's other contributions in Yugoslavia were to be small scale, aiding the three 
Riparian states' (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary) police and customs action on the Danube in 
support of the UN embargo126 and in Mostar, at the request of the EU, WEU provided a 
police contingent to train a combined Croat/Serb police force for the EU administered 
town. The one attempt to conduct a significant WEU land operation was in response to 
UNSC Resolution 770 (13 August 1992) that called for humanitarian assistance to 
Sarajevo. Having handed over the relevant plans drawn up by its Planning Cell to the UN, 
the WEU Council at their London meeting of 10 August 1992, affirmed their `collective 
will' to contribute military, logistic, financial and other means to the humanitarian 
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but a lack of consensus led to the operation being 
handed over to an expanded UNPROFOR in September 1992. In fact WEU was not 
involved in the final resolution of the Yugoslavia problem, as NATO took the role of peace 
enforcers from 1993: by taking on this new OOA role, NATO had found a means of 
remaining `in business'. 127 
The failure of the European institutional infrastructure to secure effectively a political 
settlement in the former Yugoslavia was, at least in part, the consequence of national 
resistance to meet the costs of a coherent and broadly based policy which provided for a 
military potential. 128 However, given its lack of cohesion and experience, the EU had 
demonstrated, in its early activity and in the absence of other `interested' parties, the desire 
to find a capacity for action, so evidently lacking in the Gulf debacle. 129 Also the WEU had 
demonstrated the institutional flexibility to adapt to the operational requirements of an 
altered security agenda, ad hoc collaboration between NATO and WEU overcame initial 
`gridlock' and gave way to successful 'interlock'. In terms of European defence policy, 
concerns had moved from questions of principle to questions of technicality and the 
125 This criticism was evident in the WEU's Noordwijk Declaration of 14 November 1994. See Gnesotto , N. 
Lessons of Yugoslavia, Paris: WEU Institute, Chaillot Paper, No. 14, March 1994 for discussion of 
Yugoslavian conflict. 
126 WEU Council in Luxembourg 5 April 1993. See WEU Assembly Report, Doc. 1468, op. cit. 
127 Rees argues that `when the US moved its military and diplomatic weight behind the effort to end the 
conflict, this was motivated above all else by its determination to preserve the Alliance and its own central 
role therein. Rees, op. cit., p. 85. See Eekelen, W. van. op. cit., 1998. Ch. 7. 
128 Eekelen, W. van. op. cit., August 1990, p. 8. 
129 Rummel, op. cit., 1991-1992, p. 78. 
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relationship between the EC and WEU become a `normal' one: `the latter becoming a 
technical instrument at the disposal of the former'. 130 
The NATO Summit in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994 was to mark a watershed in US 
acceptance of the benefits of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) for the 
broader Transatlantic Alliance. Efforts at co-operation through WEU had served to 
demonstrate that a more co-ordinated Europe was not necessarily a threat to NATO or 
American interests if it was managed within an Atlantic context. The declaration of Heads 
of State, following the Summit, stated, `The Alliance and the European Union share 
common strategic interests... We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance 
through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component 
of the European Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to 
facilitate this'. Thus the NAC promised to `make the collective assets of the alliance 
available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations 
undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their common foreign and security 
policy'. 131 This declaration of intent was to re-focus military level relationships, with WEU 
specifically acting as the defence arm of the EU having resort not only to the collective 
capabilities of the European allies but also of the Atlantic Alliance itself. 
In further support of a more effective European pillar, the Brussels Declaration provided 
for the development of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept; to consist of 
multinational, tri-service headquarters, which could be deployed as self-contained elements 
of the NATO command structure, but which could also provide for the participation of 
states not within the integrated military structure of NATO itself. Drawing on the 
experiences of Operations Desert Storm, Deny Flight and Sharp Guard, the CJTF was to 
provide for action by `coalitions of the willing', in circumstances in which mobility and 
flexibility would be key determinants of success. 
132 Most significantly perhaps, the CJTF 
inside NATO's regional commands would be able to launch a military operation on behalf 
of the WEU, using joint NATO assets and non-European personnel, `under the orders of 
130 Gnesotto, N. op. cit., 1992, p. 227. 
131 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994. 
132 The CJTF could provide for coalitions of interest that could by-pass the consensual necessities of 
traditional NATO decision-making, an increasing requirement given the loss of `cold war' threat consensus. 
Mayn, C. W. `A Working Clinton Doctrine', Foreign Policy, No. 93, Winter 1993-1994. p. 5. 
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the operational commander appointed by the WEU under the political authority of the 
WEU Council. ' 133 
In providing the WEU with an operational capability that national constraints were likely 
to preclude for the foreseeable future, the CJTF would prevent unnecessary duplication and 
enable Europeans to act in support of their CFSP. 134 However, the provision of `loaned' 
facilities was not to be automatic, 135 requiring NAC approval on a case-by-case basis, 
raising the question of American veto over potential missions decided by Europeans. 
Equally, it was perceived by some, most notably the French, as a means of pre-empting the 
development of separate European military structures, such as the Eurocorps, which would 
be directly answerable to the WEU. 136 Whilst WEU could benefit from the provision of 
`separable but not separate assets' provisioned through NATO, 137 the French were not 
alone in raising concerns that the WEU must not for-go the development of an autonomous 
planning and operational capability if it was to be able to act either independently or for the 
European Union. 138 Notwithstanding the limitations on European capabilities, the evidence 
of WEU's limited operational activity over the coming years was to suggest that the lack of 
political will, rather than operational capabilities, was the significant factor. 139 Deep-seated 
national differences in the perception of problem and solution resulted in a lack of political 
133 WEU Assembly Report, Rapporteur Mr Baumel, `Draft Recommendation on the evolution of NATO and 
its consequences for WEU', Doc. 1410,23 March 1994, Adopted by Standing Committee of WEU Assembly 
in Paris, 3 May 1994. 
134 George, B. After the NATO Summit, (UK), General Rapporteur, Draft General Report, International 
Secretariat, NATO Centralized Media Service, May 1994. 
135 The French particularly had sought automatic access to Alliance provisions through CJTF's. 
136 Fairhall, D. and Palmer, J. 'NATO keeps its options open to help Yeltsin', The Guardian, 9 December 
1993, p. 12. 
137 Heathcoat-Amory states that 'Of course, WEU will not draw only on Combined Joint Task Forces; a 
range of other forces have been declared by nations as available for use under WEU auspices... This gives us 
in principle a wide range of options from which we can select to get the right combination of military 
capability and the right political 'label' for each case'. 'The next step for Western European Union :A British 
View', The World Today, July 1994, p. 135. 
138 This was considered a 'moot point' by a senior NATO official in Brussels who foresaw no possibility, at 
least within the next ten years, that Europe could reach agreement on any issue that was important enough to 
require operational potential without the agreement of the US. In his opinion the 'WEU has no military 
significance - it is a symbolic forum to express European unity'. It is neither 'sexy' nor relevant - particularly 
in light of NATO's new confidence and redefinition of scope (OOA) and role (peacekeeping etc). Briefing by 
Policy Planning Section, NATO HQ, 12 July 1994. See Taylor, T. `Challenges for Western European Union 
Operations', in Deighton, op. cit., 1997, pp. 145-155. 
139 The Europeans were particularly short on strategic lift and intelligence assets, although van Eekelen 
suggested in an interview in The Hague in 1997 that European resources were sufficient for the low level 
Petersberg tasks that were the most likely areas of activity for WEU forces. 
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will to commit WEU forces in Bosnia, 140 a problem which was to re-emerge in the WEU's 
failure to intervene in Rwanda in 1994 and in the African Great Lakes and Albania in 
1996.141 Whilst WEU's operations were to remain essentially small scale, it provided a 
mechanism for EU initiated activity in mine clearance operations in Croatia from 
November 1998 (WEUDAM), in monitoring of the Kosovo situation by the WEU's 
Satellite Centre from the same month and, following the agreement reached in March 
1999, the adoption of WEU's policing mission in Albania (MAPE) as an EU requested 
operation. 142 
Following the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit and in light of the forthcoming Amsterdam 
IGC review of the EU's defence priorities, the WEU had sought to establish what the 
defence role of the institutions of the new Europe should be. At the Noordwijk meeting of 
the WEU Council on 14 November 1994, a document entitled `Preliminary Conclusions on 
the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy' had been formulated which, in 
restating WEU's dual role as defence component of the EU and European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance, sought to identify the major challenges to European security. The 
Madrid `Common Concept' of November 1995143 took this further in identifying the 
competencies and limitations of the WEU in the light of the Gulf and Yugoslavian 
experiences. Accompanying the `Common Concept' was the Council's `WEU 
Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference' that assessed the 
organisation's post-Maastricht development and identified three possible options for 
WEU/EU relations. The `reinforcement' option, favoured by Britain, provides for a closer 
partnership between the EU and an autonomous intergovernmental WEU largely on the 
same basis as that established under Maastricht. The `merger' option for-saw the complete 
integration of the WEU into the EU and was favoured by the Germans and, as a long-term 
objective, by all but the British. The `subordination' option, by which legal and 
institutional links would establish areas where decisions of the EU would require a 
political commitment of the WEU to act, providing a middle ground acceptable to the 
French in the light of its `intergovernmentalist' leanings. Given the varying interests of the 
central players the Madrid Declaration was, in line with the Westendorp Report of the EU, 
140 'East gets a lukewarm answer', The Guardian, 22 June 1993, p. 8. 
141 See Foster, E. `Ad Hoc in Albania: Did Europe Fail? ', Security Dialogue, Vol. 29(2), 1998, pp. 213-217. 
142 See De Morales, R. `The WEU's Multi-National Police Element in Albania', NATO's Sixteen Nations, 
Supplement Special, 1998, pp. 59-60. 
143 WEU Ministerial Council, `European Security: a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries', Madrid, 
14 November 1995. 
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to represent a range of options rather than any agreed future for the development of the 
Union's defence competency. 144 
By the time of the Berlin NATO Council Meeting in June 1996 agreement had been 
reached on the relationship between NATO and the evolving European defence identity. 
Given NATO's commitment to develop the procedures for WEU-led operations using 
CJTFs out-with NATO structures, the French had come to accept the potential benefits of 
this new provision. 145 Given German resistance to overcome the constraints on military 
activity initially consequent on their constitutional obligations and British rejection of 
defence enhancement outside of the Alliance structure, the new French President Chirac 
had come to recognise that efforts to develop an independent European defence 
competence were doomed to failure, this loss of enthusiasm being evidenced by the 
implementation of defence cuts in 1996.146 Maintaining a distance from NATO was likely 
only to undermine French ability to influence the Alliance agenda and France thus 
signalled her acceptance of closer Alliance ties through re-entering NATO's Military 
Committee, seeking to encourage the Europeanisation of NATO through securing NATO's 
Southern Command. 147 The Berlin Communique of the NAC had effectively set the level 
for future institutional developments, in which NATO was recognised as the primary 
defence organisation, and first choice as `an integral part of the emerging, broadly based, 
cooperative European security structure'. 148 Welcoming enhanced NATO-WEU co- 
operation, 149 Berlin established ESDI as `within the Alliance', and WEU as the articulation 
of that identity. 
144 Reflection Group Report, Brussels, 5 December 1995. 
145 It had been recognised by the WEU Council that the `strengthening of the WEU's operational role 
depends... on NATO's elaboration of the combined joint task force (CJTF) concept'. WEU Assembly Report, 
`The Future of European Security and Preparations for Maastricht I1', Document 1458. Report submitted on 
behalf of the Political Committee by Mrs Aguiar, Rapporteur to the Assembly of the WEU, 16 May 1995. 
146 See Menon, A. `From Independence to co-operation: France, NATO and European Security', 
International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 19-34; Millon, C. `France and the Renewal of the 
Atlantic Alliance', NATO Review, No. 3,1996, pp. 13-16. 
147 The failure to obtain US acceptance of a European Commander for the Southern Command led to 
protracted disagreements between the French and the US, despite the enhancement of the DSACEUR post 
which traditionally fell to a European and which might provide the Command in a European Operation under 
the CJTF concept. 
148 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996, Final Communique. 
149 Under the British Presidency, the WEU had concluded a Security Agreement with NATO that provided 
for the flow of classified information between the two organisations. Closer co-operation on their respective 
Mediterranean dialogue and relations with Russia and the Ukraine had been established, joint meetings of the 
NATO and WEU Councils continuing to promote greater complimentarity and transparency between the 
institutions. 
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The British government, initially critical of gestures toward unrealisable European 
capability, had undergone a reassessment of its attitudes toward European co-operation and 
the role of the WEU. Whilst deep British defence cuts suggested a rationalisation of 
capabilities through closer European co-operation, '50the underlying reality that Britain 
could no longer act independently had failed to result in strategic change. One senior 
British official had been drawn to comment, `In Britain there has been no attempt to 
construct an honest intellectual rationale for the force structure. We have no foreign and 
defence policy'. 1 s1 Continuing to reject the WEU/EU merger option on the grounds that the 
presence of the neutrals would undermine the ability of Europe to act, whilst also 
potentially undermining NATO's Article V commitment, the British resisted the Franco- 
German proposals for the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to CFSP as an 
unacceptable extension of integration. 152 However, led by desires to prevent a further drift 
towards federalism in light of the forthcoming Maastricht Review in 1996, and partly as a 
result of US pressure, the British government launched a `charm offensive', presenting 
their insistence on intergovemmentalism as a `pro-European' rather than pro-nation-state 
position, 153 and encouraging the practical development of Europe's defence capabilities. 154 
In what was described by one British official as a `seismic shift towards a more Euro- 
focused strategy' particularly in the area of closer security and defence integration, the 
British government began to work closely with the French on the operation of CJTF's and 
the means of making the WEU `operationally effective' . 
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150 Malcolm Riflcind, Britain's Defence Secretary announced national defence cuts amounting to 19,000 
civilian and military jobs by the year 2000 and a saving in excess of £750m. However, in an interview with 
'Newsnight' (14th July 1994), he rejected the idea of European specialization, pointing to the need, in 
extremis, to be able to defend one's own territory. 
151 Cited in Adams, J. 'British Defence Cuts Dismay Pentagon', The Sunday Times, 17 July 1994. 
152 Proposals had emerged from the Franco-German Foreign Ministers Meeting in Freiburg, February 1996, 
for some extension of QMV to joint positions within the CFSP, `constructive abstention' providing for opt- 
outs and thus enhancing the decision-making process. 
'53The British view remains that WEU decisions which have defence implications should be handled 
intergovernmentally 'without, thanks to its institutional separation, diluting an any way the single 
institutional mechanism of the Treaty of Rome. NATO shows beyond any doubt that in the defence field 
intergovernmentalism is not second best; it is what works'. Heathcoat-Amory, op. cit,. p. 135. For the British 
`pragmatic' development of WEU capability see the Birmingham Declaration, Council of WEU, 7 May 
1996, following the British Presidency. 
's4 Interviews held at the FCO, 1996. See `A Partnership of Nations: The British Approach to the European 
Union Intergovernmental Conference, Cmd. 3181, London, FCO, March 1996. Also see Goulden, J. `The 
WEU's role in the new strategic environment', NATO Review, Vol. 44, No. 3, May 1996, pp. 21-24. 
155 British source cited in Palmer, J. 'Britain seeks lead role in EU', The Guardian, 19 July 1994, p. 1. 
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At the Amsterdam Summit of 16-17 June 1997, agreement was reached on the 
consolidation of the Treaty of European Union; 156 this agreement reflecting an uneasy 
compromise between European states on the future of a common defence policy for the 
EU. The issue of WEU's place in this arrangement was particularly contentious, the British 
insisting on 'VJEU's continuing autonomy for `Atlanticist' reasons, the neutral states 
seeking to retain `civilian' status for the EU, and the majority seeking the full integration 
of WEU into the EU. In reaching a compromise solution, the Treaty moved on the 
integration debate; reaching agreement on the fostering of closer WEU/EU relations `with 
a view to the possibility of integration into the Union, should the European Council so 
decide', whilst recognising that the Union shall `respect the obligations of certain Member 
States, which see their common defence realised in NATO... and be compatible with the 
common security and defence policy established within that framework'. In stating that 
the EU may `avail itself' of the WEU, rather than `request' that it `elaborate and implement 
policy', a subtle enhancement of EU authority over WEU was suggested. In cases where 
the EU was to `avail itself of WEU, all EU members should be able to contribute `on an 
equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU', enabling the participation of 
neutrals in Petersberg Tasks included within the purview of the Union under the Treaty. 
The WEU's `Declaration on the Role of Western European Union and its Relations with 
the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance' adopted by the WEU Council on 22 
July in response to the Amsterdam agreements, noted the WEU's role in providing the EU 
with operational capability whilst emphasising that it was also an essential element in the 
establishment of an ESDI within the Alliance. Following the Amsterdam Treaty, WEU and 
EU approved a number of arrangements for closer co-operation including mechanisms 
allowing EU to draw on the resources of WEU's military Staff, Satellite Centre and 
Security Studies Institute. 157 
The European Initiative - WEU's last post 
1998 marked the beginning of a significant shift in British attitudes towards Europe that 
was to effectively ring the death knell of WEU. The new UK Labour Government of 1997 
had entered office with `a new broom' intent on reappraising Britain's relations with her 
156 'Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts', signed 2 October 1997, ratified 1 May 1999. 
's' Other areas of enhanced co-operation were to be the harmonisation of Presidencies, closer relations 
between the Secretary General of WEU and the General Secretariat of the EU Council, and WEU co- 
operation with the EU Commission. 
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European partners and reassessing her broader security interests: a process instigated in the 
`foreign policy led' Strategic Defence Review. Keen to reinstate the UK as a world player, 
the limited contribution of Europe to the Kosovo crisis had served to demonstrate the 
weakness of the EU's CFSP, 158 whilst the US seemed increasingly supportive of the 
development of a European pillar for Alliance burden-sharing. In the light of European 
progress towards Monetary Union, the Blair government sought to enhance its European 
credentials by demonstrating its interest in promoting the development of the EU's 
CFSP. 159 At the Portschach EU Summit of October 1998, Blair signalled the shift in UK 
attitudes to European defence when he argued for more efficient and effective decision- 
making structures in the EU, including flexible and deployable forces for a credible 
underpinning of CFSP. Whilst underlining the need to ensure the complementarity of the 
CFSP with NATO, Blair was enthusiastic `for Europe to take a stronger foreign and 
security role', whilst the WEU was seen as being `less than ideal' as the instrument for 
ensuring this development. 160 Representing something of a `Pandora's box', the British 
proposals were intended to open up debate rather than provide a definitive plan. In essence, 
the British sought a more effective EU intergovernmental decision-making system for 
defence matters, where Europe could carry out `independent' military action through 
access to capabilities complimentary with those of NATO. Beyond these basic interests 
nothing had been decided. 161 The Anglo-French Declaration following the St Malo 
Summit on 3-4 December 1998 marked the real shift in British policy, in that it removed 
the long-standing British resistance to `autonomous' military capabilities for Europe. In 
acknowledging that `the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up 
by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so', the 
St Malo Declaration provided the impetus for rapid development of a common European 
defence policy. Welcomed at the European Council meeting in Vienna on 11-12 
158 See `Kosovo: Lessons from the crisis', Cmd 4724, London, HMSO, June 2000. Also see ̀ Identity Crisis', 
Janes Defence Weekly, 3 June 1998, pp. 46-55. 
159 The roots of this initiative are to be found in the confidential FCO memorandum of May 1998, the 
arguments of which are presented in Grant, C. Can Britain Lead in Europe, London, Centre for European 
Reform, 1998, pp. 44-50. These proposals looked towards the creation of a fourth EU pillar for defence policy 
which would include the Brussels Treaty Article V provision and from which states could elect to opt out. 
NATO would provide the military capability, a new EU Council of Defence Ministers authorising military 
action by requesting the use of NATO forces. The WEU would be dismembered with transferral of its 
functions to the other two organisations. 
160 Extracts from the Press Conference following the Portschach Summit, reprinted in Rutten, M. (compiler), 
From St Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents, Chaillot Papers, No. 47, Paris, WEU Institute, 
May 2001. 
161 See Whitman, R. G. Amsterdam's Unfinished Business? The Blair Government's Initiative and the future 
of the Western European Union, Occasional Papers, No. 7, Paris, WEISS, January 1999. 
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December, the St Malo agreement paved the way for an effective CFSP backed by 
`credible operational capabilities' : the future of WEU was looking decidedly gloomy. 
Reaction in the US to St Malo was, perhaps surprisingly, supportive. In an article in the 
Financial Times on 7 December, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, welcomed the 
Blair initiative, stating that `Our interests are clear: we want a Europe that can act. We 
want a Europe with modern, flexible military forces that are capable of putting out fires in 
Europe's backyard and working with us through the alliance to defend our common 
interests'. In emphasising the importance of avoiding her `3Ds' of decoupling, duplication 
and discrimination, Albright was to argue that `European efforts to do more for Europe's 
own defence make it easier, not harder, for us to remain engaged' . 
162 At the Washington 
Summit of the NAC on 24 April 1999, Alliance support for the progress made towards a 
European defence competence was forthcoming, emphasis shifting from WEU as a 
representation of ESDI within the Alliance, to support for EU-led operations, for which the 
Alliance stood `ready to define and adopt the necessary assets and capabilities of the 
Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an 
Alliance'. 163 In building on the mechanisms for `consultation, co-operation and 
transparency' existing between WEU and NATO, a new direct relationship between 
NATO and the EU was envisaged. 
At the Cologne meeting of the European Council, 3-4 June 1999, it was agreed that the 
Union must meet the St Malo objectives `without prejudice to NATO'. 164 Determined to 
`launch a new step in the construction of the European Union', the EU was to embark on 
the creation of its own crisis management capability. Former Secretary General of NATO 
Javier Solana was appointed as the EU's High Representative for CFSP and the Cologne 
decisions set the objective of establishing `the modalities for the inclusion of those 
functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities 
in the area of the Petersberg Tasks'. Committed to `take the necessary decisions' by the 
end of 2000, it was forseen that `the WEU as an organisation would have completed its 
162 The `3D's' represent the criteria of no decoupling of European and North American security, no 
duplication of effort or capabilities and no discrimination against non EU allies. Albright, M. `The right 
balance will secure NATO's future', Financial Times, 7 December 1998. See NATO Secretary General Lord 
Robertson's speech at the Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Amsterdam, 15 November 
1999, in which he attempts to reassure the US by his '31s' of improvement, inclusiveness and indivisibility. 
163 NATO Summit Communique, Washington, 24 April 1999. 
164 Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the common European Policy on Security and 
Defence, European Council, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999. 
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purpose'. In support of the decisions reached in Cologne, the WEU Ministerial meeting in 
Luxembourg on 19 November 1999, appointed Solana as Secretary General of WEU in 
order to facilitate the merger process. 165 
The decision having been taken, the pace at which the EU sought to take on the crisis 
management function of the WEU was impressive. Proposals for the establishment of a 
European rapid reaction corps were taken up at the Helsinki Meeting of the European 
Council on 10-11 December 1999, a `headline goal' on military capabilities being 
established whereby `co-operating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must 
be able by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year, military forces of 
up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks'. Agreement was 
reached on interim political-military bodies to be established by March 2000 in preparation 
for permanent institutions for the management of a Common European Security and 
Defence Policy (CESDP) including a Political and Security Committee, a Military 
Committee and a Military Staff. Arrangements for third party participation in CESDP and 
NATO/EU relations having been established at the EU's Feira Summit in June 2000, the 
Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels in November elicited firm commitments 
of forces to contribute to the realisation of the Helsinki force goal. At the Nice European 
Council Meeting of 7-9 December, the decisions reached at Cologne, Helsinki and Feira 
were codified, the Council providing clear direction for the continuing development of the 
ESDP that was to `contribute to the vitality of a renewed trans-Atlantic link'. Whilst 
excluding the establishment of a European army, an acceptable compromise had been 
reached whereby, in recognising that NATO remained the basis of collective defence, the 
EU's autonomous capacity to act in crisis management was assured where `NATO as a 
whole is not engaged' . 
166 In a strong endorsement of the position to be established at Nice 
in support of a CESDP, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, stated, `We're 
not against it, we're not ambivalent, we're not anxious, we're for it... We want to see a 
Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged on its own, 
through the European Union. Period, end of debate. ' 167 
165 Solana stated, `The expertise and specialised resources of the WEU have to be put fully at the disposal of 
the European Union. My own double-hatted appointment as Secretary General of the WEU should assist this 
process'. Speech to the Institute for European Policy, Berlin, 17 December 1999. 
166 European Council Nice 7-9 December 2000, Presidency Conclusions. 
167 Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 15 December 1999. 
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So, this was the end of the line for WEU, the profound changes in the European security 
architecture having made it effectively obsolete once the crisis management function of the 
EU had been established. The final stages of the WEU's existence were spent in planning 
its own demise, and assisting in the task of preparing the way for an effective European 
defence capability within the EU's second pillar. Meeting in Marseille on 13 November 
2000, the Council of WEU prepared the way for WEU's effective demise. In agreeing that 
the WEU's crisis management responsibilities would be handed over to the EU, the 
residual functions of the WEU were in retaining the Article V commitment of the Brussels 
Treaty, whilst the Assembly would continue to provide Parliamentary oversight of CESDP 
as the Interim European Security and Defence Assembly. Suspending the consultation 
mechanisms established between itself, EU and NATO respectively, the WEU's Institute 
and Satellite Centre were to be transformed into agencies of the EU, whilst its Military 
Staff would cease to function, in favour of the EU's own structures. The WEU's remaining 
operational activity in Croatia (WEUDAM) would continue until the end of its mandate, 
whilst the Albania police mission (MAPE) would be taken over by the EU. Political 
dialogue with Russia, the Ukraine and the Mediterranean states was also to be taken up 
within the framework of the EU, only the WEAG would continue to conduct its work in 
the area of arms co-operation for the foreseeable future. 168 
Conclusion 
In the post-Cold War era the role of the primary institutions and their influence on the 
European security agenda had been fundamentally questioned. The combination of 
external and internal challenges resulted in a significant shift in the nature of both Alliance 
and Community in the European context. The dissolution of the Soviet bloc had removed 
much of NATO's original raison d'etre, whilst concerns regarding the rising power of a 
unified Germany were to enhance European states' interest in seeking closer integration, 
not least as a means of ensuring that German power might be harnessed for the European 
good. Whilst NATO sought to establish a more political role based on a broader concept of 
security interests, the EC moved toward a closer economic union, with a defence 
competency to support its `soft' security role. The part of WEU in this process was 
considerable. As a conduit between NATO and the EU the WEU facilitated an acceptable 
juxtaposition of these two institutions, . whilst providing for adaptation in both. Through the 
development of its operational and institutional capability and the extension of its 
168 See ̀ European Security and Defence: WEU's Role', http: //www. int/eng/future. htm. 
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membership WEU was to facilitate a process of institutional transition by accommodating 
a range of divergent interests with regard to the nature and scope of development of each 
of the primary organisations and the relationship of one to the other. 
The major areas of tension during the post-Cold War period resulted as a consequence of 
differing national perspectives on the preferred scope of integration, the US leadership role 
in the Atlantic Alliance and the relationship between the emerging EU and NATO. As 
Europe began to address the issues of developing a defence identity, the integration debate 
moved into the realms of high politics, and became increasingly and inextricably 
connected to the debate regarding the future of NATO and the transatlantic link. 
Consequently, the tensions that emerged throughout the post-Cold War period were a 
complex response to these interconnecting interests. 
Within the EC, the requirement for some greater level of foreign policy co-ordination in 
the light of the new post-Cold War environment was recognised by all members. However, 
for many, defence was an integrative step too far. The decisions taken at Maastricht 
reflected the uneasy compromise between those who sought a defence competence for the 
evolving Union and those who wished to keep Europe as a civilian power. The French 
sought an intergovernmental defence competency for the Union as a means of harnessing 
German strength in support of Europe, enhancing European power not least in relation to 
the remaining Super-power. A reunited Germany sought security integration in Europe in 
line with its policy of promoting German development within the `reassuring' context of 
European integration, whilst contributing to the rebalancing of the Atlantic alliance. For 
the British, persistent Atlanticism led them to resist any European pretensions which might 
lead to an undermining of NATO, seen as the mainstay of European defence, whilst 
arguing that any defence arrangement within the Community context would compromise 
the neutrality of Ireland and restrict the potential for enlargement of the `soft security' zone 
provided by the Union. The Maastricht agreement, in establishing the WEU as an 
autonomous defence arm of the European Union, was to provide a means of overcoming 
the seemingly intractable problem of meeting these divergent interests. In separating the 
defence element from the Union, the difficult issue of the neutrals was overcome and 
consequently the door left open for the enlargement of the EU to include Austria, Sweden 
and Finland. The interests of the French in promoting closer defence ties with Germany 
were provisioned in an intergovernmental organisation that was to be an `integral' part of 
the Union. Germany was able to demonstrate its interest in promoting closer European 
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integration without undermining its relationship with NATO and the UK had ensured that 
European defence co-operation, whilst contributing to the broader Alliance, would be 
pragmatically developed amongst the key European players. 
Significantly, the WEU demonstrated throughout this period was that European security 
and defence co-operation in the EU context was `perfectly compatible' with commitments 
to transatlantic defence. 169 The interplay between alliance and integrative interests had led 
to national resistance to developments in one arena that might impact negatively on the 
other. However, the incremental development of WEU as an external organisation, 
supportive of both processes, served to dissipate these tensions by providing a testing 
ground for developments, far enough removed from the primary organisations to mitigate 
the negative effects of potential failure. 
In operational terms, WEU activity in the Gulf and Yugoslavia had demonstrated both the 
potential for and limitations of European defence co-operation. Whilst WEU coordinated 
action in the Gulf had enabled a European deployment in support of US interests and 
activity in the region, the early action of WEU in the Adriatic had caught NATO on the 
back foot. Subsequent NATO action ensured the Alliance's continuing primacy and may 
be seen partially as a response to US concerns that the European's were `taking the 
limelight'. Having moved out of area with NATO, the US came to recognise the benefits in 
the changing international environment of a more effective European contribution to 
defence. The political and capability limitations on European defence activity, 
demonstrated by WEU operations, contributed to a greater pragmatism in French attitudes 
both to the future development of a CESDP and its relationship to NATO. At the same 
time, US acceptance of the principle of ESDI encouraged the British to seek further 
practical European defence co-operation as a means of enhancing the Alliance. 
Consequently, the French and British positions converged on WEU. 
The CJTF concept, whilst `condemning' Europe to a level of continued dependency, was a 
practical solution to the problem of limited European capabilities. The WEU's part in 
developing this concept in co-operation with the Alliance was to enhance the potential for 
a European crisis management capability without undermining the coherence of the 
alliance based on continuing US leadership. The development of WEU allocated forces 
169 See Address by Dr Javier Solana, Secretary General of WEU, Council of Ministers Session at 21, 
Marseille, 13 November 2000. 
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had also served the dual functions of enhancing the alliance and promoting European co- 
operation. Firstly, they had demonstrated a European commitment to take on more of the 
costs of their own defence, easing alliance tensions over burden sharing and bringing 
France closer to the NATO structure. At the same time, these forces served to demonstrate 
a substantive European identity and capability in security matters, enabling WEU to act, if 
only in a limited sense, independently of NATO. By increasing their military capabilities, 
co-operation and co-ordination, the Europeans could influence the NATO agenda, 
contributing to the rebalancing necessary if the Alliance was to maintain its coherence in 
the altered strategic environment. 
As the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties opened the door to EU responsibility in the 
field of crisis management, the experience of WEU activity in Mostar, Croatia and 
Albania, all operations undertaken at the request of the EU, were to provide useful 
examples of the complexity of this type of activity. The WEU's identification of Petersberg 
Tasks as areas `short of defence' 170 in which to promote effective European co-operation 
had proven an acceptable division of labour for the neutral states, enabling their acceptance 
of these areas of responsibility into the Union. The military structures of WEU were to be 
the proving ground of new European structures for crisis management, whilst enabling the 
development of close operational relations with NATO. Indeed, the promotion of co- 
operative mechanisms between the WEU and NATO had contributed to a `culture of co- 
operation' between the two organisations and their national representatives at both a 
military and civilian level that was to prepare the ground for the future relationship 
between the EU and NATO. Equally, the WEU's developing framework for co-operation 
with the EU was to provide an example of the `diplomatic method' of intergovernmental 
defence co-operation that was be the basis for an acceptable working method within the 
EU's CESDP. 
In terms of the management of memberships, WEU was to support the processes of 
enlargement of the primary organisations in a manner that did not undermine the 
relationship between them. The differentiated membership structure established by WEU 
enabled a close relationship to develop between all European members of NATO and the 
EU, whilst its Associate Partner status was to enhance CEE dialogue and practical co- 
operation in line with that taking place within those two bodies. In this way WEU helped 
to prepare the emerging democracies for membership of the primary organisations, 
170 Interview with van Eekelen, The Hague, January 1997. 
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offering practical co-operation in the form of participation in exercises and low-level 
operations as well as the political dialogue that was to connect them to the `cultural zone' 
of democratic Europe. Whilst divergent national interests had led to competing views on 
the pace and scope of institutional enlargements, WEU provided a proving ground for the 
gradual integration of CEE states in a manner acceptable to the Russians and 
complementary to both alliance and integrative interests. 
The WEU had effectively shored up the two primary organisations, by enabling and 
promoting activity that could not be conducted effectively in either NATO or the EU as a 
consequence of the diversity of opinion as to their preferred development. The 
constituency of WEU had ensured visibility of its activity across both NATO and the EU 
whilst preventing either US domination of the agenda or neutrals' limitations on its 
development. As a hybrid organisation promoting both alliance and integration activity, 
WEU could be identified as Atlanticist or Europeanist in nature and this ambiguity was to 
enable compromise as national interests converged at the level of functional developments. 
The incremental, pragmatic developments that took place within WEU on the basis of this 
convergence of interests had enabled the eventual acceptance of piecemeal transition for 
both the Alliance and the EU, preventing their stagnation or indeed regression as each 
sought to adapt to meet new international realities. 
The agreements reached in Cologne, Helsinki and Nice, supported by the US and the North 
Atlantic Council, signified the resolution of the primary tensions that had racked the 
international institutions of European security since their inception. The rebalancing of 
NATO through provisions for a European pillar had been accepted, whilst NATO primacy 
had been assured. The development of an intergovernmental crisis-management capability 
for the EU enabled the assertion of European `autonomy' whilst supporting the broader 
transatlantic alliance on which defence was predicated. Clearly areas of contention, both 
within and between the institutions remained, 171 but WEU, in facilitating the gradual 
satisfaction of core concerns had enabled an acceptable order to emerge and in so doing 
had effectively served its purpose. 
171 These are likely to be in the areas of operation viability, decision-making procedures, institutional access 
(particularly with regard to Turkey), and burden sharing. There is an extensive literature dealing with these 
issues, three of the most insightful and informed discussions to be found in the publications of the WEU 
Institute: See Sloan, S. The United States and European Defence, Chaillot Papers, No. 39, April 2000; 
Howorth, J, European integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge, Chaillot Papers, No. 43, November 




The primary objective of this thesis has been to question the role played by WEU in the 
changing security environment from its birth in 1954 to its effective demise at the turn of 
the millennium. As a `full life' examination of the development of the institution, the thesis 
has sought to establish whether WEU's role has adapted over time and to explain the 
motivating factors behind functional changes in the context of altering national and 
structural imperatives. The main argument of the thesis has been that the WEU developed 
as a consequence of two strategic ̀ ideas' regarding the future security order for Europe, the 
first related to the requirements of collective defence and the second envisaging a broader 
collective order based on the closer union of European states. WEU development may be 
understood in terms of its contribution to these two `ideas' and it is this support role that 
has remained central and continuous. In addressing the question of how WEU has fulfilled 
this role, the thesis identifies that WEU managed a range of tensions that arose as a 
consequence of the lack of membership consensus on how the primary `ideas' should be 
developed. Whilst its dual support role remained extant throughout its existence, its 
specific functional development was responsive to these tensions, the resolution of which 
resulted in the WEU's eventual demise. 
Chapter 2 illustrates that WEU was born at the crossroads of the two `big ideas' of 
collective defence and European integration, the original Western Union debates 
demonstrating the prevalence of these perspectives in the thinking of the original planners. 
Whilst collective defence was seen as an immediate priority in the post-war period, `low 
politics' co-operation was seen as a means of providing broader based structural security, 
most significantly through economic development. As a single constituency for co- 
operation and with no broad integrative blueprint, these two ideas were seen as 
complementary elements of a new security order. That the ideas became unlinked was 
largely a product of the structural realities of the time. It was in the recognition of the 
inability of Europe to provide effectively for its own defence that an initial fault line was 
created with the establishment of a distinct transatlantic constituency for defence. At the 
same time, a lack of acceptance by the British of the integrative model, combined with 
French fears of untried supranationalism led to European integration taking the low politics 
route provisioned by the developing European Communities. As NATO became the 
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primary organisation of collective defence, and the European Communities became the 
seat of `progressive integration', WEU clearly established itself as a support to these two 
distinct constituencies as the primary organisations for the satisfaction of WEU's dual 
interests. The continuity in this purpose is evidenced by the declaratory statements of WEU 
over its lifetime; whilst the means of support were to change, the WEU consistently placed 
itself at the crossroads of these two interests. 
What emerges from the historical examination of WEU development is the extent to which 
there was a lack of shared perspective on what should be the nature and scope of 
integration and what were the requirements of and for alliance. That diverse national 
interests created tensions between states in their pursuit of their own `vision' of these 
arrangements is evidenced by the manner in which they sought to utilise WEU either to 
restrict or pursue activity in the primary organisations to satisfy national agendas. These 
institution-specific interests were also further complicated by the linkage between alliance 
and integration where activity in one arena impacted on the interests of the other. It has 
been the contention of many authors that WEU was caught in the `ebb and flow' of these 
two dynamics. The contribution of this thesis to the understanding of WEU's role has been 
in its `through life' examination of the manner in which states have sought to utilise the 
institution as a means of satisfying the tensions which have emerged as a product of these 
two dynamics and the resultant contribution of WEU to the management of the European 
security environment constituted by frequently conflicting interests. 
WEU's contribution to the establishment of an effective post-war security order for Europe 
was demonstrated in Chapter 2, which identified the central tensions mitigated by the 
establishment of WEU in 1954. Most evident amongst these were the lack of shared 
perspective on the nature of threat, the leadership role of the US in the alliance and the 
scope of European integration. In committing the UK to continental defence and instituting 
an arms control arrangement to manage future German military development, the WEU 
was to provide a compromise solution acceptable to all. Disappointed by the inability of 
European states to follow the federal path, the US accepted the defence benefits of a 
German contribution to NATO as an immediate solution to the collective defence 
requirements of the region in the light of the Soviet threat. The French, who had been 
driven down the path of defence integration by fears of an unacceptable alliance option for 
German inclusion, found the WEU option the least unacceptable path, in the face of the 
reality of dependency. For the British, their limited commitment to Europe had ensured the 
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continuing vitality of NATO as the primary instrument of defence, whilst potentially 
destabilising defence integration had been effectively removed from the European agenda. 
Nevertheless, the MBT's `token' commitment to the `progressive integration' of Europe, 
symbolic of a continuing European interest in collective action, was to provide for future 
integrative development unanticipated by the British architects of the new WEU. 
In its early years, the WEU sought to establish its role, given the division of high and low 
politics between the two primary institutions. The differing perspectives of European states 
on the preferred nature and scope of European integration, most particularly in terms of 
French resistance to British accession to the EEC, created one significant area of tension 
that was to impact on the WEU's development during the period from 1955 to 1973. 
Within NATO, pressures had developed as a consequence of the uneven nature of the 
alliance, issues of burden sharing combined with concerns amongst the Europeans 
regarding their lack of influence over NATO policy. British resistance to the development 
of any `competing' arrangement for European defence led to Council resistance to 
Assembly pressures for a more assertive role in the oversight of NATO activity. Whilst the 
WEU's arms control function was to provide the reassurance required by the Europeans, 
most particularly in relation to German rearmament, the national interest of independent 
states quickly undermined the ability of the WEU to implement effectively its arms control 
function. As tensions arose within the Alliance as a consequence of the limited influence of 
European states on US leadership within it, national priorities determined the development 
of conventional and nuclear capabilities almost regardless of commitments under the 
Brussels Treaty. Efforts to utilise WEU as a means of redressing the nuclear balance within 
the alliance through proposals for a European deterrent met with US resistance as they 
sought to maintain control over their wayward and dependent allies. Nonetheless, through 
providing for an articulation of European alliance concerns, it seems likely that the WEU 
was able to influence US thinking leading to some small level of European influence 
within the Nuclear Planning Group. As burden-sharing issues began to emerge within the 
alliance, the WEU did appear to offer the means for closer arms co-operation in support of 
efficient arms production. However, national and industrial interests conspired against too 
close a co-operation in this area, arms co-operation efforts through WEU being largely 
motivated by British concerns to undermine the Franco-German-Italian forum, over which 
it could have little influence. The WEU did provide a means of tying the FIG into the 
NATO framework and thus prevented any `competing' arrangement from emerging. 
French departure from the Integrated Command Structure of NATO in 1966 stifled any 
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further development of WEU as a vehicle for alliance management, particularly given the 
resistance of Britain to any developments in this area. Nevertheless, the Assembly did 
provide for parliamentary debate amongst the major European allies and, in including the 
French, contributed to European defence dialogue that could not take place in any other 
forum. 
It was the change in British attitudes to European economic integration that was to lead to 
British promotion of the WEU as a vehicle for dialogue between itself and the integrating 
Six. De Gaulle's rejection of British EEC accession on the grounds that the UK constituted 
a Trojan horse for American interests in Europe placed the French at odds with her 
European partners who sought to develop the political function of WEU as a means of 
levering the French into acceptance of British entry. The French resisted WEU 
development on the basis that it was too Anglo-Saxon in its approach to defence, and a tool 
of the British in terms of integration, arguing that the developing Community was the 
proper constituency for political co-operation. Nevertheless, the WEU did provide a bridge 
between the UK and the Six during the de Gaulle years and, by contributing to Franco- 
German rapprochement, not least through the resolution of the Saar problem, enabled some 
closer level of European co-operation to develop, whilst facilitating an enhanced UK 
connection to the continent. The accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973 resolved this 
particular tension between the French and the other Six members of WEU, with the 
political function of WEU being the casualty of this success in the process of building 
Europe. 
Given the disinclination of both the British and French to utilise WEU as a vehicle for 
defence co-operation, for the British because this might undermine NATO and for the 
French because it might enhance it, the lack of continued British interest in the WEU as an 
`engine' of integration led to its decline at the Ministerial level. Chapter 4 demonstrates 
that interest in revitalising WEU in the early 1980s was a response to heightened tension 
within both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. In the Alliance context, 
the unilateralism of the Reagan Administration had raised tensions between allies as 
European and American foreign policy perspectives diverged. Concerned, on the one 
hand, that the US might entangle Europe in unnecessary conflicts and on the other that US 
strategy may decouple the Europeans from their American ally, the Europeans sought a 
vehicle for articulating their concerns in order to influence American policy without further 
undermining Alliance cohesion. As Alliance relations became strained, developments 
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within the European Community framework had led to increased interest amongst some 
members in the establishment of a security dimension to European integration, as the 
logical next step in the construction of a powerful Europe. Resistance from both the neutral 
and Atlanticist states led to frustrations within the Community, as efforts to pursue 
European security co-operation produced limited results. 
Examination of the tensions emerging within alliance and community during the 1970s 
illustrates the dynamic behind the reactivation of WEU in 1984. The Rome and Platform 
Documents evidence the alliance concerns of Europeans, the agenda for dialogue being 
essentially those areas of contention between them and their US ally. Whilst being 
portrayed as a contribution to alliance management, demonstrating the commitment of 
Europeans to effective defence for the broader alliance, it was also clear that WEU 
revitalisation might contribute to a more assertive Europe that may find itself at odds with 
American leadership demands. The revitalised WEU was to strike a balance between these 
two positions, although the slow pace of the consequent development within WEU was a 
result of the concerns of the Atlanticist not to do anything to undermine US commitment. 
The WEU was also to satisfy the interests of Europeans, most notably the Germans and 
French, in developing some level of European security co-operation given the failure of the 
Community to 'deliver'. In providing a constituency of European states `serious' about 
defence, the WEU was an alternative vehicle for `high politics' co-operation, serving to 
take the pressure off the Community whilst constituting a `staging post' for a nascent 
European security dimension for the Community. For the British, WEU was to serve the 
diametric purpose of limiting Community development, by promoting an alternative 
multinational forum for `high politics' and one that would sit comfortably within the 
Alliance framework. What the discussion in Chapter 4 points up most clearly is the manner 
in which WEU could satisfy opposing interest, its development being the product of a 
convergence of ideas as to the method of achieving quite disparate and indeed 
contradictory objectives. Subsequently, during the revitalisation process, WEU was to 
represent both an enhanced contribution to the primary vehicle of collective defence, the 
NATO alliance, and an embryonic autonomous EDC. As a bridge between the Community 
and Alliance interests, the WEU provided for a wide span of possible interpretations of its 
nature. This enabled a compromise to be reached on the basis of subjective understanding 
of the implications of decisions reached. 
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The period following the end of the Cold War provided a range of new challenges and 
opportunities for the European institutions, broadening the security agenda and calling into 
question the continuing efficacy of the NATO alliance and the potential security role for an 
ascendant European Community. Whilst Europeans looked to the deepening of economic 
integration in order to facilitate enlargement and harness the power of a united Germany, 
the issue of a European security dimension for the emerging Union raised familiar 
tensions. Concerns regarding the potential de-linking of the US/European defence 
relationship as NATO's Post Cold-War relevance was questioned, coincided with an 
increased interest amongst Europeans to take a more assertive role in the management of 
European security issues. The perennial dilemma for the Atlanticists was how to provide 
an enhanced European contribution to alliance defence without undermining US 
commitment. For the Europeanists the issue was rather how to overcome the constraints on 
the development of a European security competence within the Community context. Once 
again, as the discussion in Chapter 5 illustrates, the WEU was to provide the vehicle for 
meeting a range of diverse interests regarding the scope of integration, the balance within 
the alliance and the nature of the relationship between the two. 
The Maastricht compromise had tied the WEU to the development of the Union by 
establishing it as an integral part of that Union and the `sub-contractor' for Europe's 
embryonic defence identity. Hence, WEU was to provide an external means of 
accommodating the interests of key players in the broadening of Europe's integrative 
scope, whilst providing sufficient distance to satisfy the concerns of the neutral states and 
the interests of the British in ensuring that European defence co-operation would be a 
contribution to the broader alliance. The examination of WEU's activity in the post- 
Maastricht period demonstrates the extent to which WEU was able to contribute to the 
resolution of central tensions that plagued the European security architecture. Most 
significantly, as an autonomous institution bridging the Union and the Alliance, WEU was 
able to demonstrate that European security and defence co-operation need not be at odds 
with Atlantic alliance interests. Through the development of its operational function, WEU 
provided an example of the potential contribution of a European defence capability for the 
resolution of common alliance concerns, whilst the possibility of European only operations 
in the management of European crises resonated with a US administration readdressing its 
foreign policy direction. The limitations on WEU operations helped to demonstrate the 
realities of Europe's continuing dependence on US capabilities and encouraged both a 
desire for greater capability (and less dependence) and a more pragmatic acceptance of the 
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limits of European defence aspirations, particularly for the French. Following acceptance 
of the CJTF concept, and the level of implied subordination of ESDI to the Alliance, a 
major hurdle to the development of a rebalanced Security architecture for Europe was 
overcome. Whilst the aspirations behind the continuing development of WEU's 
operational capabilities may have continued to differ, the desire for an enhanced European 
pillar of the alliance had become a common objective, at least in the short term. 
Amsterdam marked another significant step in the transition process, as the neutrals in the 
EU came to accept the WEU's Petersberg tasks as areas of EU competence, effectively 
separating defence from the remit of EU. WEU co-operation served to draw together the 
alliance and Europe in a symbiotic relationship, WEU acting as the conduit for this 
development. Drawing together the range of present and future EU and European NATO 
states through its differentiated memberships, WEU offered mechanisms for consultation, 
confidence building and practical co-operation which were to prove valuable experience 
both for the EU's crisis-management capability and for the future political and operational 
relationship between NATO and the EU. The shift in British policy following the launch in 
1998 of Blair's initiative, served to remove the final major hurdle to a CESDP as Britain 
came to accept the requirement for an autonomous European crisis-management capability, 
under the intergovernmental second pillar of the EU. As an effective pillar within the 
broader NATO alliance, British acceptance of a European defence competence signified 
the resolution of the final major tension obstructing the transition of the European security 
order and consequently spelt the end of WEU. 
From the historical examination of WEU's development a number of conclusions 
regarding the role of WEU and the means by which it was able to conduct this role may be 
drawn. 
Firstly, the WEU established itself as a support institution with the dual role of promoting 
European integration and the Atlantic Alliance. That WEU was not seen as the primary 
organisation for satisfying integrative or alliance interests is evident in its treaty provisions 
and formal declaratory statements as well as in its subsequent activities and institutional 
development. In assessing the WEU as a `secondary' organisation, the significance of its 
role should not, however, be underestimated. The maintenance of an effective European 
security order required the efficient functioning of the primary organisations for defence 
and integration and the significance of WEU's contribution to the well being of these 
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organisations has been demonstrated throughout its `shadowy' existence. It is thus 
inappropriate to judge WEU's successes in terms of the maintenance and development of 
its own functional activity. As WEU was to evolve and devolve its functions according to 
the requirements of the system, its devolution of certain functions may represent a rational 
response to the requirements of its dual support function, as exampled by its transference 
of it cultural responsibilities to the Council of Europe, or its support of the IEPG as a more 
efficient vehicle for arms co-operation. This is most evident, of course, during the WEU's 
final years, where its dual role led to the promotion of activity that would inevitably result 
in its own demise. 
The lack of a clear vision of the nature of the WEU's support role is evidenced by an 
associated lack of agreement on the functional direction of WEU development. As states 
pursued different agendas in terms of the European construction process and the Atlantic 
Alliance, the WEU remained essentially responsive to the requirements of managing these 
two dynamics. WEU's ad hocism in terms of its functional development may be seen as an 
advantage in that it proved itself sufficiently adaptable, given its broad mandate, to satisfy 
a range of situational and changing interests over time. 
That there was a need for a support mechanism for alliance and integration is evidenced by 
the examination of WEU in its historical context. WEU's contribution to the European 
security order was essentially in managing areas of tension between states that emerged in 
terms of their attitude to these two dynamics. Whilst the tensions lay essentially in the 
diverse perceptions of individual states of the desired nature and scope of integration and 
alliance, particular issues emerged over time that raised the level of tension to an extent 
that threatened to undermine the primary organisations. This thesis does not attempt an 
explanation of the foreign policy approaches of individual states, nor does it attempt to 
explain the complex system of intergovernmental bargaining that leads to international 
agreement, but it does serve to point up the complexity of the environment in which system 
changes impact on national preferences. Consequently, as the European Community 
evolved and dependence on the US declined, changes in the threat environment created 
new tensions to those evident in the immediate post-war period. Whilst keeping the US 
engaged may have been one of the consistent themes of WEU activity, the decline in the 
acceptance of dependency led to a rise in concerns regarding the `competitive' nature of 
European developments and efforts to utilise the WEU as the means of smoothing the 
water between the European and Transatlantic processes. Examining WEU development 
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within the changing structural environment from post-War to Cold War to post-Cold War 
demonstrates that national attitudes toward the altering threat environment combined with 
relative power shifts in the system to influence national perceptions of interests. 
Consequently, any single level explanation of WEU development would be flawed. 
WEU provided a vehicle for the management of tensions as a consequence of its 
membership and broad mandate. Containing the key European players and providing for 
broad ranging activity, the WEU provided a focus for action that could not be conducted in 
either of the primary organisations. It allowed for intergovernmental decision-making on 
areas including defence and, in excluding the US and the European neutrals, enabled co- 
operation over issues that would not compromise either of the primary organisations. WEU 
functional development frequently represented both the lowest common denominator and 
the highest point of compromise as states sought both to promote and prevent activity 
taking place elsewhere which might impact on the primary institutions. Examination of the 
WEU's operational development may be seen as a response in part to the less favoured 
NATO out of area proposals of the 1980s and to the Franco-German defence relationship 
of the 1990s. By offering some level of co-operation within WEU, an acceptable 
compromise could be reached, resulting in incremental change acceptable to all. In this 
way, WEU prevented stagnation or regression in the primary organisations, whilst enabling 
a staged development of function that was to provide the example for future primary 
organisational development. 
What is clear throughout the examination of WEU's development is that its real strength 
lay in the ambiguity of the organisation, consequent upon its dual support role. Essentially 
the WEU was a chimera, states seeking to identify with it in terms of their own preferences 
for the development of the security structures of Europe. It is true that `negative' 
perceptions led to a resistance to its use during the 1970s, the French seeing it as an 
Atlanticist organisation and the British believing it to be a vehicle with Europeanist 
pretensions. However, the ambiguity of the organisation, serving as it did both integrative 
and alliance interests, enabled the institution to provide for a convergence of interests in 
terms of activity, despite the inherent contradictions in the nationally sought objectives. 
Consequently, whilst the French could promote WEU development from the 1980s as a 
contribution to European integration, the British sought to utilise it as a means of 
restricting the widening of the integrative process to defence. The subjective lens through 
which the WEU was perceived enabled the French to identify WEU as the embryo of a 
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developing European defence identity, whilst for the British it remained a tool of alliance 
management. That WEU could be all things to all people enabled a compromise to be 
reached which resulted in the incremental undermining of tensions between various 
interests as essentially unintended convergence resulted in positive developments for all. 
Through the historical examination of the full-life development of WEU this thesis has 
contributed to the understanding of the complex interaction of interests that have 
constituted the European security agenda since the War. The WEU's role in managing 
these tensions has been significant. As a support organisation, developed in response to the 
changing needs of the system, WEU contributed to the establishment of the European post- 
War security order, and facilitated the transition of this order to meet the challenges of 
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